


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**THE EARLY MUSLIM EXPANSION IN SOUTH INDIA**



# THE EARLY MUSLIM EXPANSION IN SOUTH INDIA

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## PREFACE

This monograph presents the results of my investigation of the circumstances under which the great Hindu empire of Vijayanagara came to be established. The first half of the 14th century A.D. is a period of unparalleled interest in the history of South India. The four Hindu monarchies which arose from the ruins of the Cōḷa and Cālukya empires, perished in their attempt to check the advance of Islam; and were practically incorporated with the Muslim empire of Dehli embracing the whole country. This in its turn fell after a brief spell of glory yielding place in South India to several small independent kingdoms which ultimately merged into the Vijayanagara Empire. An attempt is made in the following pages to trace the course of the history of South India during this eventful period of a few decades with the help of material gathered from the Hindu as well as the Muslim sources. The most important of the latter is, no doubt, 'Iṣāmy's *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, a work of considerable value to the students of Hindu-Muslim history. Scarcely less important are the copper-plate charters of the Musunūri chiefs and the Redḍi kings of Kondaviḍu and Rajahmundry brought into light in recent years; these present a vivid picture of the Muslim rule and of the birth of the Āndhra National League which roused the patriotic feelings of the Southern Hindus, and emancipated them from their thralldom to Islam. These records dispel the mist of uncertainty and enable us to see clearly the trend of events during these momentous decades.

It would not have been possible to bring the investigation undertaken here to a successful conclusion without the willing co-operation of scholars interested in South Indian history. Rao Bahadur C.R. Krishnamacharlu, B.A., Superintendent for Epigraphy, Southern Circle (now Government Epigraphist for India) granted me permission to consult the invaluable epigraphic records collected by his department. Mr. Sayyid Usha, B.A., Lecturer in Persian, University of Madras, rendered me help in ways far too numerous to mention. I acknowledge with gratitude their ungrudging help. My thanks are also due to Mr. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, M.A., Professor of Indian History and Archaeology, and Mr. S. Narasimha Iyengar, M.A., L.T., Assistant Professor of English, Presidency College, Madras, for revising my manuscript, reading the

proofs and offering valuable criticisms and suggestions, and to Mr. S. Muthuswami, M.A., who took upon himself the laborious task of compiling the index.


I offer my thanks to the Syndicate of the University of Madras for sanctioning the publication of this work in the University Historical Series and to Mr. G. Srinivasachari, the Proprietor of the G. S. Press, for the speedy and excellent manner in which he executed the printing of this work.

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N. VENKATARAMANYYA.

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## CHAPTER I

### THE FOUR HINDU KINGDOMS

At the close of the thirteenth century of the Christian era Deccan and South India were under the sway of four great Hindu dynasties, the Sēuṇas, the Kākatiyas, the Hoysalas and the Pāṇdyas. The first three dynasties partitioned among themselves the erstwhile dominions of the Cālukyas of Kalyāṇi, and the last appropriated the major part of the Cōḷa empire.

The Sēuṇas, like their southern neighbours, the Hoysalas, derive the origin of their family from the legendary clan of the Yādavas. They are generally spoken of by the historians as the Yādavas of Dēvagiri, probably with a view to keep their identity distinct from that of the Hoysalas who are also referred to occasionally as the Yādavas of Dwārasamudra. During the palmy days of Singhaṇa, the greatest king of the dynasty, the Sēuṇa authority extended over the whole of Western Deccan, comprising Mahārāṣṭra, Northern Konkan including the districts of North Kanara, Belgaum, Bijapur, Dharwar, Bellary, and portions of the south-western Telugu country.

To the east of the Sēuṇa territory lay the kingdom of the Kākatiyas. The Kākatiya monarchs claimed descent from the Sun and counted the great Cōḷa king, Karikāla, among their ancestors. During the days of Gaṇapati and his successors, the Kākatiya kingdom reached its widest extent, comprising the whole of the Telugu country, excepting Chittore, and portions of Anantapur and Bellary districts. Its frontier reached Kāñcī in the south; on the west it passed close to Anegondi along an imaginary straight line touching Raichur and Gulbarga in the Hyderabad State; then it inclined towards Kalyāṇi in the north-east; and passing through that ancient city, it turned to the east and touched the Bay of Bengal somewhere in the Ganjam district in Southern Orissa.

The later Kākatiya sovereigns held sway practically over the whole extent of the Telugu country.

The Hoysala kingdom was situated on the southern frontier of the Sēūṇas. It embraced during the reigns of Narasimha II and Sōmēśvara the whole of the present Mysore State, the two Arcots, Trichinopoly, Salem, Coimbatore, and portions of Anantapur and Bellary districts. In the last quarter of the thirteenth century, the Hoysalas lost their hold on the Tamil country owing to the expansion of the Pāṇḍyas. At the time of the first Mussalman inroad into Deccan, their authority was confined to the present Mysore country.

With the reign of Kulōttunga III (1178-1216 A.D.) the hegemony of the Cōlas came to an end. During the reigns of his successors, the Cōla country fell a prey to the ambitious designs of the neighbouring monarchs. At first it came under the sway of the Hoysalas, but after the death of Sōmēśvara in 1257 A.D., the Pāṇḍyas pushed them aside and stepped into their place. Though Jaṭāvarman Sundara Pāṇḍya I (A.D. 1251-1269) carried his victorious arms as far north as Nellore and even beyond, the Hoysala power still lingered in the Cōla country up to 1280 A.D., when Māra-varman Kulasēkhara I subdued it together with the two Kongus and finally expelled Rāmanātha, the son and successor of Sōmēśvara, from the land of the Tamils. The Pāṇḍyan kingdom was at the height of its glory and power at the time when Marco Polo visited South India; but after the assassination of Kulasēkharadēva in 1310 A.D., the Pāṇḍyan power rapidly declined on account of the fratricidal war that plunged the country into confusion.

#### *Inter-State relations.*

These four kingdoms knew no peace; they were constantly at war with one another, each trying to absorb as much of its neighbour's territory as it could assimilate. The principles of political science which found favour with the monarchs and the politicians encouraged the growth of international insecurity. They firmly believed in the doctrine that might and right went together. The

Sēuṇas were continuously engaged in war with the Hoysalas on the one hand and the Kākatīyas on the other.

The struggle between the Sēuṇas and the Hoysalas began in 1191 A.D., when Ballāḷa II invaded Kuntala, and having inflicted a crushing defeat on the Sēuṇa king Bhīllama at Soratūr, made himself master of the country. The Sēuṇas, however, did not accept the verdict of the battle as final. Twenty years after the disastrous battle of Soratūr, Bhīllama's grandson Singhaṇa attacked Ballāḷa II, and not only expelled him from almost the whole of Kuntala but subjugated a substantial part of the Hoysala kingdom itself. No attempt appears to have been made by the Hoysalas to reconquer the lost territory until 1236 A.D., when Sōmēśvara led an expedition into the interior of the Sēuṇa kingdom and penetrated as far as Paṇḍharpūr in the Sholapur district of the Bombay Presidency. This expedition did not bear any fruit; and the Sēuṇas still retained in their possession the territory which Singhaṇa wrested from the Hoysalas. The death of Sōmēśvara and the feebleness of his successors encouraged the Sēuṇa kings to invade the Hoysala kingdom frequently. Kṛṣṇa Kandhāra, the successor of Singhaṇa, is said to have been engaged in hostilities with Sōmēśvara, although no definite information is available about any engagement that might have taken place. It was, however, during the time of the successors of Kṛṣṇa Kandhāra that the Hoysalas suffered the worst humiliation. Under Mahādēva and Rāmacandra, the intrepid general, Sāḷuva Tikkama, led the Sēuṇa armies twice into the heart of the Hoysala territories and carried fire and sword to the gates of Dwārasamudra. Rāmanātha, seems to have retaliated by invading the Sēuṇa dominions in 1275-6 A.D.<sup>1</sup> It was not, however, until the early years of the reign of Ballāḷa III that the Hoysalas were able to check the Sēuṇa aggressions. Ballāḷa took advantage of the disorders caused in the Yādava kingdom by the invasion of 'Alā-ud-Dīn Khalji in 1296 A.D.; he attacked Śāntalige Thousand in 1299 A.D.; and invaded

the province of Banavāsi in 1300 A.D. Rāmacandra mustered his forces, and marched to his southern frontier to oppose Ballāla III. The advance of the Sēuṇa king did not restore the peace of the frontier, as neither side could secure a decided advantage over the other. The rise of Kampilidēva in Doravāḍi, and the appearance of the Muhammadan armies under Malik Kāfūr put an end to Ballāla's designs on the Yādava territories; Rāmacandra is said to have issued special instructions to his *daḷavāy* Paraśurāmadēva to lead Malik Kāfūr and his legions to Dwārasamudra.<sup>2</sup>

The relations between the Sēuṇas and their eastern neighbours, the Kākatiyas, were not more amicable. The hostility between the two dynasties commenced in the closing years of the 12th century. Jaitugi, the son of Bhillama, came into conflict with Kākati Rudra about 1195 A.D.; he claims to have killed Rudra and seized his kingdom.<sup>3</sup> It was probably on this occasion that Rudra's nephew and heir, Gaṇapati, was carried away as prisoner of war. Mahādēva, who succeeded his brother Rudra on the throne of Hanumakoṇḍa, died after a brief rule of three years. On his death, his son Gaṇapati, who was set at liberty, by the Sēuṇas, succeeded him.

2. *Origin of the City and the Empire of Vijayanagara*, pp. 69-78.

3. K. V. Subrahmanya Iyer thinks (*Ancient Deccan*, p. 281) that the hostilities between the two dynasties commenced with Rudra's attack upon the Sēuṇa chief Mallugi whom he identifies with Mailagidēva, one of the enemies defeated by Rudra as mentioned in the Hanumakoṇḍa inscription (IA. xi. pp. 9ff.). This identification has been questioned in recent years. M. Rama Rao points out that the enemies whom Rudra defeated were chiefs who held sway over the districts in the neighbourhood of Hanumakoṇḍa; and that it is more reasonable to identify Mailagidēva with a chief of that name ruling at Polavāsa (the modern Polāsa in the Karimnagar district of the Hyderabad State) than with Mallugi, the Sēuṇa King. (*Kākatiya Sañcika*, p. 26). Therefore, it cannot be definitely asserted that the struggle between the Kākatiyas and the Sēuṇas began as early as the reign of Mallugi.

Gaṇapati was a powerful king; he seems to have maintained his own, notwithstanding the claim of Singhaṇa, his contemporary on the Yādava throne, that he defeated the Āndhras.<sup>4</sup> After Singhaṇa's death in 1246 A.D., Gaṇapati seems to have subjugated a large part of the south-western Āndhra country which was under the rule of Yādavas. It may be stated in this connection that during the reign of Singhaṇa, the Sēuṇa rule extended almost over the whole of the western Telugu country, as testified by his inscriptions in Raichur, Bellary,<sup>5</sup> Anantapur,<sup>6</sup> Kurnool<sup>7</sup> and Cuddapah<sup>8</sup> districts. His generals were frequently at war with Tikka I, the Telugu Cōḷa king of Nellore.<sup>9</sup> It is not unlikely that his power was recognized in the Nalgonda district of the Hyderabad State;<sup>10</sup> but no trace of the rule of the successors of Singhaṇa is found in the Cuddapah and Kurnool districts and inscriptions bear ample testimony to the existence of the Kākatiya rule in this region.

The death of Gaṇapati and the accession of his daughter Rudrāmbā encouraged the ambitious Sēuṇa monarch Mahādēva to invade Telingāṇa.<sup>11</sup> Victory is claimed by both the sides; and it is

4. EC, viii, Sb. 135.

5. 498 of 1915.

6. VR., i, Ap. 66; 345 of 1920.

7. VR., ii., Kl., 221.

8. Mack Mss., 15-2-53, p. 136.

9. *Nīrvacanōttara Rāmāyaṇam*, I.31;  
*Daśakumāracaritram*, I.16, 79.

10. A branch of the Sēuṇas closely allied to the ruling family at Dēva-giri was in possession of Pānugal in Nalgonda district (*Telingāṇa Ins.* [Kākatiya] No. 35). They held the place as the subordinates of Rudrāmbā and Pratāparudra. They must have established themselves in this region, when it was under the Sēuṇa rule. They seem to have preferred to remain in the district even after its subjection by Gaṇapati.

11. Bhandarkar: *History of the Deccan*, pp. 198-9;  
*Kākatiya Sañcika*, p. 59.

not possible to know at this distance of time what actually took place. The last decade of the 13th century A.D. witnessed the final phase of the struggle, when a determined effort seems to have been made to eject the Sēuṇas from the Telugu country. Viṭṭhalanātha, lieutenant of Gōṇa Gannā Redḍi, an officer of Pratāparudra, led an expedition into Kuntala, and captured from the officers of the Sēuṇa king Rāmacandra, the forts of Ādevāni, Tumbūḷam, Mānuva and Hāluva; and having proceeded against Rāicūr captured the place in 1295 A.D. This was no punitive raid, but a campaign undertaken for the permanent subjugation of the district; for Viṭṭhala declares that he captured the forts of Ādevāni, Tumbūḷam, Mānuva and Hāluva; entered the fort of Rāicūr in 1295 A.D., and constructed a 'stone fort' (in the place of a mud one) for the protection of all the kingdom and the people.<sup>12</sup> The territory remained under the Kākatiyas until the dynasty was subverted by Ulugh Khān in 1323 A.D.

Notwithstanding the frequent wars in which they were engaged with the Sēuṇas, the Kākatiyas showed little inclination to allow their neighbours in other quarters to remain in peace. They found time to give constant trouble to the Tamil chiefs and kings across their southern border. The Cōḷa monarchy was in the last stages of dissolution. Petty chiefs who owed allegiance to the Cōḷa throne became practically independent; subordinate kings who had been paying tribute declared their independence; and foreign invaders found the time most suitable for prosecuting wars of aggression. Encouraged by the political confusion obtaining in the Tamil country, and probably requested by the Cōḷa king or one of his subordinates to intervene on his behalf, Gaṇapati sent an army under one of his officers, Sāmanta Bhōja, in 1249 A.D. to the south. Bhōja executed the task entrusted to him successfully; he led the Kākatiya armies to Kāñci and captured the city.<sup>13</sup> This brought the Kākati-

12. J.T.A., vi, pp. 36-8.

13. IA, XXI, pp. 200-201. What induced Gaṇapati to interfere in the affairs of the Tamil country is not known. It is not unlikely that he

yas naturally into conflict with the Tamil powers, who resented their intrusion and endeavoured to expel them from their land. The Pāṇḍyan king, Jaṭavarman Sundara Pāṇḍya who ascended the throne in A.D. 1251 was a powerful warrior; and within a few years of his accession, he made himself the master of the east coast from the Cape Comorin to Nellore. He overthrew the Hoysala armies and killed Vira Sōmēśvara in 1257 A.D.;<sup>14</sup> he subdued the Cōḷa country, and compelled the Cōḷa subordinates who declared independence to submit to him. Having consolidated his conquests, he advanced upon Kāñcī in 1257 A.D., killed Gaṇḍagōpala and occupied the city. The capture of Kāñcī involved Jaṭavarman Sundara Pāṇḍya in a war with the Kākatiyas; for, Gaṇapati became by this time the overlord of the Telugu Cōḷa princes of Nellore to whom the city then belonged. Jaṭavarman Sundara Pāṇḍya did not await the arrival of the Kākatiya forces at Kāñcī, but carried the warfare into the enemy's territory. At the head of a large army, he march-

sent Sāmanta Bhōja to expel the Hoysalas from Kāñcī which was included in the dominions of the Telugu Cōḷas of Nellore at this time. Tikka I, the opponent of Hoysala Sōmēśvara, was ruling at Kāñcī in 1243 A.D. (NDI. i. p. 206); he seems to have died in the next year; and Sōmēśvara appears to have attacked Kāñcī, taking advantage of the death of his old enemy. To ward off Sōmēśvara's attack, Tikka's son, Manuma-siddha II probably appealed to Gaṇapati for his help; and the latter readily responded to the call by despatching an army. Several Kākatiya officers and nobles bear the significant title of *Appaya-Gōpaya diśāpaṭṭa*. It means that the bearer of the title or one of his ancestors put to flight Appaya Gōpaya, i.e., Gōpaya, the son of Appaya. The only Appaya Gōpaya who is known to have flourished during this period is Gōpaya Daṇḍanāyaka, son of Appaya Daṇḍanāyaka who commanded Sōmēśvara's armies in the Tamil country. (616 of 1919). The title *Appaya-Gōpaya diśāpaṭṭa* indicates that the Kākatiya nobles and generals came into conflict with Appaya Gōpaya; and as the only region where they could have fought with him is the Tamil country in the neighbourhood of Kāñcī, it is not unlikely that this happened during Sāmanta Bhōja's expedition.

14. A. Krishnamurti: *Hoysalas* (unpublished).



ed to Kāñcī and occupied it. Ravivarman's expedition did not, however, produce permanent results, as he was obliged to return to his own country almost immediately on account of the arrival of Sulṭān Mubārak Shāh of Dehli with his armies in Deccan. The Pāṇḍyas, no doubt, reoccupied the city; but they could not remain there long as they had to face a fresh enemy from the north. The Kākatiya king, Pratāparudra, having discovered that the opportunity for re-establishing Telugu authority at Kāñcī was favourable, moved southwards with all his forces. He subjugated the petty chiefs that held sway over the borderland, and having overthrown in a battle the Pāṇḍyan army that opposed him in the neighbourhood of Kāñcī, captured the city.<sup>19</sup> Then he proceeded into the interior of the Pāṇḍyan kingdom, defeated the Śambavarāya and also king Ballāla whom he seems to have met somewhere in the Tamil country,<sup>20</sup> and finally advanced as far as Jambukēśvaram near Trichinopoly.<sup>21</sup> Having thus demonstrated his military power, Pratāparudra returned to his capital; and his authority over Kāñcī and its neighbourhood was not questioned until the end of his reign a few years later.

The Hoysalas showed as little inclination as their neighbours to keep within the limits of their kingdom. Their feud with the Yādavas of Dēvagiri has already been noticed; but the Yādavas were not the only people with whom they fought. They had early and intimate relations with the Tamil powers in the south. The active Hoysala intervention in the affairs of the Tamil country began with the reign of Narasimha II who first entered the Cōla kingdom about 1220 A.D., ostensibly with the object of helping the feeble Cōla monarch Rājarāja III. He found the Cōla country so attractive that he established himself at Kaṇṇanūr in the neighbourhood

19. *Velugōṭivārivamsāvali*, 35-37. EL. vii, p. 131; *Śivayōgasāram*, Kākatiya Sañcika, App. p. 16.

20. Mack. Mss. 15.4.4. p. 37. Pedda Rudra's Inscription at Drākṣārāmam (JOR, XII, pp. 213-16).

21. IA, XXI, p. 200.

of Srīrangam in the Trichinopoly district and substituted his rule for that of his ally whom he came to assist. This involved him in a series of wars with the Cōḷa feudatories on the one hand and the Pāṇḍyas on the other. Sōmēśvara, the son and successor of Nara-simha II, left the administration of his possessions in Karṇāṭaka in the hands of his ministers, and devoted all his time for consolidating his power in the Tamil country. He so far succeeded in achieving his object that for nearly two decades he virtually became the controller of the destinies of South Indian princes. The accession of Jaṭāvarman Sundara Pāṇḍya to the throne of Madura tolled the death knell of the Hoysala power in the Kāvērī delta. Jaṭāvarman attacked Sōmēśvara, defeated his armies and put him to death. The defeat and death of Sōmēśvara did not result in the immediate expulsion of Hoysalas from the south; for, Sōmēśvara's son Rāma-nātha, continued to rule the Tamil possessions of his family for well over two decades after his father's demise, although he was ultimately forced to relinquish his hold upon them by Māravarman Kulaśēkhara about 1280 A.D.

The Hoysalas had to remain content with their ancestral territories in Karṇāṭaka for the next thirty years, as the continued rule of the powerful Māravarman Kulaśēkhara rendered the expansion of their territory in the south impossible. The assassination of Kulaśēkhara in 1310 A.D. followed by the outbreak of a civil war between his sons, however, opened the flood-gates of foreign invasion. Ballāḷa III was the first to take advantage of the altered situation; he entered into an alliance with one of the sons of Kulaśēkhara, and was marching towards the Pāṇḍyan dominions when his progress was arrested by the sudden appearance of Malik Kāfūr with the Dehli armies in his rear; but soon after the retirement of the Muhammadan armies he returned, for Pratāparudra's generals came into conflict with him, as noticed already, in some part of the Tamil country in 1317 A.D.<sup>22</sup> His activity in the Tamil country

22. *Mack. Mss.* 15.4.4. p. 37; *JOR.*, XII, p. 214.  
*EC.*, IX, Cp. 73; *MAR.*, 1916, p. 55;  
*EC.*, XII, Ck. 4.

from 1318 to 1343 A.D., when he lost his life in a war with the Sultān of Madura, is very well attested by his inscriptions as well as the accounts of the foreign travellers. Ballāla III never gave peace to the unhappy inhabitants of the Kāvērī delta.

The relations of Ballāla III with his neighbours on his eastern frontier were not more friendly. He subdued the ancient Telugu Cōla principality of Niḍugal sometime before 1306 A.D., and annexed it to his kingdom.<sup>23</sup> He waged fruitless wars with Kampilidēva and his son Rāmanātha in a vain attempt to bring their territories under subjection.<sup>24</sup> His attempts along the west coast, however, were completely successful. He waged war upon the Ālupa chiefs of Bārakūr and forced them to submit to his authority.<sup>25</sup>

The brief account of the inter-state relations in South India during the 13th and the early 14th centuries of the Christian era, given in the foregoing pages, indicates the unsettled state of the peninsula on the eve of the Mussalman invasions. To add to the confusion caused by the conflicting ambitions of the rival dynasties, the pugnacious activity of religious reformers and sectarian leaders divided the people into sects frequently hostile to one another. The thirteenth century was a period of intense religious activity. It was an age when Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism, the two dominant creeds of Hinduism, not only set on foot an organized campaign of extermination against heretical faiths but made strenuous efforts to establish their supremacy over each other. Vīra Śaivism, which arose in the last quarter of the 12th century A.D., swept over the Telugu and Kannada countries like a fierce tornado rooting out older faiths and institutions which found favour for centuries with the people; but, as Vaiṣṇavism stood its ground firmly, a conflict arose between the two creeds which brought discord into the social life even of the common people. The bitterness with

23. *Origin of the City and the Empire of Vijayanagara*, pp. 75ff.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 82ff.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

which the controversy was carried on by people on either side filled the minds of sober and thoughtful men with apprehension. They vainly attempted to reconcile the rival sects by propagating the creed of Harihara. The earliest thinker who, during this period, endeavoured to provide a common meeting ground to the Śaivas as well as the Vaiṣṇavas was the poet Tikkana, a minister of Manumasiddha II, the Telugu Cōla king of Nellore. He attempted to impress on the minds of his contemporaries that there was but one supreme deity, who was neither Viṣṇu nor Śiva, but Harihara, a deity in whom both Śiva and Viṣṇu were united. But Tikkana's attempt does not seem to have borne fruit; for, the theologians of the opposing faiths still wrangled and fought; and created a feeling of disgust in the minds of enlightened men. Nearly a century after Tikkana's death, Nācana Sōma, who found them still indulging in their old pastime, denounced their blind stupidity in upholding Viṣṇu or Śiva as the sole arbiter of the universe. Such was the condition of South India on the eve of the Muhammadan invasions. The interminable dynastic wars, and the religious factions which promoted political and social disintegration reduced the vitality of the nation, and paved the way for foreign conquest.

## CHAPTER II

### THE KHALJIS, 'ALĀ-UD-DĪN

#### SECTION 1

##### *First Invasion of Dēvagiri*

Although the Mussalman power was firmly established in Northern India since the days of Muḥammad of Gh̄h̄r, no attempt was made by the Muslim monarchs to extend their sway over the Deccan and the extreme south of the peninsula until the closing years of the 13th century A.D., when Garshāsp Malik, the nephew and the son-in-law of Sultān Jalāl-ud-Dīn, made a sudden attack upon Dēvagiri, the capital of the Sēuṇa kingdom. Garshāsp Malik's descent upon Deccan was not the result of an organised scheme of conquest set on foot by the Sultān of Dehli. It was in the nature of a private enterprise planned stealthily by Garshāsp for his own advantage. The daughter of the Sultān who was married to him held him in little esteem; and she received considerable encouragement from her mother, Malikah-i-Jahān, to keep up this attitude. Garshāsp's sensitive nature rebelled against this domestic tyranny. He wanted to gain his freedom by putting his wife to death; but that act would involve him in troubles which it would not have been possible for him to overcome under the circumstances. He should gather sufficient strength to oppose the Sultān and his sons before he could think of punishing his wife for her insolent conduct. Therefore, he resolved to lead an expedition suddenly, without attracting the attention of the government, against Dēvagiri and exact sufficient money from its king so that

he might proceed against Dehli and deal with his wife as she deserved and defy her relations.<sup>1</sup>

Garshāsp made preparations for carrying out his enterprise with great caution. He obtained from the Sultān permission to delay the payment of tribute for the 'iqṭā', and sanction to lead an expedition against the fort of Chāndēri in Mālwa which was intended to serve as a blind to hide his real purpose.<sup>2</sup> He despatched spies to the kingdom of Dēvagiri to ascertain the proper time when he could take its ruler at a disadvantage during the absence of his army from the capital.<sup>3</sup> He gathered together three or four

1. 'Iṣāmy: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*: p. 222.

Baranī states that 'Alā-ud-Dīn was so troubled by his wife and mother-in-law that he wanted to conquer some country wherein he might stay and never return home.' (E.D. iii, p. 149). Nizām-ud-Dīn Aḥmad (*Ṭabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, Eng. Tr. Vol. I, p. 144) and others repeat this statement. But 'Iṣāmy makes it appear that he had no such intentions. He declares explicitly that Garshāsp Malik (i.e., 'Alā-ud-Dīn) wanted to return from Dēvgiri to Dehli laden with wealth.

کجا مال و کو پهل و کو لشکر  
\*

وگر خود سپاهي به دهلي برم  
\*

به صد بار مي بايدش پيختن  
\*

يکي حيله مي بايد انگيختن  
\*

کنم رنج همراہ خود یک دو ماہ  
کنم راغي آن بوم و بر را اسير  
\*

کز ايدر برانم یکا یک سپاہ  
کشم ناگران سر سوي ديو گهر  
\*

که شد گنجرا کھر رنجرا  
به خا مي نگيرد خرد دامم

ازان ملک گهرم بسے گنجرا  
وزان پس اگر قصد دهلي کنم  
*Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, pp. 221-2.

2. Baranī E. D., iii. pp. 148-9.

3. Wassāf, E. D., iii, p. 40.

thousand horse and two thousand foot; assigned to each soldier his place; and provided them carefully with the necessary equipment.<sup>4</sup> Having completed his preparations, he set out from Kara on Saturday 19th Rabi'ul-Ākhar 695 A.H. (Feb. 26 A.D. 1296),<sup>5</sup> and advanced rapidly towards the kingdom of Dēvagiri. He pitched his camp at the end of every march in a wood or deserted place. The progress of his expedition was unhindered, until he reached Lāchūra which appears to have been the northernmost district of the kingdom of Dēvagiri. As soon as the news of the arrival of Turkish invaders in his district reached Kānhā, the governor of Lāchūra, he hastened to Dēvagiri to inform his master Rāmadēva of the danger threatening the peace of his dominions. Rāmadēva was in the capital, although the army had gone with his son Bhillama (or Sangama according to some historians) to a distant part of his kingdom on some expedition.<sup>6</sup> On hearing the intelligence of the arrival of the Mussalman invasion, Rāmadēva hastily collected such forces as he could gather and sent them

4. Baranī, E. D., iii, p. 149. 'Iṣāmy mentions only the horse:—

شہیدم ازان عرض جنگی سوار  
 هزاری سہ چار آمد اندر شمار  
*Futūh-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 222.

Ferishta, however, states that 'Alā-ud-Dīn marched with 8000 chosen horse against Rāmdēva (Briggs, *Ferishta* i, p. 304).

5. *Khusrau*: (*Khazā'in-ul-Futūh*) JIH, viii, p. 238.

6. Baranī (E.D. iii. p. 150) and Iṣāmy (*Futūh-us-Salāṭīn* pp. 226-27) state that Rāmadēva was in his capital at that time; their statement is corroborated by the author of *Mulḥiqāt* (Briggs, *Ferishta*, I. p. 305) Nizām-ud-Dīn Aḥmad and Ferishta declare that Rāmadēva had also accompanied the army, but returned to the capital on receiving the news of the arrival of the invaders. *Ṭabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, Eng. Tr. Vol. I, p. 145; Briggs, *Ferishta* I, p. 305).

under the command of one of his *rāṇas*, probably Kānhā himself, to obstruct the passage of the enemy at the Ghāt of Lāchūra.<sup>7</sup>

Kānhā returned to his district with the army; he also received help from an unexpected quarter. Two women, who were probably the rulers of the principalities in Konkan, marched with their forces to strengthen the royal army as soon as they came to know of the arrival of the Turks. Kānhā opposed the invaders in the neighbourhood of Lāchūra, and attempted to check their progress.

When the Turks came near Lāchūra, Kānhā drew up his forces and barred their path. An engagement took place. The two brave Hindu women who were like tigresses on the battle-field attacked the Turkish army fiercely, thereby exciting the admiration of their foes. Nevertheless, the Turks defeated the Hindus and put most of them to death. During the battle, Kānhā and the two women were taken prisoners, though they fought ever so well.<sup>8</sup>

7. Baranī E. D., iii, pp. 149-50. 'Iṣāmy, an earlier writer, who describes the events connected with this expedition at great length, attributes an unreasonable conduct to Rāmadēva. It is said that when Kānhā informed Rāmadēva that Turks invaded his kingdom, he did not believe him. Instead of sending troops to help Kānhā he is said to have ridiculed him and sent him away. (*Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, pp. 223-4). Notwithstanding the authoritative character of 'Iṣāmy's work, it is hard to believe that Rāmadēva was so over-confident of the inaccessibility of his kingdom as to discredit Kānhā's information.

8. 'Iṣāmy: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, pp. 224-25.

قوي چست بودند در کار زار	هنیدم دو عورت دران روزگار
به کا نها رسیدند هر دو مدد	هنیدند چون ترک بگذشت حد
به روز و غا هر یکی کینه خواہ	به دنبال هر یک فراوان سپاہ
*	*

Garshāsp Malik next proceeded to the city of Kaṭaka,<sup>9</sup> which he sacked. Rāmādēva was greatly alarmed, as he had no troops to defend himself. The army had accompanied, as mentioned already, his son Bhillama (or Sangama)<sup>16</sup> who went on an expedition to a

ز لا چوره کا نها س—پا هي کشيد	چو نزدیک لا چوره لهر رسيد
يکي جنگ بر روئي صحرا بداد	مقابل به پیکار ترکان سستاد
* * *	* * *
که بودند در کینه چو ماده شیر	همان هر دو چند و زنان دلیر
بسه دنبیل و بوق و پیکان زدند	یکایک بر افراج ترکان زدند
* * *	* * *
دگر آن دو هندو زن نامدار	هنیدم که کا نها دران کار زار
بسه خون دران حرب گه ریختند	سستادند با ترک آویختند
دران دشت بردست ترکان اسیر	هم آخر شدند از پس دارو گیر

9. Kaṭaka and Dēvagiri were two different parts of the same city; Kaṭaka was the outer extension of which Dēvagiri, the citadel, was the hub. The names appear to have been used interchangeably in the 14th century. Ibn Baṭūṭa declares, 'He ('Alā-ud-Dīn), set out to carry the holy war into the country of Dēvagiri (or Daulatābād) which is also called the country of Kaṭaka.' (E. D. iii, p. 598).

10. Bhillama is mentioned by no other Mussalman historian excepting Khusrau and 'Iṣāmī. Whereas the former states that he had a brother called Sangama Dēv, (*Dewal Rānī and Khizr Khān* 'Aligars Edn. p. 86) the latter calls him 'Yak Pīsar' 'the one son'.

به فرمان آن رای کشور کشاي	هنیدم دران وقت افراج رای
که مررای را بودي آن یک پسر	به دنبال هم بهیلم نامور

*Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 226.

Nevertheless, the evidence of Khusrau who mentions both the princes by name must be considered more authoritative. Therefore, the name of Sangama who appears to have been the elder is substituted for Bhillama in this work in order to avoid confusion.

remote part of the kingdom. He was compelled to seek shelter within the citadel of Dēvagiri, where he was besieged by the invaders; but as the citadel was not properly supplied with provisions, he could not long hold out against the enemy.<sup>11</sup> At the end of a week, he was forced to sue for peace. Meanwhile, the Turks were engaged in plundering the cities of Kaṭaka and Dēvagiri. As Garshāsp was desirous of returning to his country quickly with as much booty as he could seize, he accepted Rāmadēva's proposals and a treaty was soon concluded. Besides the elephants and horses which fell into his hands, Garshāsp obtained in marriage one of Rāmadēva's daughters and immense wealth as the price of peace.<sup>12</sup> As he was about to retire from Dēvagiri, Sangama, who heard of the arrival of the invaders, hastened with a large host consisting of 500,000 foot, 10,000 horse, and eight powerful elephants to the rescue of the capital, and reached its outskirts. On hearing of Sangama's approach Garshāsp summoned Rāmadēva to his camp and told him that since they concluded peace, it was not proper for them to resume hostilities. If, however, Rāmadēva thought otherwise and chose the latter course, he would first put him to death and proceed to deal with his son in a like manner. Rāma-

11. According to Shaikh 'Ain-ud-Dīn Bijāpurī who is said to have been a contemporary of 'Alā-ud-Dīn, Rāmadēva collected about 4000 citizens and domestics to oppose the Mussalmans. In the fight that ensued, he was, however, defeated and forced to seek shelter within the fort. In their hurry to throw in provisions into the fort, Rāmadēva's men carried inside a large number of salt bags abandoned by some merchants believing them to be filled with grain. When Rāmadēva discovered the truth, he opened negotiations with 'Alā-ud-Dīn and concluded peace. (Briggs, *Ferishta* I, p. 306)

12. *Ṭaṣāmy: Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 228.

به صد سال کردن تراند رقم  
ازین هشت زنجیر ازان صد قطار  
ابا دختر جانفزا رام دیو

جواهر نه چندین که اهل قلم  
بسے پهل و بس آشتی راهوار  
بیا ورد در پیش گر هاسپ نهر

dēva protested his loyalty to Garshāsp and promised to persuade his son to cease his warlike activities. He despatched a messenger to Sangama advising him to desist from waging war upon the Turks and make peace with them. He pointed out that he was in the hands of the enemy and his life depended upon his son's decision. In obedience to the wishes of his father Sangama abandoned the idea of continuing hostilities; he came to Dēvagiri from his camp and submitted to Garshāsp Malik.

Garshāsp was greatly pleased with Rāmadēva; he summoned him to his camp and treated him with much consideration. He gave back to Rāmadēva his royal umbrella, together with his kingdom and presented him with two powerful elephants. They vowed to each other that one should be the father and the other the son. Thereupon, Garshāsp who had attained his object returned to Kara.<sup>13</sup>

13. This account is based upon *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn*, (pp. 228-31). The passages from the text cannot be cited here as they are too long for quotation. As the final agreement between Garshāsp and Rāmadēva is not mentioned by other writers, and as it appears to have influenced Rāmadēva's future relations with 'Alā-ud-Dīn, the passage describing the incident must be specially noticed. (P. 230).

به فرقىش ده در و گور فهاوند	همان رام ديوگزين را بخواند
همان ملك او باز او را سپرد	همان چتر او را بدو را سپرد
كه باهند اندر چپ و راست اوي	دو پهل دمان دادش آن نامجوي
يكي شد پدر ديگري شد پسر	يكي عهد بستند با يكدگر

The author of *Mulḥiqāt*, as mentioned by Ferishta, gives a different version of facts. As 'Alā-ud-Dīn was preparing to depart from Dēvagiri with rich booty, Sankar Deva arrived with a large army, and attacked him. He was, however, defeated and put to flight; several members of the royal family were taken prisoners. Rāmadēva had to sue for peace once again. 'Alā-ud-Dīn, no doubt, demanded a higher price; and Rāmadēva who had

## SECTION 2

*First Invasion of Tiling*

Malik Garshāsp's victory over Rāmadēva paved his way to the imperial throne. He treacherously slew his uncle and sovereign Sultān Jalāl-ud-Dīn who came to congratulate him on his brilliant victory over the infidel king of Dēvagiri; purchased the allegiance of the nobles and the army by a lavish distribution of money, and usurped the throne. He assumed the title of 'Alā-ud-Dīn, and within a short time, established his authority firmly at Dehli. During the early years of his reign, 'Alā-ud-Dīn was busily engaged in restoring order in his dominions. He had to put down the rebellion of the Jalāly nobles who showed a tendency to assert themselves, and concert measures not only to beat back the persistent Mughal attacks on his western frontier but to reduce to subjection the powerful Hindu princes of Rājaputāna who defied his predecessor. 'Alā-ud-Dīn displayed considerable vigour in dealing with his enemies; and successfully imposed his yoke over the whole of Hindustan within a short time. When he found that his power was securely established, he turned his attention towards Deccan. The victory which he had won with comparative ease over Rāmadēva excited his ambition. The rich South Indian Hindu kingdoms which had not yet felt the power of Islām must be brought under the heel.

'Alā-ud-Dīn was not, however, desirous to extend the boundaries of his dominions. He was probably aware of the difficulty of

no other alternative surrendered all his wealth together with the district of Elichpūr and purchased peace. Briggs *Ferishta*, i, p. 309.

The account of *Mulhiqāt* is not supported by other evidence. 'Iṣāmy's narrative appears to be more consistent; and as he displays an intimate knowledge of facts connected specially with the history of Deccan, his version is accepted as genuine.

enforcing his authority over the southern part of the peninsula from his distant capital, Dehli. It was perhaps due to this apprehension that he remained contented with the exaction of tribute from the southern monarchs, avoiding as far as possible territorial annexation. The policy which 'Alā-ud-Dīn followed in his relations with the Hindu kings of Southern India is clearly expounded in the instructions given by him to Malik Kāfūr on the eve of the departure of the expeditions to Tiling and Ma'bar.

"The order of the Caliph concerning Bilāl Dēv and all other Rāis is this: First I am to place before them the two negatives of the oath of affirmation. (There is no god but Allah etc.) May be, their hearts will be illuminated! But if Destiny has drawn a curtain before their eyes, and they fail to see the light, I am to offer them the alternative of having the yoke of tribute (*zimma*) put on their necks. If they reject this also and refuse to pay tribute, then I will not place any burden on their necks but will simply relieve their necks of the burden of their heads."<sup>14</sup>

The orders of the Sultān were not always as inflexible as this. He was more anxious to get the wealth of the South Indian kings than their territory. Malik Nā'ib Kāfūr was specially instructed by the Sultān not to drive the Rāi of Tiling to extremities.

'If the Rāi (of Tiling) consented,' said the Sultān, 'to surrender his treasure and jewels, elephants and horses, and also to send treasure and elephants in the following year, Malik Nā'ib Kāfūr was to accept these terms and not press the Rāi too hard. He was to come to an arrangement and retire without pushing matters too far, lest Rāi Laddar Deo should get the better of him. If he could not do this, he was, for the sake of his own name and fame, to bring the Rāi with him to Dehli.'<sup>15</sup>

14. *Khusrau: Khazā'in-ul-Futūh*, JIH, ix, pp. 60-61.

15. Baranī, E. D., iii, p. 201. Hodivāla takes exception to the English

It is evident that 'Alā-ud-Dīn was not eagerly desirous of acquiring territory in Deccan. He seems to have preferred to exploit the hoarded wealth of the country avoiding the arduous task of governance. Nevertheless, he did not rigorously adhere to this policy. When exceptional circumstances rendered the annexation of territory imperative, as, for instance, Dēvagiri after the demise of Rāmadēva, he did not hesitate to incorporate it with his dominions. The pursuit of this policy spread ruin and destruction in the peninsula. The country was plundered and devastated; the temples were desecrated and burnt; and the kings and princes had either to surrender all their possessions or sell their lives dearly on the battle-field. A contemporary Hindu writer observes that war or peace with Sultān 'Alā-ud-Dīn made little difference; the former involved death, and the latter the loss of everything that one possessed.<sup>16</sup>

rendering of the latter part of this passage, on the assumption that the text which the translator had before him is identical with his own. The sentence which he particularly objects to is this:

و در بند آن مہاہی کہ رای لدر دیو برتر آید یا برای نام و آوازہ  
برابر خود کردہ رای را بدہلی آری .

He renders it as follows:—"And do not insist that Laddar Dēv should wait upon thee, and do not bring the Rāi (Laddar Dēv) along with thee to Dehli, for the enhancement of thy own glory and fame". He points out that 'the Sultān specially warned Kāfūr against the repetition of such impolitic proceedings' as the bringing of Rāmadēva to Dehli.

*Studies in Hindu-Muslim History*, pp. 280-81.

Hodivala does not, however, explain how the taking of the Rāy to Dehli could be termed impolitic.

16. *Alāudīna nṛpatau na sandhir-na-ca vighrahaḥ.*

*Sandhau Sarvasva-haranam vighrahe prāṇa nighrahaḥ*

The first expedition which Sultān 'Alā-ud-Dīn despatched after his accession to the throne of Dehli to the South ended ignominiously. Most Mussalman historians scarcely take any notice of it; and a few who take cognizance of it pass it over hurriedly as it does not reflect credit on the armies of Islām. Baranī, the only author who gives a brief account of it, introduces it incidentally,<sup>17</sup> not so much to describe the episode itself as to account for the ease with which Targhī, the Mangol chief, marched to Dehli without encountering any opposition on the way. He dismisses the subject with a few words.

Chhajju 'At this time,' says he, 'the Sultān was engaged in the siege of Chitor. Malik Fakhr-ud-Dīn Jūnā dādbak-i-Ḥazarat, and Malik Jhajū of Kara, the nephew of Nuṣrat Khān had been sent with all the officers and forces of Hindustan against Arangal. On their arrival there, the rainy season began, and proved such a hindrance that the army could do nothing and in the beginning of the winter returned, greatly reduced in numbers to Hindustan.'<sup>18</sup>

Baranī does not mention the time when the Sultān despatched this expedition. Yāḥya bin Aḥmad speaks of an expedition to

17. The expedition is also referred to by Niẓām-ud-Dīn Aḥmad and Ferishta, but in such a casual manner that it escapes the attention of all excepting very wary readers.

18. E. D. iii p. 189. The passage describing this expedition in the Madras Government Oriental Mss. Library (D. No. 298) runs thus:

درین سال که سلطان علاءالدین در گرفتن حصار چتور نهفت کرد  
 ملک فخرالدین جونا داد یک حضرت و ملک فخر (ججو؟) مقطع کره  
 برادرزاده نصرت خان با تمامی امراء هندوستان و سوار و پیاده  
 هندوستان در ارنگل رسیدند -

This indicates that the expedition was sent to Tiling in the same year in which the Sultān laid siege to Chitor.

Tiling in 702 A.H., but he confounds it with Malik Nā'ib Kāfūr's expediiton which set out from Dehli a few years later;<sup>19</sup> Badāūni mentions two expeditions, both under the command of Malik Nā'ib Kāfūr, one in 702 A.H. and the other in 709 A.H. He asserts, wrongly of course, that 'Alā-ud-Dīn's army was victorious on both the occasions.<sup>20</sup> Ferishta assigns the reduction of Chitōr and Targhī's invasion to 703 A.H. and points out that though the Sultān was in the capital, he could not oppose the invader as his cavalry was absent on an expedition to Warangal at that time.<sup>21</sup> As Ferishta's date falls sufficiently early in the reign of 'Alā-ud-Dīn and conforms to the order of events as described by Baranī, 703 A.H. (1303-04 A.D.) may be accepted as the actual date of the despatch of the first expedition to Tiling.

The army which was placed under the command of Malik Fakhr-ud-Dīn Jūnā (later Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughlaq) and Jhajū of Kara is said to have marched by way of Bengal,<sup>22</sup> and suffered disaster in the middle of the way. The rains might have obstructed the progress of the invasion, but they could not have brought about the destruction of a large part of the army, unless it is assumed that it was caught in floods and drowned.

There is, however, reason to believe that the expedition reached Tiling and was worsted in an encounter with the enemy. The chronicles of the Velama chiefs embodied in the *Velugōṭivāri-vamśāvalī* allude to a victory over the Mussalman invaders of Dehli prior to the advent of Malik Kāfūr. Pōtuganti Maili, one of the Nāyaks of the court of Pratāparudra, claims to have destroyed

19. *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* (Gaekwad's Oriental Series LXIII) p. 78.

20. Ranking, *Al Badāoni*, i. p. 265.

21. Briggs, *Ferishta*, i. p. 354.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 353.

the pride of the Turuṣkas of Dehli in a battle near Upparapalli in the Karimnagar district of the Hyderabad State.<sup>23</sup> As Maili is said to have later visited the court of 'Alā-ud-Dīn at Dehli, he must have defeated the army commanded by Malik Fakhr-ud-Dīn. Maili was not the only officer that was responsible for this victory. Venna, the son of Rēcerla Prasāditya, one of Queen Rudrāmbā's ministers, is said to have overthrown the Turuṣka army in battle.<sup>24</sup> As Venna's sons figure in Pratāparudra's later wars with the Mussalmans, his victory over the Turuṣkas must also have been won at Upparapalli. It is evident from this that Malik Fakhr-ud-Dīn penetrated into the heart of Tiling and reached Upparapalli in the neighbourhood of the capital, Warangal. There, he was opposed by the Tilinga forces, and in the fierce encounter that ensued, the Dehli army having sustained a crushing defeat was forced to retreat hastily. 'Alā-ud-Dīn who was thus baulked of his prey had to bide his time.

23. ఉప్పరపల్లి సుద్ధతి వైబడి ఢిల్లీతురుష్కుల తృక్తదంచె.

*Mack. Mss. 15.4.3. p. 82.*

The Mackenzie Surveyors who visited Warangal about the end of June 1816 A.D. noticed an inscription engraved on a pillar then standing in the fort recording the victory of Manarangodāri Rāju and Layingadēva over the Muḥammadans. As the epigraph in question is dated in Samvat 1362 (=A.D. 1304-5), the victory which these chiefs are said to have won over the Turuṣkas must have taken place just before the setting up of the pillar.

—*Mack Mss. 15.3.20, p. 101.*

24. నన్నద్ద ప్రసరత్తురుప్ప-పుతనాసందోహ నిర్మూలనో  
త్పన్నానూపయకుండు విక్రమకళాపారీణదోస్సారుండు...  
.....చెన్నధరణిపస్వామి సామాన్యుడే.

*Velugōṭṭarivāṁśavali, 25.*

## SECTION 3

*Second Dēvagiri Expedition*

'Alā-ud-Dīn could not immediately concert measures to retrieve the disaster. The affairs of Hindustan first claimed his attention. The Mongols gave him no respite. Within a short period of four years they invaded Hindustan thrice. Although he undertook the subjugation of Mālwa which was within easy reach of his dominions in 1305 A.D., he had to devote almost the whole of his attention in organizing the defence of his realm. The Sultān had to keep an ever vigilant eye on the western frontier to prevent the irruption of the barbarian hordes. Nevertheless, he was constrained to equip a large military force and despatch it to Deccan before he could feel completely free from the danger of Mongol invasions.

The cause which led to the despatch of this expedition is said to have been the rebellion of Rāmadēva, king of Dēvagiri. 'Rāmadēva had rebelled,' says Baranī, 'and for several years had not sent his tribute';<sup>25</sup> and all the later historians repeat his statement. 'Iṣāmy, however, gives a slightly different account which represents Rāmadēva as an unwilling participator in the rebellion. According to him Rāmadēva, who remained loyal to 'Alā-ud-Dīn, sent a secret messenger to Dehli to inform him that a rebellion headed by Sangama had broken out at Dēvagiri against the Sultān. He was himself held a prisoner in his palace by Bhillama (Sangama) and his followers; and he requested the Sultān to send a competent person with an army to put down the rebels and restore the imperial authority.<sup>26</sup>

'Iṣāmy's account appears to be nearer the truth than Baranī's. Whereas the latter does not suggest any ostensible reason for the

25. E. D. iii, p. 200.

26. *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*, p. 274.

unusual display of generosity by 'Alā-ud-Dīn to a rebel, the former gives a satisfactory explanation. The motive which prompted Rāmadēva to communicate the news of his son's revolt to the Sultān, however, remains obscure. Rāmadēva, no doubt, had given his daughter in marriage to the Sultān, and vowed to behave like a father towards him. These facts do not, however, furnish a satisfactory explanation of his unpaternal conduct towards Sangama. He was probably constrained to assume this attitude by force of circumstances. The disaster which befell the Sultān's army in Tiling must have considerably lowered the prestige of his military force. And Sangama who attributed the Sultān's former victory over his father more to a fortuitous combination of circumstances than to military superiority, prevailed upon his father to withhold the payment of annual tribute. But the defeat of the Rāja of Mālwa and the conquest of the country by 'Ain-ul-Mulk in 1305 A.D. showed that the Sultān was as powerful as ever to chastise his enemies. It was necessary to propitiate the Sultān to escape the punishment that might be meted out to him for the rebellion. There was, besides, another important reason for apprehending an invasion from Dehli. Rāy Karan, the ruler of Gujarāt, being attacked by Ulugh Khān fled from his territories with his two daughters and sought refuge in the territory of Rāmadēva. His queen Kamalā Dēvī, however, fell into the hands of the Khān who sent her to Dehli with the other booty taken during the war (A.D. 1299). The Sultān took her into his harem. Now, one of the two daughters of Karan who shared with him his exile died; Kamalā Dēvī being desirous of keeping with her the surviving daughter, Dēval Dēvī, begged the Sultān to send for Dēval so that she also might reside with her at Dehli. In compliance with her wishes, the Sultān ordered Malik Aḥmad Jhītam to lead an expedition to Gujarāt, and take possession of Dēval Dēvī. On Jhītam's approach, Karan being greatly alarmed fled with his daughter to Mahārāṣṭra and sought refuge with Sangama, the son of Rāmadēva. Sangama who coveted the princess promised to offer him protection on condition that he consented to give her in

marriage to him. Karan having no other alternative agreed to the proposal and was preparing to send Dēval with Sangama's brother Bhillama to the court of Dēvagiri. And Malik Jhītam who was scouring the country in search of the fugitives was expected to descend upon Marhaṭ at any time.<sup>27</sup>

27. Khusrau: 'Ashīqa, E. D., iii, pp. 551-2, cf. 'Iṣāmy: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, pp. 278-9. According to Khusrau, Ulugh Khān was sent (together with another officer called Pānchamīn) by the Sultān to bring Dēval Dēvī to Dehli.

بر آنسو نام زد گشتند در دم  
الفغان معظم پنچامین هم  
'Ashīqa, (Aligar Edn.), p. 85.

But this is a mistake, for Ulugh Khān died some five months after the final conquest of Rantambhor in July 1301 A.D. (Baranī, E.D., iii, p. 179). Therefore he could not have led the second attack upon Rāy Karan in 1306 A.D.

It may be noted here that Qāzī Aḥmad Ghafarī, whom Ferishta cites in this connection, speaks of Alaf Khān (Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, pp. 365 ff.) as the person who was specially deputed by the Sultān for the task. As the name Alap Khān الفغان can be easily corrupted to Ulugh Khān, الفغان, and as Ghafarī follows closely the narrative of Khusrau, Alap Khān may be taken to have been the officer who was actually sent by the Sultān. 'Iṣāmy, however, gives a different account. According to him, the officer whom the Sultān sent to Gujarāt for the second time was not Ulugh Khān or Alap Khān but Malik Aḥmad Jhītam; he was accompanied by another officer called Panchmanī. When they advanced on Paṭṭan, Karan fled to Marhaṭ for protection. Receiving no hospitality in that country, he went to Tiling and sought refuge under Luddar Dēv, the ruler of the country. In the meantime Karan's family including the beautiful Dēval fell into the hands of the invaders at Paṭṭan; and Jhītam who was in the meantime summoned by the Sultān took them with him to Dehli.

چو هد روز لشکر به پطن رسید  
چمان کرن چون این حکایت شنید  
سرا سر رها کرد خیل و تبار  
ابا چند هم دست هد در فرار  
همی رفت تا سر به سره گشت کهید  
چو آنجا مقام سکونت ندید

Rāmadēva, who was a man of considerable sagacity and foresight dissociated himself from his son, and sent a message to the Sultān informing him of his son's rebellion, together with protestations of his own loyalty. If the Sultān's armies came and were defeated, no harm would come of his message. If on the other hand the Sultān were victorious, he would still be regarded as a friend and loyal ally and be treated accordingly. Considerations such as these might have urged Rāmadēva to despatch the messenger to Dehli with the news of his son's rebellion.

As soon as 'Alā-ud-Dīn heard of Sangama's rebellion, he decided to send an army immediately to restore his authority. He

همي رفت تا سر خيال تنگ  
 بدا دش چمان لدر بر خویش جاي  
 در آمد به پٹن ابا ترکنار  
 شده صابطه جمله اقطاع کرن  
 دول نام خوش منظر و خرد سال  
 مهی یک دو چون ماند آنجا حشم

آزان جا مغان داد سري تنگ  
 چو اندر تنگ آمد آن سست راي  
 فرض چون ملک احمد سرفراز  
 بدست آمدش جمله اتباع کرن  
 یکے دختر بکر و صاحب جمال  
 اسیر آمده با تما مي حرم  
*Futūh-us-Salātīn*, p. 278.

The Sultān then bestowed Gujarāt as an *iqṭā'* on Alap Khān who was at that time in Multān, and ordered him to take possession of the district without delay. *Ibid*, p. 279.

Now, 'Isāmy was an younger contemporary of Khusrau, and he must have had access to first-hand information which was not available to later historians like Ghāfarī. As Ulugh Khān was dead some five years before the despatch of the second expedition against Gujarāt; as Panchmīn whom Khusrau associates with Ulugh Khān in this campaign was, according to 'Isāmy, a lieutenant under Malik Aḥmad Jhītam; and as the latter is said to have captured Karan's family including Dēval Dēvi, it seems reasonable to take Jhītam as the commander whom the Sultān had actually dispatched to Gujarāt to bring Dēval Dēvi to the court, notwithstanding the evidence of later writers such as Ghāfarī and Ferishta.

chose his favourite slave Kāfūr to lead the expedition, and commanded Khwāja Hājī to accompany him. They set out at the head of 30,000 cavalry,<sup>28</sup> and having passed in course of time the Ghat of Sāgūna, proceeded to lay the country waste.

Intelligence of the arrival of the Muslim army soon reached Dēvagiri. Sangama Dēva does not seem to have made any attempt to check the advance of the invaders. He is said to have concentrated all his forces at the capital. As soon as he learnt that the enemy was moving towards the city, he led his troops outside, and took up a strong position on the top of a hill in the neighbourhood. He was supported by his brother Bhillama and his lieutenants Rāghava and Rāmadēva.<sup>29</sup>

Malik Nā'ib, meeting with no opposition on the route, marched upon the capital, and attacked Sangama on Wednesday 19th Rāmzān 706 A.H. (24th March 1307 A.D.)<sup>30</sup> In the battle that ensued, Sangama was defeated; and he sought safety in flight. Nearly half of his troops followed him; and the rest who fell into the hands of Mussalmans were cut to pieces. Rāmadēva and his family who were spared by the special command of the Sulṭān were made

28. Khusrau: *Khazā'in-ul-Futūh*, J.I.H. viii, p. 373. However, according to Ghafari, whom Ferishta quotes with approval, Malik Nā'ib and Khwāja Hājī had under them 100,000 horse. This was further strengthened by contingents from Mālwa and Gujarāt (Briggs, *Ferishta* I. pp. 365-66). Moreover, he mixes up Dēval Rāni episode with Kāfūr's expedition for which there appears to be no justification. No early historian connects the capture of Dēval with Kāfūr's expedition. They might have coincided in time; but in the light of available contemporary evidence, it is not possible to state whether Kāfūr had any connection with the capture of the princess.

29. 'Iṣāmy: *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, pp. 274-75.

30. Khusrau: *Khazā'in-ul-Futūh*, J.I.H., viii, p. 374.

prisoners.<sup>31</sup> The Mussalman army next sacked the city and seized much valuable booty. Malik Nā'ib took possession of the country in the name of his master, and distributed it among his officers.<sup>32</sup> He then marched to Dehli with the prisoners and presented them to the Sultān with the booty taken in the war.

'Alā-ud-Dīn treated Rāmadēva with great kindness and conferred on him many favours during his six months' sojourn in Dehli; for, he believed that Rāmadēva remained faithful to him notwithstanding his son's rebellion. He gave back to him the government of Marhaṭ to which he added, if Ferishta may be trusted, the district of Nausārī in Gujarāt.<sup>33</sup> He also presented to Rāmadēva two lakhs of golden tankas to defray the expenses of his homeward journey; and finally bestowed on him the title of Rāy-i-Rāyān, and gave him permission to return to his native country.<sup>34</sup> Rāmadēva appears to have been deeply touched by the honour done to him by the Sultān. During the remaining years of his rule he not only stood firm in his loyalty to the Sultān but rendered valuable assistance to the officers whom he sent to subdue the Hindu kingdoms of the south.

#### SECTION 4

##### *Second Tiling Expedition*

For a short time after Malik Kāfūr's return from Dēvagiri, the Deccan remained undisturbed by the Muslim armies. The Sultān

31. *Ibid.*

32. Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 369.

33. *Ibid.*

34. 'Isāmy: *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, p. 276. According to Ferishta, the Sultān gave Rāmadēva only one lakh of tankas 'to bear his expenses home.' Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 369.

was still preoccupied with the affairs of Hindustan. He had to proceed against Satal Dēv, the Rāja of Sivāna<sup>35</sup> personally, as the Rāja had defied the imperial officers during the last five or six years. Besides, the Rāja of Jhālor who set up the standard of rebellion had to be subdued. When these affairs were settled in a satisfactory manner, 'Alā-ud-Dīn, being completely free from the complications of the North Indian affairs, felt that he could then fully devote his attention to the subjugation of the Southern Hindu states. He first turned his gaze upon Tiling, for his armies suffered defeat, as noticed already, a few years earlier in that country. To wipe out the disgrace of defeat as well as to increase his resources and the glory of Islām, he resolved to send an army into that land. As Malik Nā'ib and Khwāja Hāji had distinguished themselves in the recent campaign against Dēvagiri, they were commissioned to lead the expedition.<sup>36</sup>

35. The Alighar text of *Dēval Rānī and Khizir Khān*, (p. 69) has Samāna;

ازان پس شه بدولت شد روانه	بر سم گشت بر سم سم سما نه
بد انجا بود راغي سخت با زو	گسته سنگ رايان را ترازو
در همت آرماني نامش ستل ديو	همش راوات بفرمان و همش مير

But Elliot's text has Siwāna (E.D. iii, p. 550). In Prof. Habib's translation of *Khazā'in-ul-Futūh* (JIH. viii, p. 375) also the place where Satal Dēv was ruling is referred to as Siwāna. Ferishta calls Satal Dēv Rāja of Sewāna (Briggs, *Ferishta I*, p. 370). Moreover Siwāna rhymes much better with 'ravāna' than Samāna. The correct name of the place appears to be Siwāna.

36. According to Wassāf (E. D. iii, p. 49) the expedition started from Dehli in 709 A.H. which was led by Malik Nabū, Zafar Khān and Nānak Hindī. Malik Nabū is, no doubt, Malik Nā'ib Kāfūr. Zafar Khān who was killed in 699 A.H. while pursuing the Mangol invader Targhī could not have been one of the commanders. There is much uncertainty about the correct reading of the text of Wassāf concerning the name Nānak Hindī. No evidence is available to show that Hindus were appointed to high posts in the imperial army at that time.

Malik Nā'ib and his colleague started from Dehli on 25th Jumādā I 709 A.H. (31st. Oct. 1309 A.D.)<sup>37</sup> and reached Dēvagiri within a short time. When they approached the city Rāmadēva went out to receive them with presents, and paid obsequious attention to the needs of the army so long as they remained within his dominions. He daily visited the army headquarters, in order to see that they had everything they needed.<sup>38</sup> Malik Nā'ib, however, did not remain long at Dēvagiri. Within the space of a week he is said to have passed through Rāmadēva's dominions and entered the kingdom of Tiling. Notwithstanding the hardships of the journey in an unknown mountainous region, he pushed forward rapidly, passing on his way the diamond mining district of Basiragarh and reached Sarbar (Sirpūr?) which appears to have been a fort of some importance on his route. He invested the fort closely and soon reduced the garrison to sore straits. Seeing that there was no chance of holding out without succour, the garrison resolved to perish rather than fall into the hands of the barbarian foes. They lighted a huge fire and threw themselves with their wives and children into it. The fort was then captured by the Mussalmans and was handed over to Annā Niḍu (Anānīr) the surviving brother of the commandant who promised obedience to the Sultān.<sup>39</sup>

The survivors of the garrison of Sarbar fled to Warangal with the news of the arrival of the Muslim invasion; but the information did not cause any surprise; for, Pratāparudra seems to have been forewarned of the coming of the invaders. He was a powerful sovereign whose sway extended over the whole country inhabited by the Telugu speaking people. He had a strong army consisting

37. Khusrau: *Khazā'in-ul-Futūh*, JIH, viii, p. 378.

38. Baranī, E. D. iii, p. 201.

39. Khusrau: *Khazā'in-ul-Futūh*, JIH, viii, pp. 382-3.

of a hundred elephants, 900,000 archers and 20,000 horse.<sup>40</sup> He took the necessary steps not only to defend his capital but to impede the progress of the enemy. He not only commanded all his nobles and officers to repair to the fort with their forces, but laid waste the country along the route which the invaders were expected to follow.<sup>41</sup> Although the difficulty of finding provisions must have caused some trouble to the invaders, the royal orders summoning all the provincial troops to the capital must have facilitated their advance as it had resulted in the abandonment of all the forts.

Meanwhile, Malik Nā'ib marched swiftly towards the capital, and arrived at the village of Kūnarbal in its neighbourhood on 16th Sha'bān 709 A.H. (20th January 1310 A.D.). He immediately seized the hill of Hanumakoṇḍa where he established himself. The army pitched their tents close to the fort, and each tent as well as the whole camp was protected by a *katkhar* or wooden palisade.

40.

تلنگي صاحب صد پيل راي      جهان تلنگ را فرمان روي  
Khusrau: 'Ashīqa: (Aligar Edition), p. 69.

Cf. 'Navalakṣa dhanurdhar-ādhi-nāthē  
*Prthvīm śāsati Vīra Rudra Dēvē*

Vidyānāthā: *Pratāparudriyam*.

'Iṣāmī: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*: (The India Office Ms. cf. the published Agra Text, p. 286).

لدرديو آن راي نه لک تلنگ      مرين قوم را پيش نامد به جنگ

41. Baranī E. D. iii, p. 202. Ferishta, however, states that the neighbouring chiefs hastened to Warangal to join Pratāparudra; but as the Muslim army which proceeded by forced marches reached the city earlier, Pratāparudra was obliged to shut himself within the fort before the arrival of his allies. (Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 372). This appears to be partially true.

The city of Warangal had two forts, one within the other, surrounded by a deep ditch. The outer fort was built of mud, and, if the *Pratāpacaritra* can be relied on, had seventy seven bastions each defended by a Nāyak.<sup>42</sup> All the fighting men of the kingdom who came to defend the capital were assembled in it; and all the subordinate chiefs and distinguished nobles went with their treasures and elephants to reside with the king in the inner fort of stone. Both the forts were built strongly and equipped with up to date machinery of defence. The siege which commenced on 15th Sha'bān (19th Jan. 1310 A.D.) is said to have lasted a month.<sup>43</sup> But this seems to be an under-estimate of the actual duration, as the Mussalman army did not leave Warangal until 16th Shawwāl (20th April 1310 A.D.).<sup>44</sup> Some of the incidents of the siege stand out prominently. Very early in the course of the siege, the Hindus made a night attack upon their besiegers. "A thousand swift Hindu horsemen from the troops of Bānik Dēva the *muqaddam* of that country," says Khusrāu, "made a night attack on the Muslim army with demonish cries and the Hindi sword."<sup>45</sup> Though all the facts connected with

42. *Pratāpacaritram*, J.T.A., vii, p. 287-8.

43. *Isāmy: Futūh-us-Salāṭīn*: pp. 282-3.

شہیدم سپہ یک مہ انجا بماند \* \* \* \* \*  
 ہب و روز خون مدومی فہاند \* \* \* \* \*  
 چو بگذشت یک ماہ را ئی تلگ \* \* \* \* \*  
 قوی آمد از ناوک ترک تلگ \* \* \* \* \*

44. Khusrāu: *Khazā'in-ul-Futūh*, JIH; viii, p. 401.

45. *Ibid.*, viii, p. 386. The identity of the chief is not known. He is called a *muqaddam* or the commander of Tiling. Virabhadra Rao calls him Vināyakadēva (*History of the Andhras II*, p. 360). No officer of this name is known to have existed under Pratāparudra. Among the Nāyaks of Pratāparudra, enumerated in the *Velugōtivāriwamsāvali*, there appears

this incident are totally submerged in the ocean of the meaningless verbiage of Khusrau's pedantic prose, this attack could not have been so easily repulsed, as he makes it appear. Nevertheless, the night attack was a failure; and it did not materially affect the progress of the siege. Malik Nā'ib pushed forward the siege operations vigorously. As his artillery could not hit effectively the defenders of the mud fort, he erected *sābāts* and *gargajēs* higher than the walls, and filled up the deep moat which prevented the besiegers from approaching them. These measures gave fresh impetus to the Muslim army; and very soon they effected a wide breach within the wall. Encouraged by this success they made a vigorous attack on the fort on 12th Ramzān (13th February 1310 A.D.) and carried it by storm. The fall of the outer fortress, however, did not bring the siege to a close; the defenders of the mud fort who escaped death retired to the inner stone fort; and Pratāparudra, who had hopes of ultimate success, still remaind defiant.

Although the Mussalmans laid siege to the stone fort as soon as they made themselves masters of the outer fort (Wednesday, 16th Ramzān—17th Feb. A.D. 1310), Pratāparudra does not seem to have submitted almost immediately as mentioned by Khusrau. The attention of Malik Nā'ib appears to have been considerably distracted by the activity of the Hindu soldiers scouring the countryside. They destroyed the postal system by means of which news passed between the camp and Dehli and threatened to cut off his communications with the headquarters. 'On this occasion, however,' says Baranī, 'while the Malik Nā'ib' was besieging the mud fort of Arangal, some posts in the way were dis-established

the name of a certain Rānakadēva. In an epigraph of Gundlapāḍu in the Guntur district dated Ś. 1195 (68 of 1929-30) Rānaka Gōpadēva the '*rāyadaṇḍādhipa*' or the commander-in-chief of the royal forces is mentioned. If this officer were alive in 1310 A.D., it is not impossible that he was the *muqaddam* mentioned by Khusrau.

as the passage across Tiling was extremely dangerous, and for more than forty days no news of the army came to the Sultān.<sup>46</sup> And Ferishta also alludes to the dislocation of the postal system. 'Now, while the Malik Nā'ib was besieging the fort of Arangal,' says he, 'the roads became dangerous owing to the large number of Tilingi soldiers, and the posts were swept away.'<sup>47</sup> The Sultān, who still remembered the former defeat of his armies in Tiling, was greatly concerned, and he could not regain his peace of mind, until he obtained an assurance of victory from the Saint Shaikh Nizām-ud-Dīn 'Aulia.<sup>48</sup> It is evident that Malik Nā'ib had to face trouble from outside while he was investing Warangal. Nevertheless, he did not relax the vigour of his operations. He sent parties of his soldiers into the country to carry fire and sword.<sup>49</sup> It was during one of these raids that Qarā Beg and his men captured three elephants belonging to Pratāparudra, in the neighbourhood of the town of Dahdūm.<sup>50</sup>

Notwithstanding the diversions caused by his subjects, Pratāparudra could not hold out against the enemy long. The fall of the mud fort led to the overcrowding of the inner fort. 'That fort,' says 'Iṣāmy, 'was full of people, men of the fort as well as men of the country; an arrow did not fall to the ground but on the heads or

46. Baranī (Habib's trans.) JIH ix, p. 223.

47. Ferishta: (Habib's trans.) JIH. ix, p. 225.

48. Baranī: (Habib's trans.) JIH. viii, pp. 223, 225.

49.

پس از ترک و تاز دیار تلنگ  
بزد خیمه گرد حصار تلنگ

'Iṣāmy: *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 282.

50. *Khazā'in-ul-Futūh*: JIH, viii, p. 337.

bodies of men.<sup>51</sup> 'To the garrison within the stone fort,' observes Baranī, 'the world now appeared smaller than the eye of an ant.'<sup>52</sup> 'The inner fort to which Ladder Dēv had retired,' points out Ferishta, 'was insufficient to contain the whole.' This terrible overcrowding of large numbers of people within the limited space of the inner citadel compelled Pratāparudra to sue for peace.<sup>53</sup> He sent distinguished Brahmans and ambassadors to the Malik Nā'ib's camp to negotiate the terms of surrender.

51. 'Iṣāmī: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 282.

چو پر بود از آد می آن حصار      چه از اهل شهر و چه اهل دیار  
یکی ناوکی کم فتادی زمین      مگر بر سر و بر تن آد مین

52. Baranī: (Habib's trans.) JIH, ix, p. 222.

53. Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 372. The published text of Ferishta's history, however, runs thus:

و بعد از آنکه سپاه اسلام نز دیک رسید لدر دیو در قلعه درونی  
ورنگل که از سنگ بود متحصن گشت - دیگر رایان در قلعه بیرونی که  
گلی بود و وسعت بسیار داشت تحصن جستند - و ملک ناآب قلعه را  
احاطه نموده ابواب دخول و خروج مسدود ساخت - و کفار علم مدافعه  
افراشته هر روز جمع کثیر گشته می شدند تا آنکه پس از مدتی بسی  
موفور قلعه بیرونی مفتوح شد - و اکثر رایان و زمینداران با زن و فرزند  
خود و اقوام خود اسیر شدند و خلعتی بسیار قعیل شدند و لدر دیو  
عاجز شده سی (سه؟) صدفیل و هفت هزار اسب و نقود و جواهر بسیار داد و  
پیشکش هر ساله قبول کرده ملک ناآب علم مراجعت بر افراشت -

'He first collected in heaps,' says Khusrau, 'the treasures he had buried under stones.....in order to provide for his ransom. Next he constructed a golden image of himself, and in acknowledgement of having become a tribute payer, he placed a golden chain round its neck, and sent it through ambassadors....to the commander of the imperial army.'<sup>54</sup>

He offered to surrender 'all the treasures and elephants and horses' and promised to pay tribute and attend the military review of the imperial army. When the ambassadors reached the Malik Nā'ib's camp, they found that he was in no mood to consider their proposals favourably. He communicated the peace proposals, however, to the officers of the army. And they "swore by the head Khizr Khān, the emerald in the ring of the kingdom, that they would accept the gold and raise the siege." Therefore, he was obliged to accept the peace terms and suspend hostilities.<sup>55</sup>

The ransom which the Malik Nā'ib exacted from Pratāparudra appears to have been heavy, although no accurate information is available on the subject. 'Iṣāmy mentions only wealth besides

54. *Khazā'in-ul-Futūḥ*, JIH, viii, p. 393.

55. *Ibid.* pp. 395-6. A somewhat different account is given in the *Dēval Rānī* and *Khizr Khān*. According to this work, the Rāy of Tiling who was hostile to the Sultān, being unable to offer resistance, shut himself in his fort. Here, he was besieged by the Malik Nā'ib who reduced him to desperate condition. He sued for peace and sent him his own image in gold with 100 elephants. Although the Malik Nā'ib accepted the presents and suspended warfare, he assumed an attitude of sternness and threatened the Rāy that unless he came to the camp in person the hostilities would be resumed. The Rāy seeing no other way of escape submitted; he came to the camp and the peace was concluded.

*Dēval Rānī* and *Khizr Khān* (Aligar ed.), pp. 69-70.



greatly pleased with the success of his arms in Tiling received the victorious general and his officers in a black pavilion specially erected for the purpose on the Chautra-i-Nāṣirī.<sup>62</sup> He showed his appreciation of their services by investing the Malik Nā'ib with special dresses of honour thrice during the course of a single day, and distributing largesses among his comrades who contributed much to the victory.<sup>63</sup>

Pratāparudra seems to have carried out his obligations faithfully. The despatch of the stipulated amount of tribute with the contingent of elephants is recorded by contemporary writers. The first year's tribute seems to have been paid to Kāfūr, while he was encamped on the banks of the Narmadā, on his way to Ma'bar. 'After the rivers, mountains and valleys had been crossed,' says Khusrau, 'a present of twenty-three elephants huge as Elburz, arrived from the Rāy of Tiling.'<sup>64</sup> The arrival of another contingent at Dehli is noticed by Baranī towards the close of 711 A.H. 'At the end of this same year,' he observes, 'twenty elephants arrived in Dehli from Laddar Deo, Rāi of Tiling, with a letter stating that he was ready to pay at Deogīr, to any one whom the Sultān would commission to receive it, the treasure he had engaged to pay', thus fulfilling the terms of the treaty made with Malik Kāfūr.<sup>65</sup> Two officers of Pratāparudra, Pōtugantī Maili and Telunga Bijjana, accompanied by some other Nāyaks, seem to have escorted the

62. *Ibid*, p. 401.

63. 'Iṣāmy: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*: p. 283.

چو ده دید رویش قری گشت هاد	سه باره به یک روز خلعت بداد
سرانی که با اودران ترک و تاز	کهیدند زحمت به راه دراز
سه نامور چریکی را نواخت	ز راه کرم برگ چریک بساخت

64. *Khazā'in-ul-Futūḥ*: JIH. ix, p. 52.

65. E. D., iii, p. 204.

the treasury to Dehli. The account of an interesting incident which occurred during their stay in the imperial capital is preserved in the *Velugōṭivārivamśāvali*. For some obscure reason, probably due to the Sultān's desire to witness the display of swordsmanship, for which the Deccanis had always been famous, they had to fight a duel. A special durbar was held at the *dākhōl*<sup>66</sup> in front of the royal palace. 'Alā-ud-Din himself presided over the assembly of noblemen and officers who gathered together to witness the function. The Sultān and the world-famous warrior Malik Kāfur were chosen as arbiters. The fight took place in the open arena in front of the *dākhōl*. At the end of the fight the distinguished judges declared Maili victor.<sup>67</sup> This incident testifies to the existence of

66. The *dākhōl* was the open court-yard of the royal palace where stood two stone benches on either side of the gate. It was also here that condemned criminals were executed. (See. *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* (G.O.S. lxiii), p. 95). According to Ibn Baṭūṭa, it was situated outside the first gate. 'Outside the first gate,' says he, 'there are stages on which executioners sit who have to kill the people. It is the custom with this people that whenever the Sultān orders the execution of a person, he is despatched at the door of the hall of audience, and his body remains there three days.' E. D. iii, p. 612.

67. Mac. Mss. 15-4-3.

నీ. ఢిల్లీలో సురథానుఁ డల్లావదీ ధరాధ్యక్షుండు ప్రత్యక్షసాక్షిగాఁగ  
మహనీయజయశాలి మలికి నేమారుండు జగదేశ్వరుండు సాక్షిగాఁగ  
జగత్పై డెబ్బదేడుగురు నాయంకులు నక్షీణబలయుతుల్ సాక్షిగాఁగ  
సహజసాహసయుద్ధసన్నద్ధవరభటాశ్రయ మైన దాళోలు సాక్షిగాఁగ  
గీ. సూర్యవంశోదయఖ్యాతుఁడార్యతెలుఁగు  
బిజ్జలపుపాలు గెల్చి దద్దీమబలుండు  
వైరిగజభీముఁ డమితసత్యప్రియుండు  
ఘనభుజాశాలి యగు పోతుగంటి మైలి.

V. Prabhakara Sastri: *Cāṭupadyamaṇimanjari*, ii, p. 63.

friendly intercourse between the conquerors and the conquered despite the racial and religious antipathy and the devastating character of the Mussalman invasions.

## SECTION 5

### *The Expeditions against Dwārasamudra and Ma'bar*

Malik Nā'ib did not long remain in Dehli. Within a few weeks of his return to the capital, he was summoned by the Sultān to his presence and was asked to lead an expedition to Ma'bar and proclaim the Muslim faith in that far off region,<sup>68</sup> of course, by means of fire and sword with the usual accompaniments of rapine and plunder. Ma'bar was not the only country that was destined to share the benefits of the new dispensation. Malik Nā'ib was also commanded to evangelise the kingdom of Dwārasamudra which lay on his route to Ma'bar.<sup>69</sup>

The kingdoms of Ma'bar and Dwārasamudra lay at the extreme south of the peninsula, and were farther removed from Dehli than any country which had been conquered by the Muslim armies up to that time. 'Ma'bar is so far from Dehli,' says *Khusrau*, 'that a man travelling with expedition can only reach it after a journey of twelve months. The arrows of the preceding Sultāns had never reached that distant land.'<sup>70</sup> Ma'bar was an extensive and powerful

68. *Khusrau*: *Khazā'in-ul-Futūh*: JIH. ix, p. 50.

69. 'Isāmy: *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn*: p. 285.

وزان پس ملک ناگب راد را      بفرمود صفدار فرمان روا  
که راند سپه را به قصد بلال      کند کهورش را هم پایمال  
از انجا سرے سوي معبر کهد      يگی تمغ کهور کشا بر کهد  
Cf. Barani: E. D. iii, p. 203.

70. *Khazā'in-ul-Futūh*: JIH. ix, p. 49.

kingdom. From Quilon on the Arabian sea, it extended along the Coromandel coast up to Nellore, on the bank of the North Pennār,<sup>71</sup> and included within its boundaries the entire land inhabited by the Tamils at present. This extensive dominion was subjected to the authority of the Pāṇdyas who had the ancient city of Madura on the Vaigai as their principal capital. Although the government of Ma'bar is usually spoken of as a unitary monarchy subject to the authority of a single king, it was, in fact, governed by a college of princes, all belonging to the Pāṇḍyan family. Khusrau refers to two brothers, Sundara Pāṇḍya and Vīra Pāṇḍya, who were ruling in Ma'bar at the time of Malik Nā'ib's invasion.<sup>72</sup> Wassāf mentions Manār Barmūl a son of the daughter of Kalēs Dēwar as ruling at Karāmhattī in the neighbourhood of Kālūl,<sup>73</sup> besides the two princes mentioned by Khusrau. 'Isāmy,

71. Wassāf. E. D. iii, p. 32.

72. Khazā'in-ul-Futūḥ. JIH. ix, p. 56. Elliot's extracts from the 'Ashīqa of Amīr Khusrau (E. D. iii, p. 550) introduce the name of a Rāy called 'Pāṇḍya Guru' who was a Brahman. 'There was another rāī in those parts whose rule extended over sea and land, a Brahman, named Pāṇḍya Gurā.' Dr. S. K. Aiyangar believes that 'this Pāṇḍya Guru might be one of the number of the Pāṇḍyan princes, whose inscriptions have come down to us, other than the brothers Sundara Pāṇḍya and Vīra Pāṇḍya.' Being dissatisfied with his solution, as it does not explain the brahmanhood of the Pāṇḍya, he offers another solution, in a footnote. 'It is just possible that this Pāṇḍya Guru was a priest or mahant with authority over Ramēśvaram and other temples in the vicinity.' This explanation rests upon his own authority; for, he adds, 'there is no definite authority to lead to this conclusion however.' (*South India and Her Muhammadan Invaders*, p. 100). Prof. Ḥabīb, however, has destroyed this Pāṇḍya Guru; he renders the text of Khusrau's poem thus: 'In this vicinity there was an august Rāī, a Brahman named Bīr Pāṇḍyā' (*Dēwal Rānī and Khizir Khān*, JIH. ix, p. 219). Though Prof. Ḥabīb has corrected Elliot's mistake and changed Pāṇḍyā Guru to Bīr Pāṇḍya, he has not tampered with his brahmanhood. As a matter of fact, Vīra Pāṇḍya has been elevated to the priestly caste by an incorrect

however, asserts that Ma'bar was governed by five uterine brothers called collectively 'the Panch Pāṇḍya'<sup>74</sup> The *Velugōṭivārivamśāvali* states that the Panca Pāṇḍyas, viz., Vira Pāṇḍya, Vikrama Pāṇḍya, Parākrama Pāṇḍya, Sundara Pāṇḍya and Kulasekhara Pāṇḍya were defeated in a battle which they fought with Pratāparudra of Warangal near Kāñci.<sup>75</sup> Marco Polo also bears testimony to the government of the kingdom by five princes. 'You must

rendering of the text. The text of the 'Ashīqa or *Dēwāl Rānī* and *Khizr Khān* runs thus: Alighar text, p. 72).

دران حد نیز را گے بود والا      بتاج هندوان لولو گے لا لا  
بر آب و خاک فرمان تمامش      برهمن بیر پنڈ یا گردہ نامش

'In that part of the country, there was a great Rāy, a shining pearl in the crown of the Hindus. His authority was recognized over land and sea; the Brahmans gave him the name of Bīr Pāṇḍyā.' (I am obliged to Mr. Sayyid Usha, B.A., Lecturer in Persian, Madras University, for suggesting the correct translation of the passage). Thus, it is evident that there was no Brahman, called Pāṇḍyā Gurū who ruled over any part of Ma'bar at the time of Malik Kūfūr's invasion.

73. Wassāf, E.D. iii, P. 54.

74. *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, p. 289.

ہندو کہ معبر دران روزگار      نبود سب در ضبط یک شہر یار  
دروہنج کس بود فرمان روا      کہ خواندند پیچ پنڈ یہ آن قوم را

75. *Velugōṭivārivamśāvali*, 37, 38.

ఉ. కంచినమీస మందు నతిగాఢమహోగ్రతఁ బంచపాండ్యులఁ

మించినవిక్రమస్ఫురణ మీటి విజృంభణ సంచితంబుగాఁ

ద్రుంచి జయించి భూతములఁ దృష్టలఁజేసె రణంబున నృహో

దంచితకీర్తిహోరుఁ డెఱచాచన్యపాలుఁడు భూతలంబునఁ.

...వీరపాండ్య, విక్రమపాండ్య, పరాక్రమపాండ్య, సుందరపాండ్య, కులశేఖర పాండ్య మొదలయిన పంచపాండ్యులఁ గంచికాడ రణము నుడిపి...

know,' says he, 'that in this province (Maabar) there are five kings, who are own brothers.'<sup>76</sup> It is, therefore, evident that about the time of Malik Kāfūr's invasion, Ma'bar was under the government of a family monarchy consisting of five princes called collectively Pañca Pāṇḍyas.<sup>77</sup> Each of these five princes seems to have held independent sway over some part of the empire, though the senior-most or the most powerful of them was recognized as the supreme head of the state.<sup>78</sup> He alone was most probably crowned; and on him devolved the right of directing the general policy of the empire.

The ruler of Ma'bar was a powerful sovereign. The principal seat of his government was the ancient city of Madura on the Vagai; another city called Vīra Dhāvalapaṭṭaṇam (Bīr Dhūl) situated on the Coromandel coast in the Tindivanam taluka of the South Arcot district served as a secondary capital to the northern pro-

These Pāṇḍyan princes, with the exception of Vikrama are mentioned in the inscriptions of the time.

Vīra Pāṇḍya—MER 1913 Para 45; 1918 Para 48; 1922 Paras 28, 30; 1924 Para 32; 1909 Para 27.

Parākrama Pāṇḍya—MER 1910 Para 33; 1922 Paras 32-35; 1924 Para 38; 1927 Para 40; 1932 Para 25.

Sundara Pāṇḍya—MER 1916 Para 28; 1918 Para 50; 1921 Para 40; 1922 Para 37; 1930 Para 15; 1934 Para 19.

Kulaśekhara Pāṇḍya—MER 1910 Para 33.

76. Yule: *Marco Polo*, ii, p. 331.

77. It is not unlikely that this system of government had been in existence from an earlier period; for, the Cōla inscriptions of the 11th century allude to the Pañca Pāṇḍyas. Kulōttunga I, for instance, is said to have destroyed a forest where the Pañca Pāṇḍyas had taken refuge. E.I. v. p. 103. *Colas*, ii, pp. 19-20.

78. Yule: *Marco Polo*, ii, p. 331.

vinces of the empire.<sup>79</sup> He had a large army, the strength of which seems to have depended on a corps of a thousand must elephants. Besides the troops recruited from his Hindu subjects, he had a strong contingent of Mussalmans in his service. As it is said that he used to import from abroad a large number of horses every year, he must have had a powerful cavalry. The authority of the king of Ma'bar was not confined to his landed possessions. He was the lord of the sea, which he controlled by means of a numerous fleet.<sup>80</sup> With such a powerful force at his command, the king of Ma'bar was able to dominate the land and the sea. He inflicted a defeat upon his northern neighbour, the Kākatiya ruler of Warangal, and chased him across the Kṛṣṇā.<sup>81</sup> He deprived the Hoysalas of Kongu, and laid siege to their capital Dwārasamudra twice.<sup>82</sup> His fleets tra-

79. This place is identical with Markāṇam. See my article on the Bīr Dhūl in J.A.H.R.S. xiii, pp. 1-5.

80. Wassāf E. D. iii, p. 33. Khusrau; *Dēwal Rānī and Khizir Khān* (Alighar ed.) p. 72.

سپہ بسیار و کشتی بیکرانہ  
مسلمانان چو ہند و چاکرانہ  
ہزارش پیل مسست معبری پیش  
کمیت تہند جوشان خود ز حد بیش

The elephants of Ma'bar were held in high esteem on account of their ferocious character. The words which Khusrau puts into the mouth of Paratāparudra give an indication of their value:

"There are also a hundred elephants.....They are the mad elephants of Ma'bar, not the vegetarian elephants of Bengal.' *Khazā'in-ul-Futūḥ* JIH, viii, p. 394.

81. 332, 340, 361 of 1913; Part. ii, Para 18 of 1914; *Pāṇḍyan Kingdom*, p. 168.

82. *Pāṇḍyan Kingdom*; pp. 183-4. The casual mention of a detail about the fort of Dwārasamudra by Khusrau is the sole evidence regarding this fact. "The commander of the army went round the fort (Dwārasamudra) before which (the troops) of Ma'bar had been twice defeated." *Khazā'in-ul-Futūḥ*—JIH. ix, p. 58).

versed the high seas, and enforced his command in Ceylon and the other islands.<sup>83</sup>

The power of the king of Ma'bar, however, declined after the assassination of Māravarman Kulaśekhara I in 709 A.H.<sup>84</sup> He had two sons, Sundara Pāṇḍya the elder, born of the queen legally wedded to him, and Vira Pāṇḍya the younger, born of a concubine. As the latter displayed 'remarkable shrewdness and intrepidity,' Kulaśekhara nominated him as his successor. Sundara Pāṇḍya who was thus superseded, being incensed with his father by this act of manifest injustice, put him to death, and crowned himself at Madura. He won over the army that was at the capital to his side, and marched with all the treasury and the army to the city Mankūl where he established himself. Vira Pāṇḍya, being desirous of avenging the death of his father, advanced with his forces on his half-brother; and engaged him in a battle on the margin of the lake Talāchī.<sup>85</sup> Though neither side was victorious in the engagement, Vira Pāṇḍya accidentally fell into the hands of his enemy, who seized all his treasures. He managed, however, to effect his escape from captivity, and with the help of his cousin, Manār Barmūl (Mannār Perumāḷ), the ruler of Karāmbhatti near Kālul he not only regained his lost possessions, but turned the tables on Sundara Pāṇḍya, who was forced to seek safety in flight.<sup>86</sup>

83. *Pāṇḍyan Kingdom*: pp. 176-7.

84. E. D. iii, p. 53.

85. Mankūl and Talāchī have not yet been properly identified. Elliot doubted whether Mankūl could be identical with Namkūl, (E. D. iii, p. 53. n. 2). S. K. Aiyangar believes that it is one of the Mangalamams near Madura. (*South India and Her Muhammadan Invaders*, p. 97. n. 1). Nothing is, however, known about the lake Talāchī.

86. Wassāf: E. D. iii, pp. 52-4. Khusrāu corroborates the narrative of Wassāf. It was discovered that the two Rāis of Ma'bar had formerly but

The kingdom of Ma'bar was convulsed in this manner, when, by the orders of Sultān 'Alā-ud-Dīn, Malik Kāfūr set out at the head of the imperial army from Dehli on 26th Jumādā II, 710 A.H. (20th Nov. 1310 A.D.) to spread the light of Islām in that land of dark infidelity. After a journey of nearly two and a half months he reached on 13th Ramzān (Feb. 3, 1311 A.D.) Dēvagiri which served as the basis of operations for the Muslim armies in Deccan during that period. Rāmadēva placed the resources of his kingdom at the disposal of Malik Nā'ib so that he might provide the army with the 'material of war.' The Rāy-i-Rāyān 'ordered all things needed by the army to be placed in the market.' "The material provided for the army—hard and soft goods of wool and

a single will (rūz) and were as united as the two furqadain. But the younger brother, Sundar Pāṇḍya, had from political ambition, coloured his hands in the blood of his father, according to the law, 'seize what you find.' Thereupon, the elder brother, Rāi Bīr Pāṇḍya, collecting many Saturnine Hindus, and leaving his two cities empty, had hastened to slay his younger brother alive.' (*Khazā'in-ul-Futūḥ*, JIH. ix, p. 56).

Although Khusrāu reverses the order of the seniority of the Pāṇḍyan brothers, and does not allude to the illegitimate birth of Vīra Pāṇḍya, he fully bears out the truth of Wassāf's account. The epigraphical evidence, however, seems to contradict the statement of the Mussalman historians that Sundara Pāṇḍya killed his father. An inscription of Tiruk-kāḷakkudī in the Ramnad district dated in the 44th year of Kulasēkhara (June 10th 1311) represents him as the monarch governing the kingdom at that time. (106 of 1916; *Pāṇḍyan Kingdom* pp. 202-204). This presents, indeed, a real difficulty. It may be pointed out that Wassāf and Khusrāu were the inhabitants of two different countries. One was a resident of Baghdād in 'Irāq, and the other of Dehli in Hindustan. They must have obtained their information from independent sources; and their agreement as regards the assassination of Kulasēkhara goes far to confirm the belief that it was a fact. As to the difficulty presented by epigraphy it may be pointed out, if the practice of a later age might be cited in explanation, that it was not unusual during Vijayanagara times for the royal orders

leather, brass and iron—was beyond all computation.”<sup>87</sup> He also issued special directions to one of his officers, Paraśurāma Daḷavāy, whose estates lay on the frontiers of the Hoysala dominions to guide the imperial army in its march on Dwārasamudra.<sup>88</sup>

Rāmadēva had special reasons for assisting Malik Kāfur in his attack upon Dwārasamudra. Since his accession to the throne, Ballāla III had been making ceaseless attempts to encroach on the Sēuṇa territory. He seized the Sāntalige Thousand in 1299 A.D., invaded the province of Banavāse in the next year, and caused such confusion in the province that Rāmadēva was obliged to take the field in person. He made persistent efforts to seize Malenāḍu, and showed no inclination to suspend hostilities, notwithstanding the repeated reverses which he and his armies sustained at the hands

to be dated in the reign of a king, one or two years after his demise, as if he were still ruling. It is not unlikely that such a thing happened in this instance also.

87. *Khusrau: Khazā'in-ul-Futūh*: JIH. ix, pp. 53-4.

88. *Ibid.* According to Baranī, however, Rāmadēva was dead by the time of Malik Kāfur's arrival at Dēvagiri. 'They then proceeded to Deogir, where they found that Rām deo was dead.' (E.D. iii, p. 203). Nizām-ud-Dīn Aḥmad repeats Baranī's statement, and adds that Rāy-i-Rāyān's son performed the usual services. (*Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī* (Eng. Tr.), i, p. 184). Ferishta states that the commanders of the imperial army on reaching Dēvagiri "found that Rāmdew, the old king was dead, and that young Prince Shunkul Dew was not well affected to the Mahomedans" (Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 373). This statement though erroneous, has been accepted by scholars in general. To cite only one instance. 'The army marched again,' says Haig, 'by way of Deogir, where Shankar Deo had succeeded his father who had, in the words of an uncompromising historian, 'gone to hell' either late in 1309 or early 1310. Historians are not agreed on Shankar's attitude to the Muslims.' (C.H.I., iii, p. 115).

The evidence of Baranī and the later historians must not be accepted as genuine in preference to that of *Khusrau* who lived in the court of 'Alā-ud-

of Kampilidēva, the Sēuṇa governor of that district.<sup>89</sup> Ballāḷa's aggressions on Rāmadēva and others are also alluded to by Khusrau.

'In that country also, there was a famous king; his name was Ballāl; he was well known at the time. His power rested on his

Dīn and had special opportunities of knowing the true facts at first-hand. He was intimately acquainted with Malik Nā'ib and the other officers who led the expedition, and could not have been ignorant of such an important event as the death of Rāmadēva, had it really happened before Malik Nā'ib reached Dēvagiri, on his way to Ma'bar. Another historian, who was a younger contemporary of Khusrau also, indicates that Rāmadēva was alive at that time. While describing Malik Nā'ib's march to Ma'bar, 'Iṣāmy states simply that he passed through Dēvagiri; but does not allude to Rāmadēva at all.

شہد مملک ناگب نامدار      چو بشنید فر ما گش شهر یار  
سپہ راند از تختگہ ناگزیر      بہ یک چلہ بگذشت از دیوگیر  
وز انجا در آمد بہ حد بلال      ہمی کرد سرحد او پانگمال

*Futūh-us-Salātīn*: (Quoted from the India office Ms.) cf. The published Agra Text, p. 286.

But some time after the return of Malik Nā'ib to Dehli, a traveller from the city of Dēvagiri visited the Sultān in Delhi and informed him that Rāmadēva died and that his son Bhillama (Sangama) revolted.

یکی روز سیاحی از دیوگیر      کہ بد سادق القول و روہن ضمیر  
بر حضرت بہامد سیاحت کنان      زمین را ز ہر سو مساحت کنان  
خبر گفت از مردن راند یو      کہ بود ست در ملک مرہٹ خدیو  
*Ibid.*, p. 325.

This clearly shows that Rāmadēva was alive at the time of Malik Nā'ib's visit to Dēvagiri on his way to Ma'bar.

89. *Origin of the City and the Empire of Vijayanagara*: pp. 73-74, 81-84.

wealth and elephants; and (the kings of) Dēvagiri and Ma'bar were his quarry.<sup>90</sup>

Therefore, when the imperial army was marching against his inveterate foe, Rāmadēva could not refrain from actively assisting them.

The army started again from Dēvagiri on 17th Ramzān (7th Feb. 1311) and after a march of five days, reached Bandri (Bandir in the Satari Tk., of the North Kanara Dt.)<sup>91</sup> in the territory of the *daḷavāy* Paraśurāma Dēva which stood somewhere near the Hoysala frontier. Here, Malik Nā'ib halted and despatched 'swift-footed scouts' into the enemy's territory to make 'diligent enquiries on all sides' and 'find out the condition of the country.'<sup>92</sup> The manner in which the information was collected bears testimony to the efficiency of the Muslim military organisation. Four officers, Bahrām Karra, Qatlah Nehang, Maḥmūd Sartīha, and Abājī Muḡhal who accompanied the army were specially detailed to secure intelligence. Every day one of these four officers had to go in advance of the army for gathering information, accompanied by an interpreter who was acquainted with the languages of the country. He

90. *Dēval Rānī and Khiz̤r Khān*, p. 71.

بد اینجا نیز راغی بود با نام      بلاش نام و نا ما و ر در ایام  
بمالش زور و پیشش سری هم      زبوش دیوگیری میبزی هم

91. S. K. Aiyangar feels that Bandri is almost certainly Pandhārpūr, 'which in all probability was the southern limit of the dominions of Rāmadeo according to Amīr Khusrāu's itinerary for Malik Kāfūr.' (*South India and Her Muhammadan Invaders*, p. 192). Amīr Khusrāu, however, does not give room for this speculation. He simply states that Kāfūr crossed three rivers during his five days march and reached Bandri.

92. Khusrāu: *Khazā'in-ul-Futūh* JIH, ix, p. 55.

brought intelligence of things good and evil; and the commander directed the movement of the forces as seemed most advisable to him.<sup>93</sup> The officer who went into Ballāḷa's dominion brought very important information. Ballāḷa was absent from his kingdom. As soon as he heard that a civil war broke out in Ma'bar between the two sons of Kulaśekhara, he marched with his troops into that country, all unconscious of the danger that threatened him in the rear. Ballāḷa's object in leading his troops to Ma'bar, according to *Khusrāu*, was to plunder the merchants of the two important cities in the dominions of Vira Pāṇḍya which he left without proper means of defence, when he hastened to the south with all his troops to chastise his brother for his unfilial conduct.<sup>94</sup> A stronger reason than the lust of plunder was his ambition to recover his ancestral possessions in the Tamil country which were wrested from his predecessors by Jaṭavarman Sundara Pāṇḍya<sup>95</sup> and Māra-varman Kulaśekhara.<sup>96</sup> Therefore, he must have considered the outbreak of civil dissensions in the Pāṇḍyan kingdom a favourable

93. 'Iṣāmy: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭin* p. 288.

روان شد بفرمان شاه جهان	شنیدم چو آن ناگب کامران
زد رگه آن خسرو کامگار	برو نامزد کرد مردان کار
چو محمود سرتیم باهوش و هنگ	جو بهرام کوه چو قتل نهنگ
بفرمان شه بود فرمان برش	ابا جي منل بود در لشکرش
که هم کرد با ناگب خود تعین	بهر روز ازین پیچ مرد گزین
بیارودی اخبار هر خمر و شر	یکی پیش رفتی برای خبر
که واقف بدي در تمامی زبان	بهردي ابا خود یکی تر چمان

94. *Khazā'in-ul-Futūḥ*: JIH, ix, p. 56.

95. EI, iii, pp. 11-14.

96. A. Krishnamurti: *Hoysalas*, ch. vii.

opportunity for regaining what his uncle and grandfather had lost, and proceeded with all expedition to realise his ambition.

Providence, however, did not favour Ballāla's designs. The time for establishing his power in the Tamil country had not yet come. The 'sky-rending thunder of the Muslim drums at his back' arrested his progress. And he had to hasten back to his capital, in the picturesque language of *Khusrau*, 'like an upturned and unlucky Saturn.'<sup>97</sup>

As soon as Malik Nā'ib heard that Ballāla was away from his capital, he held consultations with his officers, and resolved to march rapidly towards Dwārasamudra with an army of 10,000 men. He set out from Bandri on 23rd Ramzān (Feb. 13, 1311 A.D.) and reached Dwārasamudra on 5th Shawwāl (Feb. 25, 1311 A.D.) after an arduous journey of twelve days.<sup>98</sup> On the way, he devastated Ballāla's dominions and spread panic in the countryside. An unsuccessful attempt seems to have been made to check his advance. Two *viragal* inscriptions at Dudda in the Hassan district record the death of a chief in a battle with the Turukas who were advancing on Dōrasamudra.<sup>99</sup> The battle with the Turukas mentioned in these epigraphs must have been a skirmish which impeded but little the progress of the invaders.

Ballāla appears to have been inclined at first to offer resistance. He addressed an appeal to the Pāṇḍyan princes for help, forgetting in the anxiety to save himself his recent demonstration of hostility

97. *Khazā'in-ul-Futūḥ*: JIH, ix, p. 56.

98. *Ibid.*, pp. 56, 57.

99. E. C. V. Hn. 51, 52. The inscriptions are wrongly dated on Monday śu di 5 Māgha of the year Saumya during the prosperous reign of Vira Ballāla Dēva. Though the date is irregular, the Turuka invasion mentioned in them must be identical with Malik Nā'ib's expedition.

towards them. Vira Pāṇḍya who had recently succeeded in chastising his brother generously responded to the appeal; and 'sent to his assistance an army of horse and foot'.<sup>100</sup> The garrison defending Dwārasamudra seems to have directed their artillery against the Muhammadans.<sup>101</sup> But Ballāḷa, who was the most clear-sighted Hindu monarch of his time, saw that he could not successfully resist the might of Dehli. Hostility to the invaders was sure to bring ruin to himself and his people. The country would be plundered, and the temples of the gods destroyed. Submission involved loss of all his wealth and war material; but that would leave him in the undisturbed possession of his kingdom; and his people would escape the horrors of Muslim invasion. He preferred the happiness of his people to the shadowy glory which he might acquire by an unsuccessful fight with the invaders. Therefore, he resolved to decline the contest and make peace with Mālik Nā'ib; but his nobles and officers who were unaccustomed to tame submission, did not easily acquiesce in his decision. They 'tried to incite' him to continue the warfare, and pointed out that the prospect of victory was not absolutely gloomy, that submission without any resistance would lower the prestige of the kingdom, and death and annihilation in a heroic struggle with the invaders was preferable to an ignominious peace purchased at the cost of national honour.<sup>102</sup> Ballāḷa, however, stood firm; he said that the Hindus could not stand against the Turks. Wherever they came into conflict with each other, the latter destroyed the former. Rudra Dēva, the master of nine lakhs of Tilinga warriors, could not oppose this

100. Wassāf: E. D. iii, pp. 49, 50.

101. 'The servant, Bilāl Deo has thrown a few stones from the top of his fort.' (*Khazā'in-ul-Futūḥ*, JIH. ix, p. 60). This sentence which *Khusrau* puts in the mouth of Ballāḷa Dēva doubtless indicates that the garrison made an attempt to attack the besiegers.

102. *Khusrau*: *Khazā'in-ul-Futūḥ*: JIH, ix, pp. 57-8.

nation; the celebrated Rāmadēva, the king of Dēvagiri, being unable to meet them in battle, made peace with them; and even Hamīr, the king of Hind, who had waged war on them, perished.<sup>103</sup> To contemplate resistance to them was disastrous. Therefore, he asked them to 'lay aside all idea of opposition'. The firm attitude of Ballāḷa impressed his followers; 'they gave up all thoughts of resistance', and consented to make peace with the Muhammadans.<sup>104</sup> Ballāḷa did not, however, proceed precipitately to open negotiations with Malik Nā'ib. He wanted to ascertain whether the invaders were really as strong as he believed them to be. He sent Kīsū (Kēśava) Mal, one of his officers, to visit the camp of the enemy, and 'find out the strength and circumstances of the Muslim army.' Kīsū Mal passed through the camp, noting the strength of the enemy's forces, and the vigilance with which they kept watch over the fort. He returned to his master, and told him that the invaders were, indeed, formidable. Thereupon, Ballāḷa sent Bālak (Ballappa) Deo Nāyaka who was reputed to be a clever diplomat, to negotiate the terms of surrender. Malik Nā'ib received the ambassador, and explained to him the usual conditions under which he was instructed by the Sultān to offer protection to the Hindu kings. He ordered some

103. 'Iṣāmy: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*: (India Office Ms.); cf. Agra Text, p. 286.

بدل گفت کین لشکر در کشاے	شنیدم چو این قصه بشنید راے
به بازی صف هندوان بشکند	به هر سو که تازد خرابی کند
سزین قوم را پیش نا مد به جنگ	لدر دیوان راگی نه لک تلنگ
که برگشت ازین قوم کم برد جان	همیری که بد شد هندوستان
که بودست در ملک مرهط خدیو	همان رای خرشید فر رامدیو
به خدمت در آورده سر بی درنگ	برین طائفه پس نیامد به جنگ

104. *Khusrau: Khazā'in-ul-Futūḥ*. JIH, ix, p. 58; Wassāf: E. D. iii, p. 50.

Hindu Parmār *hājibs* of his camp to accompany Bālak Deo into the fort, and stipulate with Ballāla personally the conditions of peace. On hearing the conditions explained to him by the imperial *hājibs*, Ballāla consented to become a *zimmī* and surrender all his wealth, elephants and horses.<sup>105</sup> Malik Nā'ib's victory over Ballāla is said to have resulted in the establishment of Islām and the construction of a stone mosque in the kingdom of Dwārasamudra.<sup>106</sup> This is highly improbable. Malik Nā'ib stayed in Ballāla's dominions for a period of thirteen days. He reached Dwārasamudra on the 5th of Shawwāl and left for Ma'bar on the 18th of the same month. Though he served under a master who bore the magical name of 'Alā-ud-Dīn, he could not have worked, without the aid of the wonderful lamp, miracles during the brief period of less than two weeks. Therefore, the establishment of Islām and the erection of a mosque must be relegated to the realm of pious fancy.

Having successfully plundered Ballāla III, Malik Nā'ib was now ready to move on with his legions towards Ma'bar. As the route lay through difficult mountainous country, the journey could not be easily accomplished without proper guides. Malik Nā'ib knew

105. *Khazā'in-ul-Futūh*, JIH. ix, pp. 58-64. The amount of wealth and the number of elephants and horses carried away by Malik Nā'ib on this occasion have been variously estimated by the Muslim writers. According to Wassāf, Ballāla delivered up to Malik Nā'ib 'the country of 'Arikanna' as a proof of his allegiance, and treasure beyond what imagination could conceive together with 55 large elephants. (E. D. iii, p. 50). Baranī states that 'all the treasures of the place fell into the hands of the victors'; but he does not allude to any concession of territory and reduces the number of elephants to thirty-six (*Ibid.*, p. 203). The other Muslim writers give vague accounts of vast treasures which do not help to make our knowledge any more definite.

106. Wassāf: E. D. iii, p. 50; "Instead of shell-blowing, pyrolatry, and idol-worship the true faith and the five daily prayers were established." Cf. Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, pp. 373-4.

that Ballāla who was familiar with all the roads leading into the plains of Ma'bar could give him most valuable help. Therefore, he summoned Ballāla to his presence, and commanded him, on behalf of his master, that he should guide the imperial army into Ma'bar without exciting attention so that the people of that country should be taken completely by surprise. Ballāla saw that he had no means of escape. If he wanted to avoid ruin, he had to obey, and lead the Muslim army. Therefore, he consented to accompany Malik Nā'ib, and set out accordingly with his retinue.<sup>107</sup>

After five days' march through hard impenetrable tracts, they reached Ma'bar frontier on 23rd Shawwāl (15th March 1311), but their progress seems to have been checked by unexpected developments in the camp. Abāji Mughal, one of the officers, who accompanied the army, by the Sultān's command, contemplated treason. One day when, according to the custom, he went out scouting, he penetrated into the enemy's territory with the intention of deserting. His plan was simple: he would declare his friendship to the king of Ma'bar; and with the assistance of his troops, surprise Malik Nā'ib's camp at night and put him to death. His project, however, miscarried. He stumbled on a contingent of Ma'bar troops which lay in ambush. Unaware of Abāji's intentions, and before he could explain himself through his interpreter, they

107. 'Iṣāmy: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 287.

که ای فخر رایان هندوستان  
دل و جان تو باد عهت گرا  
چنین است فرمان شاه جهان  
زنی کوس و درسمت مبر شوی  
کهد نا گهان سر بمهر سپاه  
به راه سپه را بمهر بری  
گذیری دیگر جز اطاعت ندید

پس از هفتیم گفتش آن کامران  
تو چون از دل و جان شدی یار ما  
کنون بهنوای فخر هندوستان  
که این بار همراه لشکر شوی  
که آگاه نگردد کس از اهل راه  
کنی لشکر شاه را رهبری  
بسمع بلال این سخن چون رسید

rushed on him, killed his interpreter, and scattered his followers.<sup>108</sup> This incident did not much impede the advance of the army. As soon as the news of Abāji's treason reached Malik Nā'ib, he seized him and kept him in custody for the rest of the campaign.<sup>109</sup>

The princes of Ma'bar who were engaged in internecine warfare could not properly organise the defence of the kingdom; but they adopted a strategy which though unimpressive was calculated to force the invaders to retire from their territories within a short time. They knew that their forces could not successfully oppose the armoured Muslim cavalry; and their forts could afford them but little protection when beset with *manjanīqs*, *maghrībies*, 'arādah, *sābāts* and other up to date weapons of siege warfare. They resolved that they should not allow themselves to be caught in a fort like Rāmadēva, Pratāparudra and Vira Ballāla III. They preferred instead to take to the open country, strike the enemy when they could do so without danger, and retire swiftly to places where he could not easily follow them. The consistent adoption of these tactics enabled them to elude the grasp of the invaders. Malik Nā'ib, therefore, failed to come to grips with them; though he mercilessly harried the country from one end to the other, he could never force the Pāṇḍyan princes to submit to the Sultān of Dehli.

The Muslim army passed without accident the passes of Tarmali<sup>110</sup> and Tābar, and bivouacked on the banks of the river Kanaurī. They remained here for a while, and probably repelled an attack of the Ma'bar forces.<sup>111</sup> Breaking up the camp on the Kanaurī on the

108. *Ibid.*, pp. 288-9.

109. *Ibid.*, p. 289.

110. Elliot, 'Sarmali' E. D. iii, p. 90.

111. "The dust of the wind flew with the wind of Islām, and attacked the Ma'barī troops, who were more numerous than sand-grains; their ranks



sides retired to their respective camps. Vīra Pāṇḍya gained his object under the cover of darkness; he silently stole away from Bīrdhūl, taking with him 'a quantity of cash and valuables,' 'and also a number of men and horses.'<sup>114</sup> The flight of Vīra Pāṇḍya was not discovered until the next morning, and when the news spread in the city, the Muslim soldiers in his service were greatly disheartened, and believing that they had been deserted by their master surrendered to Malik Nā'ib who treated them with much consideration. As soon as Malik Nā'ib discovered that he had been outwitted by Vīra Pāṇḍya, he resolved to go in pursuit of him. He learnt that the Rāy had moved towards Kandūr (Kannanūr), where it was believed that he intended to take shelter. Leaving a large part of the army under Khwaja Hājī, the 'Arīz-i-Mamālīk to keep guard on Bīrdhūl, he proceeded in the wake of the fugitive monarch; but the unexpected outbreak of the rains forced him to suspend the project and return to the camp at Bīrdhūl. The rain caused much discomfort and inconvenience to the Muslim soldiery. Not only did the rain water percolate through the armour but it rendered their weapons ineffective and useless. "The water rendered the bows ineffective and made the Hindi sword rusty; it got in between the arrow and its (iron) point, and separated them from one another."<sup>115</sup> In the midst of the heavy downpour of rain, they were galled by the attacks of the enemy. The Hindu *rawāts* or the cavalry came riding in the rain and charged them. A fierce fight followed. "A deluge of water and blood flowed forward."<sup>116</sup> The Hindus were finally repulsed. Malik Nā'ib realised that if he remained inactive the

Rāi, along with other pale faces, kept falling into fits....' Khusrau: Khazā'in-ul-Futūh, JIH, ix, p. 67.

114. Khusrau: Khazā'in-ul-Futūh, JIH, ix, p. 68.

115. *Ibid*, p. 69.

116. *Ibid*.

Hindu horse would come again and harass the camp. If, on the other hand, he moved forward, he would draw them away with him. Therefore, he resolved, in spite of the torrents of rain which fell from above, to go in search of Vīra Pāṇḍya. Ballāla led the way;<sup>117</sup> and the Muslim cavalry started. The country was flooded. The whole landscape was converted into a vast sheet of water. The roads could not be distinguished from the wells and the tanks. 'The horsemen guided their horses as pilots guide their ships.'<sup>118</sup> As expected by Malik Nā'ib, the Hindus always hovered around his camp; he felt their sinister presence everywhere; but he could not strike at them. He came to a village 'where the Hindu army lay encamped'; but on his approach, they broke the camp and vanished. His scouts reported at midnight that Vīra Pāṇḍya fled to Kandūr. Immediately, he started in pursuit; he came across a few Hindu soldiers whom he put to the sword, but he found that Vīra Pāṇḍya was not among them. When the Sun rose next morning, a squad of one hundred and twenty elephants laden with treasure was discovered in the vicinity of his camp. Malik Nā'ib put to flight the Hindu cavalry guarding the treasure, seized the elephants, and entrusted them to the officers of the treasury. He then proceeded to Kandūr and took the town after a fierce struggle; but Vīra Pāṇḍya eluded him again. The Mussalmans believed that he fled to Jālkōṭa (Jālkūta?) and moved in that direction; news, however, reached them on the way that he was not there; but that he had taken refuge in the midst of impenetrable forests. In despair they gave up the pursuit and returned to Kandūr.

117. 'Iṣāmy: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭin*: p. 289.

همی رفت شادان بخوب اخترى بالاش کمر بستہ در رهبری

118. *Khusrau*: *Khazā'in-ul-Futūḥ*: JIH. ix, p. 69.

Malik Nā'ib learnt, on his return to Kandūr, that there were, at Marhatpurī, several rich shrines including the famous golden temple which was held in high esteem by all the Hindus.<sup>119</sup> Vīra Pāṇḍya, who was specially devoted to the deity enshrined in the golden temple, stationed strong contingents of elephants and horse to protect the place. Malik Nā'ib resolved to destroy these temples and plunder the wealth accumulated therein by the pious devotion of the Hindus of several ages. He set out from Kandūr with his men early in the next morning and reached Marhatpurī by midnight. He attacked the city at once, and massacred its sleeping inhabitants. At his command, the time-honoured shrines came down crashing. The idols were smashed; and the gold and gems with which they were decorated were plundered. The Brahmans and other devotees who came forward to protect their deities from the sacrilegious hands of the invaders were put to death. The Golden Temple was razed to the ground; its foundations were carefully dug out; and the other temples dedicated to Śiva, Viṣṇu and other gods were set on fire.<sup>120</sup> Having thus dismantled all the sacred structures at Marhatpurī, Malik Nā'ib marched back with the elephants and the treasure towards the main camp at Bīrdhūl and reached it on 11th

119. Khusrau: *Dēval Rānī and Khizr Khān* (Alighar edition, p. 72).

بطن را ساخت منزل گه خویش      بت و بتخانه در مرهت پوری بیش  
زرر بتخانه را بر ماه برده      زحل را زان بشان از راه برده  
بتے دروي غریق لعل و یاقوت      کم شهری را بود هر گوهری قوت

The city of Marhatpurī (Barmatpurī of the *Khazā'in-ul-Futūh*) has been identified with Markatanagara of Gangā Dēvī's *Madhurā Vijayam*. The latter appears to be another name of the city of Kāncī. See my article on Bīr Dhūl JAHRS. xiii, p. 15.

120. Khusrau: *Khazā'in-ul-Futūh*. JIH ix, pp. 72-3. *Dēval Rānī and Khizr Khān* p. 73. 'Isāmy, however, reverses the order of the events. In

Zī-ul-Qa'da (1st April 1311 A.D.). During the two days of his stay at that place, he was busy in concerting measures for completing the destruction of its temples. Of the many shrines that stood in the place, not one was allowed to remain to tell the tale of their former glory. "Their foundations were dug up so thoroughly that below every foundation a well was excavated."<sup>121</sup> Malik Nā'ib then conceived the idea of making a sudden descent upon Madura. He wanted to take Sundara Pāṇḍya by surprise and seize the treasures of the Pāṇḍyan royal family. He set out from Bīrdhūl with all the army on the 13th Zī-ul-Qa'da (3rd April 1311 A.D.) and reached Madura on the 20th (10th April 1311 A.D.). Sundara Pāṇḍya was, however, forewarned; and he did not want to fall into Malik Nā'ib's hands. He retired from his capital accompanied by his family; and he left only two or three elephants belonging to the temple of Cokkanātha in the city. On reaching Madura, Malik Nā'ib discovered to his chagrin that his prey had dodged him once again. He ransacked the city for elephants; excepting the two or three beasts attached to the temple, he could find none. He 'was so inflamed with

obedience to the orders of the Sultān, Malik Kāfūr is said to have first attacked 'the Golden Temple', and accomplished its destruction.

بدان تا برد حکم خسرو درست	به بتخانتم زور در آمد نخست
زربى کران آمد او را بدست	شنیدم که بتخانتم زور شکست
زبنیاد دیوارها برکنند	وزان پس بگفت آتش درزند

*Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*: p. 289.

This must have been the first step which the invader coming from the passes in the Eastern Ghats would have taken, if Marhatpuri were identical with Kāñci, for the latter stood directly on his route to Bīrdhūl (Markāṇam) on the seacoast.

121. *Khusrau*: *Khazā'in-ul-Futūḥ*: JIH. ix, p. 73.

anger that he set fire to the temple.<sup>122</sup> Moreover, he could not tarry at Madura even to plunder that wealthy city. His lust for plunder had drawn Kāfūr farther than he could go with safety. A new danger arose in his rear. The Pāṇḍyan princes seem to have forgotten their mutual jealousies in the presence of a common danger, and united their forces under the leadership of Vikrama Pāṇḍya, a veteran general who contributed much to the success of the Pāṇḍyan arms during the glorious days of Jaṭāvarman Sundara II. He was responsible for the conquest and the annexation of Vēnāḍ in the extreme south. Vikrama was a younger brother as well as a co-regent of Māravarman Kulaśēkhara I.<sup>123</sup> The titles and achievements of Jaṭāvarman Sundara II which are ascribed to him in his inscriptions indicate that he was a partner of the former in the council chamber as well as on the battle-field.<sup>124</sup> On the death of Jaṭāvarman Sundara II in 1293 A.D., Vikrama seems to have made himself the supreme lord of the empire, an office which by right should have devolved on his elder brother. As Kulaśēkhara was not disposed to allow himself to be dispossessed of the office which lawfully belonged to him, he repudiated the pretensions of his younger brother, and thus precipitated the outbreak of a civil war. Vikrama appears to have prevailed against his brother during the early stages of the war. He is said to have vanquished several chiefs and forced them to submit to his authority. Though success did not at first favour Kulaśēkhara, he did not give up hope and abandon the struggle. At last, he found a valuable ally in Ravivarman Kulaśēkhara, one of his subordinate chiefs who held sway over Jayatunganāḍ. Ravivarman espoused the cause of his overlord with great enthusiasm, and took the field against

122. *Khusrau*: *Khazā'in-ul-Futūh*, JIH. ix, p. 74.

123. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri: *Pandyan Kingdom*, pp. 189-190; 462 of 1921.

124. *Ibid.*

Vikrama. Being vanquished in a battle, Vikrama was forced to seek safety in flight. Ravivarman pursued him to his place of refuge; seized him, and brought him as a captive before Kulaśekhara. The brothers were probably reconciled. And Vikrama gave his daughter in marriage to his captor Ravivarman,<sup>125</sup> and settled down to rule the portion of the empire which was assigned to him. As Ravivarman's marriage with the daughter of Vikrama Pāṇḍya was celebrated in 1300 A.D.<sup>126</sup> the outbreak of the civil war between Kulaśekhara and Vikrama and the defeat of the latter should have preceded that year. Vikrama does not seem to have taken an active part in the affairs of the empire since his defeat. But the assassination of his brother, the confusion engendered by the fratricidal war between his brother's sons and the turmoil caused by the Muhammadan invasion which threatened to disrupt the empire brought him out of retirement. Vikrama had to assume the command of the army to save the empire from impending destruction. He advanced on the enemy at the head of a large force and attacked them in an unknown place. A battle ensued in which the Muhammadans suffered a defeat. The cavalry in which lay the strength of their army

125. *Līlātilakam* (Pisharoti's edition), pp. xvi-xvii.

“ഏറ്റം തിമർന്നു തിറമുറണയും നൂപൻ താൻ  
കാറത്തു സംവലിതതുലസമാൻ വിതേനേ  
ചീരത്തിനാൽ മതിമറന്ന മഹാനഭാവൻ  
കുറഞ്ഞിലും കൊടിയ വിക്രമപാണ്ഡ്യസിംഹഃ”

“ഭ്രോണായ ഭൂപദം ധനഞ്ജയ ഇവ കച്ഛാപാലബാലാം ബലി  
വേണാട്ടിന്നടയോരു വീരവിവർദ്ധ്യോ യദുനാം പതിഃ  
പാണ്ഡ്യം വിക്രമപുഷ്പം പടയിൽവെച്ചുളിപ്പിച്ചിട്ടുണ്ടനേ  
പാണ്ഡ്യരായ കൊടുത്തു തന്യു തനയാം പത്മാനനമേഗഹീൽ.”

I am obliged to Mr. P. Krishnan Nair, the Junior Lecturer in Malayalam, Madras University for having furnished me with the relevant passages from the *Līlātilakam*.

126. El. iv, p. 146.

was either cut to pieces or put to flight.<sup>127</sup> This is confirmed by Wassāf : "When at last," says he, "a large army, attended by numerous elephants of war, was sent out to oppose the Muhammadans, Malik Nabū, who thought himself a very Saturn, was obliged to retreat, and bring back his army."<sup>128</sup> Nevertheless, Malik Nā'ib kept his hold on the vast booty he had captured, and conveyed it to Dehli safely without any other mishap on the way. He was grateful to Ballāla III for the valuable assistance rendered by him during the campaign; Ballāla proved a useful ally, and, if treated with consideration, he might be serviceable in subjugating Ma'bar on some future occasion. Swayed by considerations such as these, Malik Nā'ib took with him prince Ballāla, the son and heir of Ballāla III, to Dehli. When he reached the imperial capital after a journey of six months, the Sultān received him in a public durbar held in the Golden Palace on 14th Jumādā II 711 A.H. (30th Oct. 1311 A.D.) and honoured him by investing him with a dress of honour. Malik Nā'ib then introduced young Ballāla to the Sultān, and explained to him the meritorious service rendered by his father during the Ma'bar expedition. The Sultān who was pleased with Ballāla treated his son very kindly. He invested him with a robe of honour, placed a royal tiara over his head and presented him with an umbrella. He restored to him the kingdom which Malik Nā'ib had conquered and offered him a gift of ten lakhs of tankas. The Sultān having thus shown much liberality to Prince Ballāla, sent him back to the court of his father.<sup>129</sup>

127. *Līlātilakam* (Pisharoti's edition) p. xvii.

“പരമേശ്വരൻ പരമപുരുഷൻ പാണ്ഡ്യനാഥൻ: ഖണ്ഡയോചകൻ ഗജേന്ദ്രശാസ്താവനാഥൻ: തുളസിദാസൻ: തുളസിമണി: തുളക്കരപ്പള്ളം.”

128. E. D., iii, p. 50.

129. *Futūh-us-Salātīn*: p. 290.

فرض چیں ملائک نائب سر فراز بحضرت درآمد بصد عز و ناز

Exaggerated accounts of Malik Nā'ib's Ma'bar expedition are embodied in some modern works on the history of Mediaeval India. He is represented as having subdued the whole of Ma'bar up to Rāmēśvaram in the island of Pāmban, where he is said to have not only plundered and destroyed the greatest Hindu shrine,<sup>130</sup> but built a mosque which he named after his master;<sup>131</sup> moreover, he is credited with the establishment of Muslim power at Madura where he is said to have left a military governor supported by a contingent of Muhammadan soldiers to uphold the imperial authority.<sup>132</sup>

بیا بوس هم برد رای بلال	رسا نید برشم بسے پیل و مال
بذائب ملک خلعتی خاص داد	بخندید شے چون گل بامداد
که رهبر همی برد پیمش سپاه	بلال سرفراز را گفت هـ
کلاه کیانی بفرقش نهند	ابا خلعت خاص چترش دهند
بسے وعد چایش با کرام داد	برو تنک ده لگ انعام داد
بدو داد انعام دوم و برش	وزان پس روان کرد در کشورش

It is evident from this passage that, according to 'Iṣāmy, Malik Nā'ib took with him to Dehli Ballāla III himself, and not his son. This is, no doubt, a mistake. The inscriptions show clearly that it was the son, and not the father who visited the Sultān's court at Dehli. E. C. vii, Sh. 69 records the remission of certain taxes by Ballāla III, on the occasion of the return of his son Vira Ballāladēva from Dehli, after the Turuka war. The name, Ballāladēva, which was common to the father and the son must have misled 'Iṣāmy into attributing the journey which the son had made to the father.

130. Ishvari Prasad: *Mediaeval India*, p. 204.

131. Haig: C.H.I., iii p. 116.

132. S. K. Aiyangar: *South India and Her Muhammadan Invaders*, p. 123. "There seems, however, little doubt that he (Malik Nā'ib) left a garrison behind at Madura, the headquarters of the Pāṇḍya Kulāśekhara, who had fled to protection for Delhi. Whether the garrison was left to safe-

There is, however, no evidence to sustain these statements. Malik Kāfur did not pass beyond Madura. Ferishta, no doubt, asserts that Kāfur built a mosque of stone and plaster at Sīt Band Rāmēsar. This place must not be confounded with Rāmēsvaram in the Pāmban; for Ferishta's Sīt Band Rāmēsvar stood on the coast of the sea of 'Umman (the Arabian Sea) in the immediate neighbourhood of the port of Dwārasamudra.<sup>133</sup> Moreover, it is very doubtful whether Kāfur built any mosque at all even here; for Ferishta's statement is not corroborated by any earlier Muslim historian.<sup>134</sup> Khusrau, Wassāf, 'Iṣāmī and Baranī who describe the events connected with this campaign pretty elaborately do not allude to the construction of a mosque at Sīt Band Rāmēsar or any other place. Nor is there any ground for the belief that Kāfur left a garrison at Madura. No Muslim historian mentions it; and the relations of the Dehli Sultāns with the rulers of Ma'bar during the succeeding years, as described, by the Muslim historians, clearly indicate that Ma'bar remained under the rule of the Hindu kings until the age of the Tughlaqs. The belief seems to be ultimately traceable to Hindu sources. It is

guard the interests of Kulāsēkhara is not clearly stated but seems quite likely." Dr. Aiyangar does not, of course, give any clue to the source from which he had drawn this information. "Kulāsēkhara is," as pointed out Prof. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, "an obvious slip for Sundara." *Pāṇḍyan Kingdom*, p. 208, n. 1.

133. *Ferishta*: Habib's trans. JIH., ix, p. 225.

134. Amīr Khusrau, according to Dr. S. K. Aiyangar, claims that Malik Kāfur did advance as far as Rāmēsvaram in Pāmban. (*South India and Her Muhammadan Invaders*, p. 118). Though Khusrau gives an account of Malik Kāfur's attack on Madura, he does not even allude to Rāmēsvaram in this context in any of his published works. (See my article on Ma'bar from 1311 to 1323 A.D. JOR xii, pp. 192-194.)

stated in a late Kannaḍa chronicle called the *Ballāḷa Rāyana Yuddha* that a certain Nēmi Khān or Nēmi Mulk, a commander of the Sultān of Dehli, marched as far as Rāmēśvaram, captured the king of Madura, and established a Muslim garrison in that city. In addition to these, Nēmi Khān is said to have conquered Mālwa and taken its ruler a prisoner; captured Dēvagiri and carried away Rāmadēva as a captive to Dehli; and killed Hammīra and captured the fort of Rantambhor after a siege of six or seven years.<sup>135</sup>

Most of the victories attributed to Nēmi Khān in the *Ballāḷa Rāyana Yuddha* were, no doubt, won during the reign of 'Alā-ud-Dīn; but the officers who won them were different. 'Ain-ul-Mulk Multānī conquered Mālwa; Malik Nā'ib Kāfūr captured, as noticed already, Dēvagiri and imprisoned Rāmadēva; Nuṣrat Khān and Ulugh Khān were sent, at first, against Rantambhor; on the death of the former, however, the army retreated. But Sultān 'Alā-ud-Dīn who was determined to capture the place, joined the army. The siege was renewed; Hammīra was killed, and the fortress surrendered. Therefore, it is not possible to discover the identity of Nēmi Khān with the data furnished by the *Ballāḷa Rāyana Yuddha*. Moreover, the same commander figures also in the southern wars of the Tughlaq Sultāns; and the Hindu chronicles mix up the facts connected with the Khālījī and the Tughlaq expeditions. The Pāṇḍyan chronicle, as a matter of fact, ascribes the capture of Madura and the establishment of a Muslim garrison there in May-June 1323 A.D. to Nēmi Khān.<sup>136</sup> There is, therefore, no reasonable ground to suppose that Malik Nā'ib Kāfūr subjugated Madura, and left a garrison there, either to protect a helpless Pāṇḍyan king or to uphold the imperial authority.

135. *Kampili and Vijayanagara*, pp. 6 and 18.

136. "Afterwards, in the Salivahana Sakabdam one thousand two hundred and forty-six corresponding with the year of the era reckoned from the destruction of Gollam (Quilon) two hundred and twenty-seven, agreeing

Malik Kāfūr's Ma'bar expedition was a failure. No doubt, he traversed the country from one end to the other; plundered, burnt, and destroyed temples, towns, and cities; and defeated the Pāṇḍyan armies when he met them; but he could neither force the Pāṇḍya to submit like Rāmadēva, Rudradēva and Vīra Ballāla to the Sultān of Dehli, nor establish his authority in the land of Ma'bar. Malik Nā'ib's expedition was, in fact, a brilliant military raid, and no more.

#### SECTION 6.

#### *The Conquest of Dēvagiri and the establishment of Muslim Power in Deccan.*

For nearly one year after Kāfūr's return to Dehli, 'Alā-ud-Dīn did not embark on any military adventure. He reached the zenith of his power and prosperity, and the empire remained undisturbed by any internal outbreak or external invasion. At the end of this

with Āni month of Rudhīrottakari, when one named Paracrama Pandian was reigning, Athi Sultan Mulk and one called Nemi came from Dehli in the north, and taking Paracrama Devar captive sent him to Delhi and conquered the country." (Taylor: *Hist. Mss.* i, p. 203).

The chronicle gives the date of the Muslim conquest of Madura in two eras: (1) Ś. Ś. 1246 Rudhīrōdgārin, Āni. The Śaka year given is the current year; and it corresponds to May-June 1323 A.D. (2) This Śaka date is said to correspond with the 227th year of another era reckoned from the year of the destruction of Kollam. This era, however, is not identical with the well-known Kollam era which was started on A.D. 824 to commemorate probably the foundation of the city, as it commenced some two hundred and seventy years later in 1096 A.D. The city must have suffered destruction in that year. Now, the Pāṇḍyas rose in revolt against the emperor Kulōttunga I, at the time of his accession in 1070 A.D. By the time of the eleventh year of his rule 1081 A.D. he subdued the Pāṇḍyas completely; but fifteen years later in 1096 A.D. the Pāṇḍyas rebelled once

period, the affairs of Deccan demanded again the Sultān's attention. News from Deccan reached the court that Rāmadēva died at Dēvagiri and Sangama, his son and successor, had revolted against the Sultān and turned hostile to the Mussalmans.<sup>137</sup> As soon as 'Alā-ud-Dīn heard of the state of affairs in Deccan, he despatched Malik Nā'ib at the head of an army to Dēvagiri with instructions to put down Sangama's revolt and annex his kingdom.<sup>138</sup> Malik Nā'ib marched with the army, and after reaching the Ghat of Sāgūna began to plunder the country. The news of the arrival of the Dehli army reached Sangama; but being too weak to offer resistance he sought safety in flight.<sup>139</sup> Malik Kāfūr, thereupon, advanced on

again. (*Colas* II (i) pp. 21-22). And Kulōttunga commissionend Nara-lōkavīra, one of his commanders, to put down the rebels; and the latter destroyed the city of Kollam (*Cola Studies* p. 191). To commemorate this important event, a new era appears to have been started.

137. Ferishta's account though correct in the main embodies much that cannot be accepted. His date for the death of Rāmadēva and the revolt of Sangama is wrong. 'Iṣāmy, who lived in Dehli during the reign of 'Alā-ud-Dīn and his successors, describes the facts connected with the rebellion differently. News reached Dehli sometime after Malik Kāfūr's return from Ma'bar, that Rāmadēva died, and Bhīllama—'Iṣāmy speaks invariably of Bhīllama and never of Sangama—revolted; the Sultān sent Malik Kāfūr to suppress the rebellion. *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, pp. 325-6.

138. The circumstances under which Malik Nā'ib Kāfūr was sent to Dēvagiri are differently related by Ferishta. According to him, Kāfūr who was jealous of Khizr Khān, the heir-apparent, fearing that the prince might be posted to Deccan induced the Sultān to appoint him instead so that he might not only chastise Sangama for his unfriendly conduct at the time of Ma'bar expedition but facilitate the payment of tribute from Tiling at a more convenient place than Dehli, as desired by the Rāya. (See Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, pp. 378-9).

139. Ferishta, however, states that Malik Kāfūr "inhumanly put him to death." Briggs, *Ferishta* I, p. 379.

Dēvagiri and took possession of it. He treated the people with kindness and moderation. As soon as he entered Dēvagiri, he assured the people of safety; nobody was slain and none imprisoned. He despatched letters to all parts of the kingdom declaring general amnesty. These measures restored tranquillity in the minds of the people, and they felt that they had nothing to fear from their new Muslim masters. Kāfūr next devoted his attention to administrative affairs. He summoned the officials of the secretariat, and examined the general accounts of the kingdom as well as of the palace establishment. Though he showed kindness to people who submitted to his authority, he put down rebels with a stern hand. Under his wise administration the country greatly prospered. Malik Nā'ib knew that the prosperity of the state depended on agriculture; he summoned the cultivators to his presence; spoke to them kindly and granted them leases. The farmers being convinced that they had a ruler who was interested in promoting their welfare devoted themselves to their lands vigorously, and extracted greater yield from the soil than before. Although the rule of the Malik Nā'ib was generally characterised by great wisdom and sagacity, it was harsh and oppressive in one respect. Like all the Muhammadans of his age, he believed that he held a special monopoly in religious and spiritual matters from God. He had not the breadth of intellectual vision to comprehend that the infidels were also the children of God who would hear their prayer as kindly as that of the faithful. As a consequence of this belief he caused much unhappiness to his subjects. He pulled down their temples and built mosques in their places; he erected in obedience to the commands of the Sultān a great mosque at Dēvagiri and named it after him. He strove to establish Islām in the land of Marhaṭṭa, and under his rule Dēvagiri became a great Muslim centre in Deccan.<sup>140</sup>

140. 'Iṣāmy: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*. pp. 326-27.

The whole of the Sēuṇa kingdom did not, however, submit to Malik Kāfūr. In the inaccessible hilly regions of Marhaṭṭa the intractable Kōlis upheld their independence under their sturdy chieftain Nāg Nāyak. The nobles who were governing the southern districts could not reconcile themselves to the loss of national freedom and the subjection to the yoke of Islām. They declined to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Sulṭān of Dehli and defied the authority of his deputy. Mallidēva, a sister's son of Rāy-i-Rāyān, Rāmadēva, who held the fief of Rāyadurga in the Bellary District, declared himself the king of Mahārāṣṭra and attempted to consolidate his position. But his pretensions were not countenanced by his fellow nobles. Mummaḍi Singeya Nāyaka, the ruler of Kampili, and Jagatāpa Gangayadēva of Gutti, rose against him and put him to death;<sup>141</sup> and whatever chances of united Hindu opposition there were to Muslim aggression perished with him. Mummaḍi Singeya did not long survive the victory. On his death, he was succeeded by his more famous son, Kampili Rāya. He was fired with the ambition of imposing his supremacy over the petty chiefs who governed the country around him. He had besides his capital city, Kampili, two other important strongholds, Kummata and Hosdurg on the Tunga-bhadra which strengthened his hold on the surrounding hilly tracts. The extent of territory subject to his authority at this time cannot be ascertained definitely; it is not unlikely that it might have included the Bellary, Dharwar and Raichur districts. Kampila was, perhaps, the most powerful Hindu chief that opposed the authority of Malik Nā'ib; and his influence over the neighbouring chiefs probably rendered their attitude towards the Mussalmans rigid and unbending.

141. *Kampili and Vijayanagara*: p. 6. The death of Mallidēva in a battle with Jagatāpa Gangayadēva is described in a long epigraph in prose and verse dated 1323 A.D. *Bharati*, xv, pp. 157-60.

Malik Kāfūr was constrained to lead an expedition against Kampila to check the growth of his power, if he could not destroy it altogether. He marched quickly with his forces into Kampila's territory; and meeting with no opposition, he advanced on Kummaṭa and laid siege to it. However, after an investment of a week, he raised the siege, owing probably to some unrecorded attacks of the enemy from outside; and he retreated towards Dēvagiri causing considerable damage to the country-side on his way.<sup>142</sup> The expedition did not produce any tangible results. Malik Nā'ib's hold on the southern districts of the old Sēuṇa kingdom remained as precarious as ever. And before he could make another attempt to reduce them, he was summoned to Dehli; and 'Ain-ul-Mulk whom he left in charge of his province does not appear to have made any effort in this direction. Kampila was thus left unfettered to consolidate his position.

142. *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn*, pp. 327-8.

Cf. Briggs, *Ferishṭa*, i, p. 379

## CHAPTER III

### THE KHALJIS: QUTB-UD-DĪN MUBĀRAK SHĀH

#### SECTION 1

#### *Rebellion of Marhatta*

What happened in Mahārāṣṭra between the departure of Malik Nā'ib from Dēvagiri, and the death of Sultān 'Alā-ud-Dīn at Dehli on 7th Shawwāl 715 A.H. (4th January 1316 A.D.) is not known.<sup>1</sup> As soon as 'Alā-ud-Dīn died, Malik Nā'ib placed Shihāb-ud-Dīn 'Umar, the Sultān's youngest son, on the throne, setting aside the claims of Khizr Khān, the heir-apparent, and began to govern the empire in the name of the young monarch. His high-handed behaviour towards the Queen and other members of the royal family alienated from him many nobles, who, however, remained submissive overawed by his military strength. Realising that his power rested on force, he commanded his lieutenant 'Ain-ul-Mulk whom he had left in Dēvagiri to hasten to Dehli with all the Muslim inhabitants resident in that city.<sup>2</sup> As soon as the order reached

1. *Khusrau: Dēwal Rānī and Khizr Khān*, p. 259.

ز هوال آمده هفتم پیا پی      ستم هفصد سہ پنچے بر سر وے  
کزیں دیر پنچ آن شاه آفاق      برون از هفت گنبد بردش طاق

Cf. E.D. iii, p. 555 *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* (G. O. S. lxiii) p. 81. Baranī places 'Alā-ud-Dīn's death on the 6th Shawwāl of some year which he does not specify. (E. D. iii, p. 208), and Ferishta on 6th Shawwāl 716 A.H. (Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 381).

2. 'Iṣāmī: *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn*, (Agra edn.), pp. 340-41.

پیارد ہم اهل اسلام (اسلم) را      کد خالی ان جمله اقلام (اقلیم) را  
بگو تا به ایدر براند هتاب      ابا هسواران و چابک رکاب

Dēvagiri, 'Ain-ul-Mulk gathered together all the Mussalmans, and accompanied by them set out for Dehli at the head of his forces.

Meanwhile, the peace of the empire was disturbed by the outbreak of rebellions in several places, especially in Gujarāt. Haider and Zirak, two lieutenants of Alap Khān who was slain by 'Alā-ud-Dīn at the instigation of Malik Nā'ib revolted in Gujarāt and put to death Kamāl-ud-Dīn Gurg who was sent against them. Malik Nā'ib was constrained to concert measures to put down their revolt and restore the authority of the imperial government. He sent, therefore, a messenger to 'Ain-ul-Mulk, directing him to proceed to Gujarāt, destroy the rebels and assume the government of the province. The messenger met 'Ain-ul-Mulk on the way, and communicated to him the message he was charged with. 'Ain-ul-Mulk at once changed the direction of his journey, and proceeded towards Gujarāt; but when he advanced as far as Chittūr in Rājaputāna, information reached him that Malik Nā'ib had been assassinated in Dehli. On hearing this news he suspended his march and halted in the neighbourhood keeping a watchful eye on the progress of events in the capital.<sup>2a</sup>

On the death of Malik Nā'ib, prince Mubārak Khān regained his freedom and took hold of the reins of government. For a few months he acted as the director of Sultān Shihāb-ud-Dīn. Then he set him aside and ascended the throne with the title Qutb-ud-Dīn Mubārak Shāh.<sup>3</sup> During the first year of his reign Sultān Qutb-ud-Dīn was engaged in setting in order the affairs of the northern provinces of his empire. He persuaded 'Ain-ul-Mulk to march to Gujarāt against the lieutenants of Alap Khān who still re-

2a. *Ibid.*

3. E. D. iii, p. 210.

mained unsubdued.<sup>4</sup> Accompanied by several distinguished warriors, 'Ain-ul-Mulk marched to Gujarāt at the head of his forces, crushed the rebels and restored the imperial authority in the province. When the rebellion of Gujarāt was completely suppressed and the power of the Sultān was firmly established in Hindustan, he turned his attention to Deccan.

The departure of 'Ain-ul-Mulk from Dēvagiri with all the Muslim inhabitants of the city left Mahārāṣṭra without any government. The Hindus who were not yet reconciled to the loss of freedom, took advantage of the voluntary retirement of the Mussalmans, seized the government and attempted to revive the defunct Sēuṇa monarchy. Rāṇā Harapāla Dēva who is said to have been a son-in-law of Rāmadēva proclaimed himself master of Mahārāṣṭra, and took possession of the country of Dēvagiri; and Rāghava, a minister and deputy of Rāmadēva joined him.<sup>5</sup> Quṭb-ud-Dīn who

4. The statement of Baranī that 'in the first year of the reign a numerous army was sent to put down the revolt of Alap Khān, who had slain Kamāl-ud-Dīn Gurg and had stirred up such a disturbance that Gujarāt had shaken off its allegiance' is utterly incomprehensible. (E.D. iii, p. 214). For he asserts in an earlier context (p. 208) that Alap Khān who was summoned from Gujarāt by 'Ala-ud-Dīn to Dehli was slain at the royal command by Malik Nā'ib a few days before the Sultān's death. A serious revolt broke out in Gujarāt consequent on the death of Alap Khān; and Kamāl-ud-Dīn Gurg who was sent against the rebels was slain by them. The rebellion in Gujarāt was, as a matter of fact, headed by Haidar and Zīrak, two lieutenants of Alap Khān, who on hearing of the assassination of their chief at Dehli through the machinations of Malik Kāfūr, threw off their allegiance to the Sultān and put to death Kamāl-ud-Dīn Gurg who was sent against them. ('Iṣāmī: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, pp. 332-3).

5. Nizām-ud-Dīn Aḥmād is the first Muslim historian who refers to Harapāla's kinship with Rāmadēva. (*Tābaqāt-i-Akbarī*, Eng. Tr., i, p. 194). This fact is not mentioned by the early historians. The name of

was anxious that Deccan should not again lapse into Hindu hands resolved to march in person with an army and restore the imperial authority. Moreover, he wanted to get hold of the treasures hoarded by Malik Nā'ib and visit, as becoming a recently crowned monarch, the outlying parts of the empire to strengthen his hold on them.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, during the second year of his reign (1318 A.D.) he set out with the army accompanied by several distinguished officers including his favourite slave Khusrau Khān, whom he had exalted to the highest place among the nobility of his empire. He halted at Tilpat for a while; and after a brief stay, marched with the army towards Mahārāṣṭra. He reached the Ghāt-i-Sāgūna at the end of a journey of two months, and proceeded to devastate the country, chastising the rebels wherever he chanced on them. The towns and their dependent territory were soon reduced to subjection. A few of the rebels under the leadership of Harapāla Dēva, and Rāghava, however, were still at large. The latter who had under him a powerful force of 10,000 horse took refuge among the hills, and unless these were put down the country could not be fully brought under the Muslim yoke. The Sultān detached Khusrau Khān and sent him with a strong force in pursuit of Rāghava.

Rāmadēva's minister, according to the Khusrau and 'Iṣāmī is Rāghav. *Nuh Sipīhr* (E.D. iii, p. 557).

همان بهلم و را گھو رام دیو      چو دیدند افواج گمہاں خدیو

'Iṣāmī: *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 275.

6. *Ibid*, p. 352.

شد از قوت بخت خود کا مگار  
مرا خیم باید زدن ناگزیر  
دران بوم و بر هر کجا بود مال  
بسازم ازاں برگ خود سالها  
در اطراف این ملک ضابط بوم

چو در ملک دھلی شہ بختیار  
بدل گفت در کھور دیو گیر  
کہ بردست همان نائب بد سگال  
چو بردست من آید آن مالہا  
دگر آنکہ من شہر یار نوم

Khusrau surprised him in a defile and inflicted a crushing defeat upon him. Rāghava crept into a 'cave in a ravine which even a snake could scarcely penetrate'; his followers 'were either slain, captured or put to flight.'<sup>7</sup> Having vanquished Rāghava, Khusrau set out to return to the royal camp; but the rebellious activities of Harapāla Dēva interrupted his journey. Harapāla Dēva who had a strong army under his command seized the mountainous country and defied the authority of the Sultān. Khusrau Khān tracked him to his retreat and launched a vigorous attack upon his forces; but he could not, however, easily overcome Harapāla Dēva's opposition. He had to fight two or three battles with the rebel forces before he could gain any advantage over them. In the final encounter, Harapāla who was desperately wounded was taken prisoner, and carried away bound hand and foot to the Sultān's camp, where he was put to death by the royal command. His body was handed over to his followers to be cremated.<sup>8</sup>

7. Khusrau: *Nuh Sipīhr*, E. D. iii, p. 558.

8. Ibid, p. 564. 'Isāmy's account is slightly different. He does not at all mention Rāghava in this connection. He states that the Sultān heard of the rebellion of Harapāla, after he devastated the country. He despatched Talabgha son of Baghda with an army in prsuit of the rebel leader. Talabgha defeated Harapāla Dēva, and carried him as a prisoner to the royal camp. The Sultān took possession of Malik Nā'ib's treasure which he had seized, and put him to death.

شم کا مران را نیفتاد دست  
سری بر زد از هیبت شهر یار  
به قصدش شد از حکم شاه جهان  
اسیرش بیاورد بر شهر یار  
وزان پس سری دوزخش کرد راه

شنیدم که هر پال نامی مرهٹ  
بسمت پرندہ بر سم فرار  
هم تلغہ پور بغدہ روان  
پس از چند روز آن یل نامدار  
سعد مال ناگب ازو جملہ شاه

*Futūh-us-Salātīn*: I am indebted to Mr. Sayyid Usha, B.A., Lecturer

The rebellion in Mahārāṣṭra was completely stamped out. The Hindus were brought again under the heel of Islām. The Sultān having now fully accomplished the object for which he had embarked on the expedition was ready to return to his capital; but the setting in of the monsoon compelled him to postpone his journey, and to sojourn in Dēvagiri for a few months. However, he utilised his enforced stay in devising measures for keeping the Sēūṇa territory thoroughly under control and bringing back to subjection the ruler of Tiling who withheld the payment of tribute since the death of Malik Nā'ib. He introduced, in the first place, changes in the administration. He appointed Malik Yak Lakhya, an old servant of Sultān 'Alā-ud-Dīn, as the governor of Dēvagiri; and divided the conquered territory among his officers. He appointed feudatories, rulers, and revenue collectors over the territories of the Mahrat-

in Persian, Madras University who kindly extracted this passage for my use from a ms. of the *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn* which he came across in one of the private libraries in Hyderabad (Deccan).

'Iṣāmy, therefore, does not allude to the part played by Rāghava in this rebellion; and he ascribes the credit of having captured Harapāla Dēva not to *Khusrau Khān* but to another officer of the Sultān, Talbagha, son of Baghda. There is also some difference of opinion regarding the manner of Harapāla's death. Amīr *Khusrau* states clearly that he was put to death by the sword (E. D. iii, p. 564); probably he was beheaded. 'Iṣāmy's evidence, however, is not explicit. He simply declares that Harapāla was despatched to hell. Baranī, however, asserts that the Sultān ordered Harapāla Dēva 'to be flayed and his skin to be hung over the gate of Deogir.' (E. D. iii, p. 215). This statement is repeated by Ferishta with certain additions. According to him, Harapāla Dēva was flayed alive, decapitated, and his head was fixed above the gate of his own capital. (Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 389). The source from which Baranī had drawn his information is not known. In the absence of confirmatory evidence it is not possible to arrive at any definite conclusion.

tas.<sup>9</sup> Secondly, he posted military garrisons at Gulbarga, Sāghar, Dhōrsamand (Dwārasamudra) and other places.<sup>10</sup> The despatch of a garrison to Dwārasamudra provoked a conflict with Ballāla III. The appointment of a Mussalman governor to Dwārasamudra was probably actuated by Ballāla's absence from his capital. The civil war in the Pāṇḍyan kingdom still dragged its ruinous course; and Ballāla who was desirous of establishing his power in the Tamil country was sojourning at Aruṇasamudra somewhere in the neighbourhood of Tiruvaṇṇāmalai. The despatch of a Muslim garrison to occupy his capital compelled him to hasten homewards; but before he could arrive at Dwārasamudra, Kaṭāri Sāḷuva Rāseya Nāyaka, one of the officers in his service met the Mussalmans, and having inflicted a defeat forced them to retire.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, the Sultān's attempt to establish his control over the Sēuṇa dominions appears to have been on the whole successful. Lastly, the Sultān despatched an army under his favourite slave, Khusrau Khān, to Warangal to demand tribute from Pratāparudra who seems to have become lax in its payment, taking advantage of the confusion that prevailed in the empire consequent upon the death of Sultān 'Alā-ud-Dīn. The Sultān, having completed his arrangements for the governance of Mahārāṣṭra, set out for Dehli (5th Aug. 1318 A.D.) as soon as the cessation of the rains rendered the roads fit for travel.

9. Baranī: E. D. iii, p. 215.

10. درگاہرگہ و ساغر و دہور سمد و دیگر ممالک تہانہا نہاد

*Tarikh-i-Ferishtah*. (Naval Kishore press), p. 125. Briggs does not bring out the meaning of the sentence clearly. See Briggs, *Ferishṭa*, i, p. 389.

11. For a fuller discussion of the subject see *The Origin of the City and the Empire of Vijayanagara*, pp. 79-80.

## SECTION 2

*Tiling Expedition*

Much confusion prevails in the writings of Muslim historians and their modern representatives about the time and the place whence Sultān Qutb-ud-Dīn despatched the expedition. Some of the early historians such as Amīr Khusrau and 'Iṣāmy assert that as soon as the Sultān put down the rebellion in Marhaṭṭa, he sent an army under Khusrau Khān to Tiling. But Baranī whose regard for truth and justice appears to have been eclipsed by his ill will towards the Hindu converts to Islām, being disinclined to record any deed creditable to Khusrau Khān, omits his Tiling expedition altogether, and causes confusion by substituting in its place his Ma'bar invasion which terminated in a manner not quite honourable to him. Yāhyā bin Aḥmad who had the accounts of Amīr Khusrau and Baranī before him jumbles up the incidents of both the expeditions and makes them episodes of a single campaign.<sup>12</sup> His account has been accepted as genuine by Badāūnī, Ferishta and all the later historians both ancient and modern. The two expeditions were, in fact, sent by the Sultān on different occasions, and they had no connection with each other excepting that the commander who was in charge of them was the same.

Amīr Khusrau and 'Iṣāmy, the two early historians, who describe Khusrau Khān's Tiling expedition are not unfortunately in agreement with each other. The former states that Pratāparudra offered resistance. Khusrau Khān, it is said, marched from Dēvagiri at the head of the imperial army and halted within three bowshots of Warangal. He was there attacked by Pratāparudra's forces consisting of 10,000 horse and innumerable foot; they were, however, defeated and chased into the fort by a small band of about 300 Turkish horsemen. Khusrau next invested the mud fort; though

12. *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhi*, (G. O. S. lxii.), pp. 84-5,

the besieged made a vigorous attempt to repel his attack by making a sally, they were defeated and driven back into the fort. One of the bastions of the outer fort was captured; when Antil Mahta, the commander of Pratāparudra's forces who was conducting the defence lost his life. Several Hindus of distinction who were aiding him perished likewise. The outer fort fell into the hands of the Mussalmans; they next rushed upon the inner fort and laid siege to it. Pratāparudra was alarmed by the bold advances of Muhammadan forces; and realising the futility of further resistance sued for peace. Khusrau Khān consented to grant him peace on condition that he surrendered all his wealth, ceded five districts of his kingdom and agreed to pay 'an annual tribute of more than a hundred elephants', '12000 horse, gold and jewels and gems beyond compute.' As Pratāparudra accepted these conditions Khusrau Khān raised the siege and returned to Dehli laden with booty.<sup>12a</sup>

This appears to be an overdrawn picture of Khusrau Khān's achievements in Tiling; for, 'Iṣāmy, who also narrates the events of the expedition, does not allude to any hostilities; he represents Khusrau Khan, on the contrary, as having collected the arrears of tribute without the use of force.

When Khusrau Khān started for Tiling, the Sultān ordered a large army and several distinguished warriors to accompany him. When the Khān reached the frontier (i.e. of Tiling), he drew up his forces for war; and he despatched a courier with a letter to Pratāparudra demanding the payment of the arrears of tribute, and threatening him, in the event of his refusal, with dire consequences. When the messenger reached Warangal, Pratāparudra received him with much cordiality and respect; he sent a reply to Khusrau Khān with many protestations of loyalty. 'I am a slave of the king,' declared he, 'and I shall go to the Khān, the commander of his forces. It was in my mind to send the tribute to the king in the

<sup>12a</sup> Khusrau: *Nuh Sipthr*, E.D. iii, pp. 550-61.

capital; but as the roads are infested with malefactors, I hesitated to send it to the court. The king must accept my apology. As the great Khān has now arrived in the interior of my kingdom, I shall send the tribute together with presents for himself.' Having sent back the imperial messenger with this reply, Pratāparudra despatched the stipulated amount of tribute together with one hundred and odd elephants to Khusrāu Khān's camp. The Khān received them, and in accordance with the instructions of the Sultān, he presented to Pratāparudra an umbrella, a *dūrbāsh* and a *qabā* set with gems. Having accomplished the task entrusted to him by the Sultān, Khusrāu Khān marched with his forces towards Dehli.<sup>13</sup>

13. *Futūh-us-Salātīn*: (Hyderabad Ms.) (By the kind courtesy of Mr. Sayyid Usha, B.A., Lecturer in Persian, Madras University).

برو نامزد شد سپاهي گراں  
روان کرد با وي شه کا مگار  
جدا گشت از خسرو کا مهاب

\*

\*

بر آهنگ پیکار لشکر کشید  
نبشته بر انراي با هوش و هنگ

\*

\*

که از خان خسرو نوندي رسيد  
به تعظيم شاندش به پهلوي خروش  
ستد راي و بوسيد و بر سر نهاد  
چو آگاه شد گشت پوزش گراي  
بسر لشکرا نش به خان بگروم  
فرستم خراجي سوي تختگاه  
سرا سر شده راه پر مفسدان

قرص چون که شد خان خسرو رواں  
به هر جا يکي سر کشے هو شمار  
شنيدم که چون خان خسرو خطاب

\*

\*

به حد آرنگل چو سر بر کشيد  
نوندي دوا نهد اندر تلنگ

\*

\*

چو راي تلنگ اين حکايت شنيد  
به صد عز و اکرام خواندش به پيش  
نوندش همان نامه پر دست داد  
هم آخر زمضمون آن نامه راي  
بگفتا که من بنده خسروم  
مرا بود در دل که خود بهر شاه  
ولي چونکه بندي است اندر ميان

It is evident from this that Khusrau Khān had no occasion to wage war upon Pratāparudra. Nevertheless, Amīr Khusrau's account of the expedition should not be set aside as wholly untrustworthy, though he is contradicted by such an authentic chronicler as 'Iṣāmy. Evidence of a more explicit character is required for rejecting completely the narrative of a contemporary historian like Khusrau; and until such evidence is brought forward, final judgment as to the nature of Khusrau Khān's activities in Tiling must be suspended. But, whatever view one is disposed to adopt regarding the events of the expedition, there is little room for doubt about its ultimate outcome. Khusrau Khān executed the task entrusted to him with considerable skill. Amīr Khusrau and 'Iṣāmy are both agreed that he collected the arrears of tribute from Rudra Dēva and restored the imperial authority in Tiling. Therefore Khusrau Khān rendered valuable services to his master, in bringing back to subjection Deccan where the imperial power had almost disappeared during the brief period of turmoil that followed the death of Sulṭān 'Alā-ud-Dīn.

پذیرد زمن عذر شاه نهنگ  
خارجي فرستم به خان باگزید  
خراج و صد و اند زنجیر پیل  
بدان تا رساند به درگاه شاه  
بران ردر دیو سلاطین پناه  
قبای فرستاد گوهر نگار

\*

\*

زین رو درین کار کردم درنگ  
نون خان اعظم چو اندر رسید  
هم آخر شنیدم پس از قال و قیل  
فرستاد در خان دریا سپاه  
همان خان خسرو به فرمان شاه  
ابا چترو بادورباش آشکار

\*

\*

که فرمان خسرو برین جمله برد  
چو بهنید شم خان خسرو رسید  
چو خرشید بر تخت زر بار داد

پس آن گاه خان باز گشتی نمود  
همی راند تا سر به حضرت کشید  
هگفت از طرب چون گل بامداد

## SECTION 3

*The Rebellion of Malik Yak Lakhy: And the Ma'bar Invasion*

Malik Yak Lakhy whom the Sultān had appointed as the governor of Dēvagiri did not long remain loyal to him. Shortly after Khusrau Khān's return from Tiling, information reached the court that Yak Lakhy raised the standard of revolt at Dēvagiri, assumed the insignia of royalty, adopted the title of Shams-ud-Dīn, and minted coin in his own name.<sup>14</sup> On hearing the news of the rebellion, the Sultān was enraged; he summoned Khusrau Khān to his presence and commanded that he should go forth with an army accompanied by several distinguished warriors such as Talbagha, son of Baghda, Shādī Satila, Qutlugh the royal huntsman, Tāj-ul-Mulk Hājī, the *shah navīs* and others. The Sultān directed that Khusrau Khān should first proceed against Dēvagiri, take Yak Lakhy prisoner, put fetters on his hands and feet and despatch him to Dehli. He should next lead the army towards Paṭṭan and subjugate the country of Ma'bar.<sup>15</sup>

The motive which actuated the Sultān in directing Khusrau Khān to lead his troops to Ma'bar was not probably mere lust of

14. 'Iṣāmī: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 355.

همي آغم از کشور دیوگیر  
همان یک لکھی گشت از شهر دیار  
بر آورد شوری به شهر و دیار  
سرے قافست از شاه روی زمین  
بر آورد وزد سکتہ خسروی  
یکی چتر در دعوی پہلوی

cf. *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* (G.O.S. lxiii), p. 84. "Later on, Yak Lakhy raised the standard of hostility in Deogir, and assumed the paraphernalia of royalty."

15. 'Iṣāmī: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*; p. 356.

plunder and iconoclastic zeal. The political condition of the country appeared more propitious for conquest than at any time before. Since Malik Nā'ib's retreat in April 1311 A.D., the affairs of Ma'bar had undergone a change for the worse. What became of Vikrama Pāṇḍya after his victory over Kāfūr's army is not known. Probably he died, or went back to the retirement whence he had emerged. Vira Pāṇḍya and Sundara Pāṇḍya resumed hostilities which they were compelled to suspend by the appearance of the Muslim legions. Sundara was completely worsted in the struggle, and fled to the court of 'Alā-ud-Dīn for protection.<sup>16</sup> It is not known how he

16. Wassāf (E. D. iii, p. 54), who furnishes all the information about this incident wrongly assigns the victory of Vira Pāṇḍya and the flight of Sundara to Dehli to the middle of the year 710 A.H. (i.e., Oct.-Nov. 1310 A.D.). Malik Kāfūr set out from Dehli on his Ma'bar expedition in Rajab 710 A.H. (Nov. 1310), i.e., roughly about the time of Vira Pāṇḍya's final victory over his brother. Therefore, Sundara Pāṇḍya had just time enough to flee to Malik Nā'ib's camp on the way, if not actually to Dehli. But, in contradiction to what is said above, Wassāf himself asserts that when Malik Nā'ib entered Ma'bar, Vira Pāṇḍya and Sundara were still fighting with each other, and it was this civil war that enabled Malik Nā'ib to capture some cities of Ma'bar. This is corroborated by Amir Khusrāu, who alludes to the fratricidal war in Ma'bar at the time of Kāfūr's invasion. Moreover, he also describes Kāfūr's attack on Sundara Pāṇḍya at Madura, and the latter's flight from the city to save himself. Therefore, it is clear that, in the first place, at the time when Malik Kāfūr entered Ma'bar at the head of his armies, the war between Vira Pāṇḍya and his brother was still inconclusive; and secondly neither Malik Kāfūr nor his master was in alliance with Sundara Pāṇḍya, nor were they friendly to him. This could not have been even possible had Sundara fled to Dehli or even to Kāfūr's camp on the way begging protection before Kāfūr's arrival with his armies in Ma'bar. It follows from this that Sundara's flight to Dehli could not have taken place in the middle of 710 A.H. An inscription at Sayamalai dated in his 9th regnal year (7th Nov. 1311 A.D.) shows that Sundara Pāṇḍya was still ruling at the time over portions of Tinnevely dis-

fared in Dehli, as no information is available about his activities in the imperial capital. However, there is reason to believe that the Sultān received Sundara kindly and responded to his appeal for help. A casual statement in an epigraph dated in the 25th regnal year of Jaṭavarman Śrīvallabha, corresponding to 1316 A.D. discloses the fact that, some time before that, Rājarāja Sundara Pāṇḍya Dēvar came with the Muhammadans, when a certain chief called Okkūruḍaiyān with his brothers and followers died "owing to foreign invasion and flood."<sup>17</sup> It is obvious that the Muhammadans referred to in this record were the Muslim soldiers whom the Sultān sent to Ma'bar to restore Sundara Pāṇḍya to his ancestral throne. This raises the interesting question whether, during the reign of 'Alā-ud-Dīn, Ma'bar was invaded a second time. There is however nothing in the Muslim histories to suggest that 'Alā-ud-Dīn sent a second expedition against Ma'bar. The Muslim troops which, according to the epigraph cited above, accompanied Sundara Pāṇḍya proceeded probably from some provincial centre, perhaps Dēvagiri, which became, after Rāmadēva's death in 1312-13, A.D. the headquarters of Muslim government in the Deccan. When Sundara Pāṇḍya returned with the Muslim force to Ma'bar to recover his throne, he found that the state of affairs

strict. (596 of 1915). He must have taken the road to Dehli sometime later. Inscriptions dated in his 11th, 12th, 13th regnal years are found in the South Arcot and Tinnevely districts; but no inscription of his 10th year (i.e., A.D. 1312-13) has been discovered so far. As Ravivarman Kulasekhara who seized Kāñci in that year and celebrated his coronation on the banks of the Vēgavati, speaks of Vira Pāṇḍya as the lord of Cōla and Pāṇḍya countries and makes no mention of Sundara, the latter appears to have lost his power by that time. It was probably during this year that he fled to Dehli to solicit help from 'Alā-ud-Dīn.

17. 642 of 1902; SIL, viii, No. 247. My attention has been drawn to this epigraph by Mr. S. Muthuswamy, M.A., one of the research students who is engaged in investigating the history of the later Pāṇḍyas.

in his dominions had undergone a complete change during the short period of his exile. His brother, Vira Pāṇḍya, whose triumph forced him to flee from the country, was in his turn driven out of the realm.<sup>18</sup> A foreign invader was in possession of his ancestral dominions. Ravivarman Kulaśekhara, the king of Kēraḷa, defeated Vira Pāṇḍya, made himself master of the Pāṇḍyan dominions, and crowned himself at Kāñci in 1312-13 A.D. Therefore, the enemy whom he had to deal with in recovering his kingdom was no longer his brother, but his powerful adversary, the king of Kēraḷa. Though no definite information is available about the events that had taken place subsequent to Sundara Pāṇḍya's return from Dehli, he appears to have come into conflict with Ravivarman and gained some advantage over him. The Tirukkal epigraph cited above, it may be remembered, refers to the death of certain people in the foreign invasion at the time of Sundara Pāṇḍya's return to his kingdom with the Muhammadans.<sup>19</sup> Another epigraph at Kāṭṭu-Mannārkoil in the South Arcot district dated January 1314 A.D. shows clearly that he was actually ruling at that time the country in the neighbourhood.<sup>20</sup> It is obvious that, by the beginning of 1314 A.D., the rule of Ravivarman Kulaśekhara gave place to that of Sundara Pāṇḍya in parts of Ma'bar.

Meanwhile, Vira Pāṇḍya, who was ousted from his kingdom by Ravivarman, was busily engaged in concerting measures to eject him from his territories. He stirred up trouble in Kēraḷa, by setting up on the throne of Vēṇāḍ, Ravivarman's native country, a rival prince;<sup>21</sup> and solicited Ballāḷa III, the king of the Karnaṭaka,

18. EI, iv, p. 146.

19. SII, viii, No. 247; 642 of 1902.

20. 571 of 1920.

21. T.A.S. iv, p. 90.

for military assistance.<sup>22</sup> Ravivarman who could not cope with the situation that was thus created retired to Kēraḷa where he appears to have ruled for a few years more.<sup>23</sup>

The departure of Ravivarman Kulasēkhara did not, however, leave the Pāṇḍyan dominions free from foreign domination. New invaders soon made their appearance, this time from Telingāṇa. The Kākatiya king, Pratāparudra, sent a large army in 1317 A.D. to harry the country; and his general, Muppiḍi Nāyaka led the Telugu army victoriously up to the Kāvērī, defeated the Pāṇca Pāṇḍyas in a battle near Kāñcī, and installed a Telugu governor in the city.<sup>24</sup> This state of affairs did not fail to attract the attention of Sulṭān Qutb-ud-Dīn, who displayed, notwithstanding his love of pleasure and dissipation, considerable zeal in bringing the infidels under the heel of Islām.

The army which the Sulṭān despatched under Khusrau Khān to restore order in Marhaṭṭa set out from Dehli, and reached after a journey of about two months Ghat-i-Sāgūna on the frontier. The news of the arrival of the imperial army rapidly spread in the country, and created ferment in the capital; but the man who should have been most concerned by the news of Khusrau Khān's arrival remained utterly indifferent. Yak Lakhy was, in fact, a most curious leader to head a rebellion. He seems to have believed that, to establish his power, all he had to do was to proclaim himself king. Therefore as soon as he declared independence, he gave the go-by to public affairs, and devoted himself entirely to the pursuit of pleasure, neglecting to take the necessary precautions even to protect his person. His followers emulated his example; and his enemies encouraged by his indifference plotted against him in secret.

22. MAR 1918, p. 55, 1913 para 86, EC. ix Cp. 73, XII, Ck. 4.

23. 77 of 1927; Part ii, para 68.

24. EI, vii, p. 131; *Velugōtivarivamśāvali*, 37.

As soon as the news of the arrival of the army from Dehli reached his ears, Yak Lakhy ordered a handful of his followers, probably under the command of his lieutenant 'Imrān, to pitch their tents around the fort. Being obviously satisfied with this arrangement for the protection of the city, he relapsed into his former state of drunken negligence. He drowned himself, in the language of a contemporary historian, 'in the wine cup and the noise of the reed (flute).' The nobles and other men of distinction of the city, who hated Yak Lakhy, sent secret messages to Khusrau Khān making protestations of their loyalty to the Sultān, and offering to join the royal army as soon as they made their appearance in the neighbourhood of Dēvagiri. Malik Talabgha of Nāgūr took the lead; he was the first to declare his intention to join Khusrau Khān; and he received the support of two other nobles, Naṣir-ud-Dīn and Shams-ul-Mulk who went over to him with their followers. They resolved to seize Yak Lakhy by means of a stratagem and carry him off as a peace offering to Khusrau Khān. The sudden departure of Yak Lakhy's forces from under the walls of the fort favoured the successful execution of their design. 'Imrān, the officer commanding Yak Lakhy's army, broke up his camp abruptly and marched with the troops to a distance of two farsangs from the city either due to a feeling of disgust with his chief's inaction, or what is more probable, to a collusive understanding with the conspirators. Whatever be the real motive underlying 'Imrān's action, it gave Talabgha and his friends a favourable opportunity to push forward their scheme. Therefore, as soon as 'Imrān left his camp, they came out of their hiding place, seized on Yak Lakhy, and marched away in the direction of Khusrau Khān's camp, keeping him in front of their forces. They soon passed the Ghāt of Ellūra and reaching the Khān's camp somewhere in the neighbourhood handed over their valuable prisoner into his hands. Khusrau Khān was thus enabled by an auspicious conjunction of circumstances to capture Yak Lakhy without striking a blow; and with the fall of the leader, the rebellion which was stirred up by his activity died out.

Khusrau Khān then proceeded to Dēvagiri followed by the Deccan *amīrs* and the army. He first despatched Yak Lakhy to Dehli, bound hand and foot, according to the Sultān's orders. Next, he made provision for carrying on the administration of Marhaṭṭa; he nominated Malik 'Ain-ul-Mulk as the Sultān's vazier in Deccan, and placed Malik Majīr Abu Rijā under him as the commander of the army in that country.<sup>25</sup>

The rebellion in Marhaṭṭa being quelled, Khusrau Khān was now ready to proceed to Ma'bar. After a brief stay at Dēvagiri, he set out with the army and marched in the direction of Ma'bar, plundering the country along his route until he reached the sea.<sup>26</sup>

Yāhyā bin Aḥmad who mixes Khusrau Khān's attack upon Warangal with this expedition mentions his conquest of the Rākhū (Rāghav?) and Malky in this connection. The territory of the former who lived between Dēvagiri and Tiling was ravaged, and a rich booty was gathered by the invaders; the latter appears to be the name of a place situated somewhere between Tiling and Ma'bar. Khusrau seized here 'twenty elephants, and a diamond weighing six *dirm*.'<sup>27</sup> He is said to have acted during this invasion, very

25. 'Iṣāmy: *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*, pp. 355-6.

26. *Ibid*, p. 359.

27. Yāhyā bin Aḥmad is the only historian who mentions the Rākhū.

خسرو خان از آنجا کوچ کرده طایفه را کهو را نهب و قاراج کرد  
و غنائم فراوان از زرسامست و ناطق بدست آورد.

*Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* (Bib. Ind. No. 254), p. 84.

But there is a good deal of uncertainty about the name of this chief as it is spelt differently راکهو , راکهو , and راکهو in the available Mss. of the work. (See G.O.S. lxiii, p. 84 n. 5). Similarly Malky is alluded to only by Yāhyā, though he is copied in this case later by Badā'ūnī who enhances the number of elephants to 920! (*Al Badā'ūnī*, Bib.

much in the same manner as Kāfūr had done a few years earlier. The princes and the people of Ma'bar seem to have also adopted the tactics which they found effective on the former occasion. They fled from their cities carrying away with them all their treasures and valuables. Nevertheless, Khusrau Khān managed to capture about a hundred elephants.<sup>28</sup> When he reached Paṭṭan, the rich sea port of the country, he met with no resistance; and that charming city fell into his hands without fighting. The governor, a wealthy Muslim merchant called Sirāj-ud-Dīn Taqī, remained in the city trusting to his Muhammadan faith, while all his fellow citizens sought safety in flight. But Khusrau Khān did not allow himself to be influenced by religious considerations when he found an opportunity to gain wealth. He therefore declared that the wealth of the merchant belonged to the imperial treasury and seized it. When Sirāj-ud-Dīn and his family were brought before Khusrau, he demanded the hand of the merchant's beautiful daughter in marriage. On hearing this demand from a person of ignoble origin like Khusrau, Sirāj-ud-Dīn felt immeasurably outraged, and committed suicide by taking poison rather than be forced to face the indignity.<sup>29</sup>

Ind. Vol. I, p. 286). The same kind of uncertainty prevails regarding the name Malky, it being spelt differently in the available mss. میملی و هملی  
and ملکی. Ferishta states that Khusrau Khān took possession of the diamond in Ma'bar itself; he does not mention Malky. (Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 391).

28. Ferishta fixes the number at one hundred and twenty. (Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 391).

29. Isāmy: *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, pp. 359-60.

همد آن مرد بود دست لشکر اسپر که هم را بود دست و هم پارسا نه تنها که با جمعی خاں و مان	چو لشکر در آمد ابا دار و گیر همو در پٹن بود فرمان روا به بردند او را به درگاه خاں
---	---

The success of *Khusrau Khān's* expedition was, however, impeded by two obstacles. The outbreak of the rains prevented the movement of troops, and he was compelled to remain in *Paṭṭan*. Moreover, the sight of the large quantities of wealth fired his ambition, and he spent his enforced leisure to devising schemes of self-aggrandisement. It is difficult to form an exact idea about his intentions at this time, owing to the conflicting accounts of the Muslim historians on the subject. *Ferishta's* account that he contemplated establishing himself in the independent sovereignty of the Deccan is not supported by evidence.<sup>30</sup> *Baranī* seems to hint that his aim was directed against the imperial throne; and to remove the obstacles from his path, he contrived the death of the loyal adherents of the crown.

"When he marched from *Deogīr* to *Ma'bar*," says he, "he used to hold secret councils at night with some of his fellow Hindus, and several disaffected adherents of *Malik Nā'ib Kāfūr*, whom he had taken as friends, about making a revolt; and thus intriguing he arrived in *Ma'bar*." "Whilst he remained in *Ma'bar* he did nothing but plot with his confidants as to the best means of seizing and putting to death those nobles who supported the reigning dynasty."<sup>31</sup>

زر و گوهري دخترى با جمال  
نظر دوخت از جمله مال و زرش  
که دختر خود اندر نکاحم درآر  
بگفتا نباید از این پیمش زیست  
همان به که یکچند زهره خورم  
وزیر کاروان کهن کوچ کرد

هزاره سه چاره هتر بار مال  
چو خاں دید در منظر دخترش  
بگفتا بدان مرد پرهیزگار  
چو بشنید آن مرد افزون گریست  
که خواهد چنین سفلتم دخترم  
شنیدم همان روز زهره بخورد

Cf *Baranī: Tārīkh-i-Firūz Shāhī*, E.D. iii, p. 219.

30. Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 391.

31. E.D. iii, pp. 216, 219.

The views of Baranī are coloured by his prejudice against the Hindu converts. It is doubtful whether Khusrau Khān entertained the idea of usurping the throne of his master as early as the time of his Ma'bar campaign. 'Iṣāmy gives a somewhat different account. Khusrau Khān, no doubt, contemplated treason; but he aimed at neither the throne, nor the sovereignty of Deccan. What he wanted was money and freedom from the authority of the Sultān. To realise his object he resolved to place all the wealth he had plundered in a ship and sail away to some distant land and deliver himself from the degrading infatuation of the Sultān.<sup>32</sup> His plans were, however, frustrated by the vigilance of his enemies. Malik Talabgha Baghda, Malik Talabgha Nāgūrī, Malik Hājī, the *Nā'ib-i-'ariz*, Malik Timur, Malik Tigīn, Malik Mal and other officers who accompanied him got scent of his designs, watched his movements, and kept him under custody day and night. Khusrau Khān who perceived that his treasonous intentions were discovered faced the situation boldly. He called the officers to his presence, and with many protestations of his loyalty to the Sultān, asked them to carry him off to Dehli in fetters as a prisoner rather than persecute him as a criminal. The officers agreed to this proposal, and took him under custody to Dehli to place him before the Sultān and lay bare his treacherous conduct.<sup>33</sup> Therefore, the expedition which Sultān Quṭb-ud-Dīn sent to subjugate Ma'bar had to return without achieving its purpose; and the country remained in the hands of the Hindus some years longer.

32. *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, p. 360.

خیالے مروزا بہ خاطر گدہست  
نہیند بہ کشتی و افند باب  
زند خیمہ بہرون ازین ہوم و ہر

چو ہر خاں خزانہ بسے جمع گشت  
ہے خواست آن صاحب انقلاب  
بتابد سر از خسرو نامور

33. *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhi*, (G.O.S. lxiii), p. 85.

'Iṣāmy: *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, pp. 361-1.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE TUGHLAQS: GHAIYĀS-UD-DĪN.

#### SECTION 1

##### *His Deccan Policy*

Very little is known about the condition of Deccan during the short reign of Khusrau Khān. The Muslim historians whose attention is focussed on the revolutionary changes in Dehli scarcely bestow a glance on the affairs of the provinces. Ferishta is the only writer that alludes to events that happened in Deccan during this period. What he states, though brief, clearly indicates that the country was disturbed by rebellion, and the Muslim authority in the peninsula received a setback. Pratāparudra, the king of Tiling, threw off the Muslim yoke, and 'refused to send tribute' to Dehli.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, he appears to have dislodged the Muhammadans from some of the places, specially Badrakōt, which they had formerly occupied. In pursuance of an agreement which Pratāparudra concluded with Khusrau Khān in 1318 A.D., 'Badrakōt, a fort as high as heaven,' which stood at a strategic point on the Marhaṭṭa frontier was ceded to the Sultān;<sup>2</sup> but as soon as he heard of the disorders in Dehli, he seems to have proceeded against the fort, and having ejected the Muslim garrison, reoccupied it.<sup>3</sup> Encouraged

1. Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 403.

2. Khusrau: *Nuh Sipihir*, E.D., iii, p. 561.

3. Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 405. According to Ferishta, Ulugh Khān captured Bīdar (i.e., Badrakōt) on his way to Warangal during his second expedition. It is obvious that the city had passed into the hands of Pratāparudra again some time previously.

by his example, the forces of rebellion made themselves manifest also in Marhaṭṭa, and disaffection spread throughout the land. The country is said to have passed from the control of the imperial government;<sup>4</sup> and 'Ain-ul-Mulk, the governor appointed by Khusrau Khān, was superseded by prince Maḥmūd Khān, one of the sons of Sulṭān Tughlaq Shāh on account either of the incompetency of the former to keep the rebellious elements under proper control, or of the Sulṭān's unwillingness to entrust the administration of an important frontier province like Marhaṭṭa to a former friend and ally Khusrau Khān.<sup>5</sup>

What the nature of the trouble in Marhaṭṭa was and how the Sulṭān overcame it are matters on which no information is available at present. Whatever might have been its character, it was serious enough to force on the mind of the Sulṭān the unwisdom of allowing a semi-independent Hindu state to exist in the immediate neighbourhood of his far off southern provinces. He resolved to abandon the policy which his predecessors had followed in dealing with the Southern Hindu kingdoms and to bring the whole of the peninsula up to the Cape directly under his control.

4. The text of the *Tārīkh-i-Ferishta* (Naval Kishore Press,) p. 131 reads:

و در سال دوم از جلوس چون لدر دیو حاکم ورنگل از ادائے باج  
گردن پیچیده ولایت دیوگڑھ نیز بے ضبط هدہ بود

It is not clear whether this indicates the outbreak of a rebellion.

5. 'Iṣāmy: *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 390.

پس انکے شنیدم کہ محمود خان      کہ بد مفتخر جملہ ہمزادگان  
شہش کردہ بد مقطع دیوگیر      ہمی بود انجا سکونت پذیر

## SECTION 2

*The First Tiling Expedition.*

As soon as Ghaiyās-ud-Dīn Tughlaq succeeded in establishing his power firmly in Hindustan, he began to concert measures for sending an army to the South. He gathered together a large force from various places such as Badāūn, Oudh, Kara, Dalmū, Bangarmū, Chandēri, etc.<sup>6</sup> and despatched it to Tiling in 721 A.H., under the command of his eldest son and heir, Ulugh Khān, with instructions to take possession of the country, and proceed after its conquest, to Ma'bar, and subjugate it. To strengthen his hands further, the Sultān nominated some of the most distinguished warriors, both of the new as well as the old dynasties, as his lieutenants, and commanded them to join the expedition with their forces. Ulugh Khān set out from Dehli followed by a large concourse of warriors including Timur, Tigīn, Takintāsh, Ranbāvla, Naẓir Kah-tūnī, Naẓir Kulazar, *Naẓir-i-Mamālik Khwāja Hājī*, Mal Afghān, 'Ain-ul-Mulk, Qadar Khān, Kāfūr the *Vakīl*, and 'Ubaid the astrologer, and reached Dēvagiri after the usual journey of two months.<sup>7</sup> When he arrived at Dēvagiri, the officers and

6. *Tarīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*, (G.O.S. lxiii), pp. 93-4.

7. 'Iṣāmy: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 384, 85, 87.

بسے سرفرازاں و کشور کشای  
کہ بودند سر لشکران گزین

\*

\*

ہد آخر وکیل در ہمسہ یار  
کہ بودند ہم نام ہردو امیر

...

...

...

\*

\*

برو نامزد کرد فرمان روائ  
چو بل و تمر تکعناش و تکین

\*

\*

چو کافر کاوِل بد او مسہر دار  
چو کہنونی و چون کلم زر نصیر  
چو زباوَلہ چو تکعناش یل

\*

\*

the troops stationed in Marhaṭṭa joined him and they marched towards Warangal, driving before them Pratāparudra and his nobles who ultimately sought shelter under the strong walls of their capital, being unable to withstand the irresistible advance of Muslim forces. Though the Muhammadan historians give few details of the campaign and represent the Hindu armies as stubble to be trampled under the iron hoof of Muslim horse, incidental references to certain events not otherwise mentioned indicate that Pratāparudra offered stubborn resistance. The warfare was, indeed, both protracted and fierce. The fighting was not confined to Warangal and its neighbourhood. A section of the army under Majir Abū Rijā was engaged in investing the fort of Kōtgīr (Kōtagiri?) at the time when Ulugh Khān was vainly attempting to reduce Warangal. It is not unlikely that other important strongholds of the kingdom were similarly assailed. Moreover, the siege of Warangal in which the flower of the Muslim army was engaged lasted for eight long months, and the besiegers were no nearer victory at the end of this period than they were at the beginning. The meagre information gleaned almost exclusively from the Muhammadan sources does not, however, furnish sufficient material for a complete reconstruction of the history of the campaign; and for the present the idea of describing fully all the incidents of the campaign must be abandoned.

Notwithstanding the success that attended Mussalman arms in the early stages of the war, the expedition proved in the end abortive. The Muhammadan historians account for its failure in two ways: Baranī, whom the majority of the later historians follow,

که بودست شیري بر دشت نبود	چون آن عین ملک وفادار مرد
بخواند و را خواجہ حاجي مدام	نصیر ممالک کہ ہر خاص و عام
*	*
کہ آخر شد اورا قدر خان خطاب	دگر مرده پند از ثابت رکاب

attributes the failure to the machinations of an evil-minded poet called 'Ubaid and his vicious companion, Shaikh Zāda-i-Damashkī. Ulugh Khān, it is said, having compelled Pratāparudra and his nobles to creep into the fort of Warangal, laid siege to it, and plundered the country in the neighbourhood to procure provisions and fodder. The two forts of Warangal, built respectively of mud and stone, were properly provisioned and garrisoned. Though the Hindus defended themselves ever so stubbornly, they were reduced to extremities soon. The fall of the mud fort was close at hand. Pratāparudra opened negotiations and offered treasures and elephants to Ulugh Khān, and promised to pay tribute to the Sultān as in the days of the Khaljis, provided that he agreed to raise the siege and retire from the country. Ulugh Khān, however, rejected the offer, and set his heart on the capture of Pratāparudra and his capital. The negotiations of peace lasted for a month. Meanwhile, the morale of the Mussalman troops suffered a change for the worse. No news reached their camp from Dehli for a month owing to the disorganization of the postal system. Consequently, great uneasiness prevailed in the mind of the Khān and his officers, and false rumours spread in the camp. The poet 'Ubaid and his accomplice Shaikh Zāda-i-Damashkī, who were in constant touch with Ulugh Khān disseminated false news of the Sultān's death and the seizure of the throne by an usurper among the troops. They next repaired to some of the leading officers of the army such as Maliks Timur, Tigin, and Kāfūr the *Muhardār*, and informed them that the Khān intended to seize and execute them, as they, who had been formerly in the service of Sultān 'Alā-ud-Dīn, were not inclined to support his claims to the throne. The information, coming as it did from the companions of the Khān, filled their minds with fear; and believing themselves to be in imminent peril, they left the camp with their followers and fled. Their flight created panic and confusion in the army; and the Hindus who naturally took advantage of the misfortune that befell them attacked their camp and plundered it. Ulugh Khān was taken by surprise,

and as he could not cope with the situation, hastily retreated towards Dēvagiri.<sup>8</sup>

The account of Baranī, valuable as it is, is not completely satisfactory; for it does not suggest any motive for the malicious intrigues of 'Ubaid and Shaikh Zāda-i-Damashki, who, it must be mentioned, had no cause of complaint against Ulugh Khān. Their aim was not merely to incite rebellion against him in the camp but to compass his death, if Yāhyā bin Aḥmad can be trusted, by means of assassination.<sup>9</sup> What induced them to adopt this extreme line of action cannot be entirely attributed to their love of mischief.

Ibn Baṭūṭa's account of this incident is somewhat different. He represents 'Ubaid not as an unscrupulous villain but an unfortunate victim of Ulugh Khān's perfidy. On reaching Tiling with the army, Ulugh Khān who was desirous of stirring up rebellion persuaded his companion 'Ubaid to spread in the army a false report of the death of the Sultān. He expected that, on hearing this intelligence, the officers of the army would accept him as their sovereign and swear allegiance to him. He was, however, disappointed in his hopes, and his plot recoiled on his own head. The officers did not believe the news of the Sultān's death. They rebelled against him and wanted to put him to death; but Malik Timur who was one of the principal *amīrs* of the army protected him and enabled him to flee to Dehli accompanied by ten faithful horsemen. Though Sultān Ghaiyās-ud-Dīn was aware of the treasonous designs of Ulugh Khān, he gave him money and troops and sent him back to Tiling to retrieve the disaster.<sup>10</sup>

The genuineness of Ibn Baṭūṭa's account is not above doubt. His statement that Sultān Ghaiyās-ud-Dīn sent back Ulugh Khān

8. *Tārīkh-i-Firūz Shāhī*, E.D. iii, pp. 231-33.

9. *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*, (G.O.S. lxiii), p. 94.

10. E.D. iii, p. 609.

with men and money to Tiling, though he was cognizant of his designs on the throne, is hardly credible. Ghaiyās-ud-Dīn was a stern and just ruler; it is not likely that he would have condoned such a serious crime, though the perpetrator happened to be his own son and heir. Moreover, the later conduct of the Sultān towards the prince does not betray any sign of suspicion or distrust. It is hard to believe, under these circumstances, that Ulugh Khān intended to rebel against his father and seize the throne.

A more satisfactory account of the incidents of Ulugh Khān's first Tiling expedition is furnished by 'Iṣāmy. He states that, on entering Tiling at the head of his army, Ulugh Khān proceeded to plunder the country until he reached Warangal. When he arrived at the place, he devastated the neighbouring district, invested the fort and made the necessary preparations to capture it. His efforts were not crowned with success; the garrison held out obstinately. The imperial forces sat round the fort for six long months but could not find their way to reduce it. Meanwhile, the Sultān manifested signs of impatience. He wrote letters to Ulugh Khān every week charging him with indifference to the behests of the imperial court and with paying heed to the advice of evil counsellors. Ulugh Khān perceived the annoyance of the Sultān; he was eager to bring the siege to a successful termination, and hasten to the court with the news of victory. Nevertheless, he could devise no plan to precipitate the fall of the fort. In his perplexity, he turned to the stars for help. There was in his camp a savant of the name of 'Ubaid who laid claim to a knowledge of the science of astrology. He summoned 'Ubaid to his presence and commanded him to discover, by means of his calculations, the day on which the fort was destined to fall into his hands. Charged with this task, 'Ubaid, though he was no adept, spent a busy week in calculation; at the end of this period he returned to the Khān and proclaimed before him the day when the fort was destined to fall. He declared further that if the fort still remained unconquered on the said day, and his prediction turned false, he was prepared to forfeit his life on the gibbet in its vici-

nity. Ulugh Khān who believed that the prediction was genuine eagerly looked for the arrival of the appointed day, though he could perceive no signs of submission in the fort. As the day fixed by 'Ubad for the fall of the fort drew near, he became nervous and alarmed; he knew that the failure of the prediction meant his own death. To ward off the danger, he conceived an ingenious plan and proceeded without delay to carry it into effect. He paid a visit to the tents of Timur and Tigīn who held the highest places in the army and told them in secret that a grave danger threatened their lives. He said that the Sultān died in Dehli, and the Khān, though he was apprised of it, kept back the information from the commanders as he intended to slay them treacherously. Timur and Tigīn who were unaware of 'Ubad's real intentions, accepted his story as genuine, and becoming suspicious of Ulugh Khān's attitude began to watch his movements closely. Several other officers who were originally well disposed towards Ulugh Khān turned against him when they learnt that he was secretly hatching plans for their destruction. Timur and Tigīn, by virtue of their superior rank in the army, naturally assumed the leadership of the disaffected officers. They resolved to abandon Ulugh Khān, and march away from his camp. To secure themselves from an attack from the Hindus, they made overtures to Pratāparudra and obtained from him an undertaking that, for the space of one watch after their departure, he would remain within the fort without making any effort to go in pursuit of them with his forces. Then they broke up their camp, struck their tents, and having set fire to the temporary walls erected by them for the purposes of defence marched away from the environs of Warangal. But as they were moving Ulugh Khān, roused by the unusual clamour that disturbed the camp, came out of his tent to ascertain its cause. He grasped its significance immediately, and apprehending danger to his person he quickly mounted a horse to flee probably to shelter and safety. Some of the commanders such as 'Ain-ul-Mulk, Khawāja Hājī, Qadar Khān and Mal Afghān who still adhered to him faithfully, seeing the danger in which he

stood, rushed to his side with their followers, and set up a cordon around him. The insurgents, foiled in their attempt to reach the Khān, marched away, and the Khān himself followed in their wake a little later.<sup>11</sup>

'Iṣāmy, no doubt, gives a more coherent and satisfactory account than others, although he occasionally skips over incidents and obscures the tenour of his lucid narrative. He does not, for instance, describe fully the story fabricated by 'Ubaid to excite rebellion against Ulugh Khān. He alludes, it is true, to the circulation of the false rumour of the Sultān's death, and the suppression of the intelligence from Dehli by Ulugh Khān; but he does not explain how Timur and Tigīn were persuaded to believe that these alleged facts foretokened their destruction. Nevertheless, 'Iṣāmy's narrative which is in general agreement with that of Baranī, dispels doubt and uncertainty and furnishes much valuable information essential for a clear understanding of the facts pertaining to the expedition.

What actually happened under the walls of Warangal may now be stated briefly, though the conflicting character of the available evidence precludes the attainment of undisputable accuracy on all points. Ulugh Khān proceeded to Warangal with his army and invested the city for six months. It is not easy to ascertain what took place in the interval. As 'Iṣāmy and Baranī, who are, on the whole, hostile to Ulugh Khān, attribute the disastrous conclusion of the expedition not to his rebellious activities but to the wily machinations of a desperate astrologer, the charge of treason which Ibn Baṭūṭa levels against him must be disregarded as groundless. The circumstances in which 'Ubaid, the astrologer, precipitated the crisis and brought disaster to the imperial army are far from clear, as Baranī and 'Iṣāmy give divergent accounts. The former states that during the interval Ulugh Khān reduced the Hindus to extremities, and that Pratāparudra offered to surrender the fort on

11. 'Iṣāmy: *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*, pp. 383-88.

certain conditions, but as the Khān had set his mind on the capture of Pratāparudra and his fort, he rejected the offer; 'Ubaid's intrigues, however, frustrated his attempt and compelled him to abandon the siege. The latter declares, on the contrary, that Ulugh Khān failed to capture the fort though he invested it for six months. And as he lost confidence in his military strength to effect the capture, he turned, in the end, to the stars to learn when they decreed its fall. The astrologer 'Ubaid whom he employed for interpreting their will, baffled by their inscrutability, made a false prognostication of victory, and to evade the evil consequences excited a rebellion in the camp against him and forced him to raise the siege and evacuate the country. 'Iṣāmy is an earlier writer and discloses more intimate knowledge of the affairs of Deccan than Baranī. Moreover, the veil of obscurity which the latter casts over the episode of 'Ubaid seems to screen facts which, for some unknown reason, he is not disposed to record. Nevertheless, the evidence is not quite conclusive to adopt one of these two views in preference to the other; and an endeavour to reach a decision in the present state of knowledge is not, perhaps, productive of satisfactory results.<sup>12</sup>

However that may be, there is hardly room for doubt that the abandonment of the siege of Warangal was due to 'Ubaid's intrigues.

12. Agha Mahdi Ḥusain attributes the outbreak of dissensions in Ulugh Khān's camp to the disagreement between him and his lieutenants with regards policy. "It seems," says he, "that S'ad and 'Ubaid quarrelled with Ulugh Khān during the siege of Wārangal for personal reasons. They had previously come to Telingāna under Malik Kāfūr and had taken part in the siege of Wārangal. They knew that 'Alā-ud-Dīn Khaljī had specially advised Malik Kāfūr to withdraw the siege and retire to Dehli as soon as the rājā surrendered and promised to pay the tribute. They favoured this mild policy of 'Alā-ud-Dīn and recollected how they had profited by it. Perhaps they also recollected how Khusrau Khān, far from pressing the siege of Wārangal had accepted the rich offers made to him and had agreed to retire. They disliked the grim resolve of Ulugh Khān to press the siege and were

He gulled Timur and Tigīn with the story of a plot hatched by Ulugh Khān for their destruction as they were supposed to stand, on account of their 'Alāī connections, in his way to the throne; and

chagrined at his refusal to accept the tempting offers of the rājā." *Rise and Fall of Muḥammad Bin Tughluq*, p. 58.

This explanation is, no doubt, ingenious; but it is not based on evidence. There is no reason to suppose that any of the officers who precipitated this rebellion had accompanied Malik Kāfūr during his Telingāṇa campaign. No historian either contemporary or later speaks of them in this connection. Some of the *amīrs* such as Timur and Tigīn, no doubt, accompanied Khusrāu Khān to Ma'bar, but the Ma'bar expedition had no connection with the invasion of Telingāṇa, although Yāhyā bin Aḥmad unfortunately mixes them up together and makes it appear that Khusrāu Khān conquered both Telingāṇa and Ma'bar during the course of a single expedition. Amīr Khusrāu and 'Isāmī, the two contemporary historians who notice Khusrāu Khān's Tiling expedition at some length do not mention the names of any one of the rebellious *amīrs*. Amīr Khusrāu refers only to Khwāja Hājī, the 'Arīz (E.D. iii, p. 559) and 'Isāmī to none at all; and Khwāja Hājī, according to 'Isāmī, did not join the rebellious *amīrs*, but remained faithful to Ulugh Khān.

که بود دست شمرے بدشت نبرد	چو آن عین ملک وفادار مرد
بخواند و را خواجه حاجي مدام	نصير ممالک که هر خاص و عام
که بد پهلواني دران روزگار	همان مل افغان يل نامدار
که آخر شد اورا قدر خاں خطاب	دگر گرد پندار ثابت رکاب
ستادند بر برد خان کراز	چو آن چار سر لشکر سرفراز

*Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*, p. 387.

There is, therefore, no ground for the belief that Timur and his fellow rebels accompanied either Malik Nā'ib Kāfūr or Khusrāu Khān to Tiling. Nor is there evidence in support of the contention that the rebellious nobles turned against Ulugh Khān owing to their disagreement with him with regards the policy which he adopted in dealing with the king of Tiling. According to all accounts, the rebellion was fomented by 'Ubaid who was prompted by his love of mischief or the desire to escape from the consequence of a false prediction which was threatening to drag him near the gibbet.

instigated them to rise in revolt. Having resolved on rebellion, Timur and Tigīn together with the other officers who joined them sent a messenger to the court of Pratāparudra, as they feared an attack from his soldiers at the earliest favourable opportunity, and secured from him a solemn undertaking that he would allow them to depart from his country without molestation. Heartened by his assurance of safety, they were engaged in making preparations for departure, when they caught sight of Ulugh Khān mounted on a horse in front of his tent. Unable to restrain their feelings, they rushed upon him with the object of putting him to death, but were baulked of their prey by the vigilance of Ulugh Khān's followers who stood round him like an impenetrable barrier and forced them to retire.<sup>13</sup> Foiled in their attempt on the life of Ulugh Khān, the rebels fell back and slowly marched away towards the Marhaṭṭa frontier leaving Ulugh Khān behind to extricate himself as well as he could.

#### *Ulugh Khān's Flight.*

Ulugh Khān was left in a most precarious position which the dictates of prudence urged him to abandon as early as possible. The rebels, no doubt, departed, but their departure turned to be a signal for the appearance of a graver danger. The Hindus, whom Ulugh Khān held penned in the fort for the last six

13. Baranī does not mention this incident, and 'Isāmy makes but a covert allusion; but Ibn Baṭūṭa who heard of this attack refers to it. He states that the rebels 'wished to kill' Ulugh Khān; but he wrongly ascribes to Malik Timur the credit of offering him protection. (E.D. iii, p. 609). According to Yāhya bin Aḥmad, the rebels were incited to take this step by 'Ubaid himself. 'He employed,' says he, 'the *amīrs* and the *malīks* such as Malik Takīn and others for assassinating Ulugh Khān.' But his assertion that the Khān dispersed them with the assistance of 50 horsemen seems to be an exaggeration.

or seven months, did not fail to take advantage of the altered situation in his camp. Pratāparudra observed faithfully the terms of his agreement with the rebels; but as soon as they marched away, he was free to deal with Ulugh Khān as sternly as he desired. The Khān himself must have been aware of this; but before he could disentangle himself, the gates of the fort opened, and a large body of fierce Hindu warriors rushed upon his camp. 'Isāmy has nothing to say of this incident; but Baranī is quite explicit. "This event," says he, "was very opportune for the besieged Hindus, and saved them. They sallied forth and plundered the baggage of the army, and Ulugh Khān with his immediate followers retreated to Dēvagiri"<sup>14</sup> An echo of this attack is preserved in the *prāśasti* of the Rāveḷḷa clan of the Velama community. The chief of this clan who was in the service of Pratāparudra is said to have deprived Ulugh Khān of the seven constituents of his office and destroyed the pride of Malik Nēmāl.<sup>15</sup> As was to be naturally expected under the circumstances, Ulugh Khān's retreat to Dēvagiri was not unhampered; for, according to Ferishta, 'he was pursued by the enemy with great slaughter.'<sup>16</sup> 'Isāmy who gives an interesting account of the events that took place during this retreat states that Ulugh Khān started in the wake of the rebels from Warangal and caught up with them on the way. He marched by their side without any mishap for two or three days; but fearing a sudden and unexpected clash between them and his followers he made overtures of peace, suggesting that in the interests of both, it was desira-

14. *Tārīkh-i-Firūz Shāhī*, E.D., iii, p. 232.

15. వులుగ ఖానుని సప్తాంగ చూటకార, మలుక నేమాలుని మానమర్దన.

Mack, Mss. 15.4.3. p. 101. The *Kaifiyat of Anumakonda* gives a lengthy description of the battle in which Ulugh Khān was defeated; but the account is so completely encrusted with legendary matter that it is impossible to separate fact from fiction.

16. Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 404.

ble that one of them should remain where they were encamped at that time, and allow the other to go in advance by a single day's journey. The rebels having accepted these proposals, Ulugh Khān moved with his troops in advance in the direction of Kōtgīr.<sup>17</sup>

Ulugh Khān's desire to arrive at an understanding with the rebels cannot entirely be attributed to his fear of a possible clash between them and his officers. At the time when he concluded the truce with the rebels, he was still within striking distance of Warangal, and he could not have been entirely free from molestation at the hands of the Hindus who plundered his camp and pursued him in his retreat. The pressure of the Hindus on his rear must have made his position considerably insecure. His attempt to make up his quarrel with the rebels and win their goodwill was probably intended to bring himself under the mantle of their protection, as they were immune, in virtue of their agreement with Pratāparudra, from the Hindu attacks. Whatever might have been his real motive, he managed, as a consequence of the truce with them, to place their forces between himself and his pursuers, and continue his retreat without further obstruction, though his mind was still beset with fear and anxiety. When he reached the neighbourhood of Kōtgīr, he chanced upon the army of Majīr Abu Rijā who was engaged in a vain attempt to reduce that fort. Ulugh Khān, whose faith in the loyalty of the officers was profoundly shaken by his recent reverses, was at first distrustful of Majīr, as he was not quite certain of his attitude towards him; but Majīr who soon perceived the cause of his distrust hastened to his camp with presents and tribute to allay his suspicion; and assured him, with many protestations of his loyalty, of his support and co-operation in bringing the rebels to book. The great cordiality displayed by Majīr, coupled with his assurance of help, lifted the gloom off Ulugh Khān's mind and restored cheerfulness to his disposition.<sup>18</sup>

17. *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, pp. 387-8.

18. *Ibid*, pp. 388-9.

Majir proceeded immediately to concert measures to lay hold of the rebels. He addressed letters to the zamindars and the heads of all the districts intimating that a band of rebels were passing through the country. He commanded that they should attack these rebels, seize them, and send their chiefs, if they were taken prisoners, to the court of the king. When these letters reached their destination, troops proceeded from every *paragana* to all places of importance to watch the roads and intercept them. Having thus completed his arrangements, Majir accompanied Ulugh Khān to Dēvagiri, where he remained in readiness to meet any new situation that might arise.

The steps taken by Majir to overpower the rebels proved effective. They, no doubt, arrived at Kalyān without any accident, and lay encamped there in the belief that they need no longer fear the king. However, they soon discovered that their confidence was misplaced. Summoned to action by the letters addressed to them by Majir Abu Rijā, the zamindars of the country flocked to Kalyān with their troops and surrounded the city. When the rebels found themselves within the ring of destruction, they lost heart and sought safety in flight; but most of them either perished in the attempt or fell into the hands of the zamindars.<sup>19</sup> Some of the rebel commanders such as Tigin and Timur were killed;<sup>20</sup> a few managed to hide

19. *Ibid*, pp. 389-90.

20. Baranī: *Tārīkh-i-Firūz Shāhī*, E.D. iii, p. 233; Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 404.

Ferishta describes the capture and destruction of the rebels in greater detail. According to him, dissensions arose among the rebel leaders and they separated; their followers turned against them; and their weapons and baggage fell into the hands of the infidels. Malik Timur went with some persons into the midst of the zamindars of Tiling, and there he perished; Malik Tigin was slain by the zamindars of Marhatta, and his skin was sent to Ulugh Khān at Dēvagiri; they captured also Malik Gul (Mal?)

themselves in obscure places whence they ultimately escaped to Bengal and took shelter in the court of the *Sulṭān Shams-ud-Dīn* at *Lakhnauti*.<sup>21</sup> The rest including 'Ubaid, Malik Kāfūr the seal-bearer, *Nazīr-ud-Dīn Kulazar*, and *Kahtūnī* were taken prisoners and sent to *Ulugh Khān's* camp at *Dēvagiri*.<sup>22</sup>

*The punishment of the rebels:*

When the rebels reached *Dēvagiri*, they appear to have been subjected to an enquiry to discover where the mischief had originally started. 'An enquiry,' says *Ferishta*, 'was instituted into their conduct, the authors of the false

*Afghān*, 'Ubaid the poet, Malik Kāfūr and other malcontents and brought them to *Ulugh Khān* at *Devagiri*.

آن چهار سردار که باهم اتفاق نموده از لشکر برآمده بودند از هم جدا  
افتاده حشم و خدم از ایشان برگشت - و اسباب و اسلحه ایشان بدست  
کفار افتاد - و ملک تیمور با چند کس در میان زمینداران تلنگ رفته  
همانجا درگذشت - و ملک تسکین را زمینداران مرهط کشته و پرستش  
را نزد الغ خان فرستادند - و ملک گل افغان و عبید شاعر و ملک  
کافور و مفسدان دیگر گرفتند بدیوگره نزد الغ خان آوردند .

*Tārīkh-i-Ferishta* (Naval Kishore Press), Part i, p. 131.

21. *Ibn Baṭūṭa*, E.D. iii, p. 609.

22. *Baranī* includes the name of *Malik Mal Afghān* among the captives. (E.D. III. p. 233). He is evidently identical with *Malik Bal Afghān* whom he refers to as a great warrior and friend of *Ulugh Khān*. It is doubtful whether *Mal* or *Bal Afghān* could have been one of the captives, as, according to *Ṭaṣmī*, he was one of the four officers who stood loyally by the side of *Ulugh Khān* when the rebels made an attack upon his person at *Warangal*. (*Ṭaṣmī: Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 390). *Ibn Baṭūṭa* does not include his name among the rebels. (E.D. iii, p. 609).

reports were discovered, seized and sent prisoners to Dehli.<sup>23</sup> Ulugh Khān with much precaution, provided them with a strong escort, lest they should escape on the way. At his command, his brother, prince Maḥmūd Khān, who was the governor of Dēvagiri, led them to Dehli and made them over to the Sultān with a report of the part which they had played during the rebellion.

The Sultān held a great durbar in the plain of Sīrī, and when the prisoners were brought before him, he summarily ordered them, according to Ferishta, 'to be buried alive,' with the severe remark, 'that as they had buried him alive in jest, he would bury them alive in earnest.'<sup>24</sup> This is, however, contradicted by early writers. Ibn Baṭūṭa states that 'Ubaid was killed, and Kāfūr was impaled on a sharp stake;<sup>25</sup> according to Baranī, both 'Ubaid and Kāfūr as well as their other accomplices were all impaled alive.<sup>26</sup> 'Iṣāmy who

23. Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 404. No reference to this enquiry is, however, found in the published Persian text. The rebels are said to have been sent to Dehli in chains.

ملک گل افغان و عبید شاعر و ملک کافور و مفتنان دیگر گرفته  
بدیو گڑه نزد الغ خان آوردند - الغ خان آنها را همچنان مقید بدھلی  
فرستاده .

*Tārīkh-i-Ferishta*, (Naval Kishore Press), i, p. 131.

24. Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 405. The published Persian text does not mention this remark; it refers only to the Sultān's stern judgment.

پادشاه غیاث الدین در شهر سیوری ہم را زنده گور کرده خورش  
طبعی بر اصل فرمود .

*Tārīkh-i-Ferishta* (Naval Kishore Press), i, p. 131.

25. E. D. iii, p. 609.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 233.

must have been an eye witness, for he was residing in Dehli at that time, describes how each of the rebel leaders was executed. 'Ubaid was impaled on a stake even as he stipulated on the day when he foretold victory to Ulugh Khān's arms. The punishment meted out to Kāfūr, the seal bearer, was such that people remembered it with terror. Naẓīr Kulazar was taken to the thrashing floor where he was trampled to death under the foot of an elephant.<sup>27</sup>

The wrath of the Sultān did not cool down with the execution of the rebels. It extended to their families and involved them in destruction. Following the cruel custom of the age, Sultān Ghai-yās-ud-Dīn sent his men into the districts where they lived, and having brought them forcibly to Dehli, put them to death in a most inhuman fashion.<sup>28</sup> The sternness which the Sultān had displayed in putting down the rebellion inspired wholesome dread in the minds of the people; and they eschewed all thoughts of rebellion during the remaining years of his reign.

27. *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, pp. 390-91.

عبيد منجم بر آمد بدار	که بد شرط کرده به روز همار
همان مهردار آمد اندر قصاص	در آن روز شد منتهم عام و خاص
نصير که ز شد اندر رحيل	فگفتند او را که پائي پيل

28. Baranī: *Tārīkh-i-Firūz Shāhī*, E.D. iii, p. 233.

*Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* (G.O.S. lxiii), pp. 94-5.

*Tārīkh-i-Ferishta* (Naval Kishore Press), Part i, p. 131.

واولاد و احفاد ایشان را که در دهلي گرفته بودند نیز زیر پاي فيل  
الداخلت -

There is nothing corresponding to this sentence in Briggs' translation.

## SECTION 3

*The Second Tiling Expedition*

The Sultān did not give up the projected conquest of Telingāna. The failure of the first expedition served only to strengthen his purpose, and urged him to make fresh endeavours. To retrieve the disaster, he resolved to send an expedition once again. It is said that Ulugh Khān repaired to Dehli to explain to the Sultān the circumstances in which he was compelled to retreat from Warangal; and was asked, on narrating his story, to return to Telingāna at the head of a fresh army and resume the conquest of the country.<sup>29</sup> This, however, does not appear to have been the case; for, Baranī clearly indicates that Ulugh Khān remained in Dēvagiri and reinforcements were sent to him thither by the Sultān with instructions to march to Tiling and subjugate that country;<sup>30</sup> and 'Iṣāmy seems to be in agreement with him, as he does not allude to Ulugh Khān's visit to Dehli in this connection.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, it may be presumed that he did not go, on this occasion, to Dehli but awaited in Dēvagiri the arrival of reinforcements. The Sultān, in the meanwhile, made energetic preparations for sending a fresh expedition, and despatched a strong force within the short space of four months.

As soon as the reinforcements reached Dēvagiri, Ulugh Khān set out for Tiling, and by rapid marches arrived on the

29. Ibn Baṭūṭa asserts that Ulugh Khān fled to Dehli straight from Warangal, but was sent back to conquer Telingāna at the head of a fresh army. (E.D. iii, p. 609). And Yāhya bin Aḥmad agrees with him (*Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*, (G.O.S. lxiii), p. 96). Nizām-ud-Dīn Aḥmad *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, i, (Eng. Tr. I. p. 212, cf. Briggs *Ferishṭa*, i, p. 405) places the visit some time subsequent to the execution of the rebels in Dehli.

30. E. D. iii, p. 233.

31. 'Iṣāmy: *Futūh-us-Salāṭin*, pp. 390-91.

frontier; he seized Bīdar which stood on the frontier, and several other forts along his route in the interior, and posted strong garrisons under trustworthy officers to protect them.<sup>32</sup> At last, he reached the town of Bōdhan which was at a distance of ten days journey from Warangal, and invested the fort for three or four days; the inhabitants were so panic stricken that the chief of the fort with all his men offered submission and begged for quarter. Ulugh Khān pardoned them and having converted the chief and his people to Islām, raised the siege and proceeded on his way to Warangal.<sup>33</sup>

The second siege and capture of Warangal are disposed of briefly by Baranī and the later historians. It is said that Ulugh Khān laid siege to the mud fort, and after assailing it vigorously with the siege engines for a few days, captured the interior as well

32. Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 405. Cf. *Tārīkh-i-Ferishta* (Naval Kishore Press), p. 131.

بعد از چهار ماه باز با لشکر فراوان از راه دیوگره متوجه ورنگل شد - و حصار شهر بیدر را که سرحد تلنگ بود و تعلق براجست ورنگل داشت با بعضی حصار چاه دیگر که در اثنای راه بود مستخر و مفتوح ساختیم بمعمدان خود سپرد و ضبط راهها بعهده ایشیان نموده بورنگل رفت .

33. 'Iṣāmī: *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 391.

بر آراست افواج را سر به سر	الغ خان صفدار بار دگر
بزد در سمناری یکی بارگاه	دگر روز آن صفدر کینه خواجه
به یک منزله هم نگورده درنگ	به روز دگر راند سرے تلنگ
پس از چندگاه به بودهن رسید	هنیدم که چون خان اختر سعید
چنان وهشتی خورد اهل حصار	دران حصن پیچید روزی سه چهار
هم ملوک و اسباب آورد پیش	کامان خواجه هد رای باطبع خویش
نه تنها که با جملگی خان و مان	بیاورد ایمان ز بعد امان
دهم روز زیر آرنگل رسید	دگر روز خان خیم زان جا کشید

as the exterior citadel.<sup>34</sup> As a matter of fact, the siege extended over a period of five months; and it is doubtful whether Ulugh Khān could have at all captured the fort, had he not been aided by Pratāparudra's amazing lack of foresight.

As soon as Ulugh Khān retreated from Warangal at the end of his first expedition, Pratāparudra celebrated a feast in honour of his victory over the Mussalmans. He deluded himself with the belief that they would not invade his country again in the near future. Therefore, he opened the granaries in the fort and sold away the stored up grain completely, he also commanded his subjects to give up warlike activities and busy themselves with agricultural operations. He soon discovered, however, the unwisdom of his actions. Within four months of his retreat, Ulugh Khān suddenly made his appearance again in Telingāna, and was approaching the capital by rapid marches. The fort was without a proper garrison to maintain its defence; and without adequate grain to provision the garrison during a siege. The success which attended the Muslim arms in this campaign must be attributed to a great extent to Pratāparudra's misplaced confidence.

Though taken unawares by the enemy, Pratāparudra put up a plucky fight. He made hasty preparations for the defence of the fort, and shut himself in. Ill-equipped as he was to stand a siege, he managed to withstand the attacks of the Mussalmans for five months; but it was inevitable that, in the absence of outside help, he should submit; for the scanty stock of provisions which he hastily gathered ran out, and famine stalked into the fort. Moreover, the spirit of his followers, who were sick unto death through hunger and weariness, was completely broken; and they clamoured for peace. When Pratāparudra saw that the siege could no longer be maintained, he resolved to surrender the fort, and sent a mes-

34. *Tārīkh-i-Firūz Shāhi*, E.D. iii, p. 233; cf. *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhi* (G.O.S. lxiii), p. 96.

senger to Ulugh Khān begging for quarter. On the receipt of a favourable reply, he threw open the gates and delivered himself with the other members of his family into Ulugh Khān's hands. The Muhammadan army then entered the fort, plundered the houses and demolished public buildings.<sup>35</sup>

*The Captivity and death of Pratāparudra:*

Pratāparudra was not allowed to remain long in Telin-gāṇa after the fall of Warangal. His presence in the country was not desirable, as it might give rise to political complications which were likely to endanger the position of the Mussalmans. Ulugh Khān who clearly foresaw this danger took immediate steps to remove him from the country. He sent him with all his relations and dependents to Dehli protected by a strong escort under Qadar Khān and Khawājā Hājī, two officers of his suite in whom he had perfect confidence.<sup>36</sup> They were not destined to lead the illustrious prisoner to Dehli; for, before they could reach the metropolis, Pratāparudra bade farewell to this mundane world and hastened to meet his creator.<sup>37</sup> His death, however, does not appear to have been brought about by

35. Isāmy: *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn*, pp. 391-92.

The fall of Warangal and the capture of Pratāparudra are attributed, in certain local chronicles, to the treachery of the Redḍi chiefs who, piqued by the favour which he bestowed on the Velamas, accepted a bribe from Ulugh Khān and stood aloof without joining the fight. (*Kākatīya Sañcika*, pp. 77-8). Much reliance cannot be placed on the evidence of these chronicles as they are largely legendary in character; and no definite conclusion can be drawn, as to the treason of the Redḍis from the questionable data furnished by them.

36. Baranī: *Tārīkh-i-Firūz Shāhī*, E.D. iii, p. 233.

37. Shams-i-Sirāj Afif: *Tārīkh-i-Firūz Shāhī*, E.D. iii, p. 367.

natural causes. In a copper plate record dated 1423 A.D. he is said to have departed to the world of the gods by his own desire. This seems to suggest that he either committed suicide or was slain at his own instance by one of his followers.<sup>38</sup> Pratāparudra who was a proud monarch could not probably reconcile himself to a life of captivity. Perhaps he realised with feelings of poignancy that he would be pointed out as a symbol of the victory of Islām over his own race. He must have considered death as the only honourable means of escape and deliberately embraced it ringing down the curtain on the final act of the drama of his life.

38. J.T.A. ii, p. 106.

*Tasmīn Pratāparudrē svasthānam svēcchaya-iva yātavati*  
*Atha sā bhūr=yavana-mayī jāta-iva mahāmaho mahimā.*

J. Ramayya Pantulu, the editor of the inscription, ignores the phrase, *svēcchaya-iva*, in his interpretation of the verse; but V. Prabhakara Sastri who recognizes its importance seems to understand by it 'a state of freedom'; for he explains the meaning of *svēcchaya-iva* as follows: "That is to say that Pratāparudra did not die in battle etc., having been defeated by the Turuṣkas" (*Śṛiṅgāra-śrīnātham*, p. 40). The passage as interpreted by Prabhakara Sastri indirectly supports the tradition that Pratāparudra was restored to liberty by his followers. This, together with the existence of two inscriptions dated respectively in 1326 and 1330 A. D. attributed to Pratāparudra, seems to point in the same direction. Swayed by the evidence of these facts and the opinion of the Āndhra historians, I held that Pratāparudra did not die on his way to Dehli, but was rescued from captivity by his followers; and attempted to reconcile the evidence of these facts with the statement of Shams-i-Sirāj Afif. (*Origin of the City and the Empire of Vijayanagara*, p. 113 ff). But this position has been rendered invalid by the discovery of a copper plate inscription of Prōlaya Nāyaka which clearly alludes to the captivity and death of Pratāparudra in the Muhammadan wars. (*Bhārati*, xix, p. 311). Moreover, of the two inscriptions attributed to Pratāparudra, the one dated 1330 A.D. has turned out, on further examination, to be that of the Gajapati Pratāparudra. (I am grateful to the Superin-

## SECTION 4

*The subjugation of the Kākatīya kingdom*

The fall of Warangal and the capture of Pratāparudra were not immediately followed by the submission of the Kākatīya dominions to the Mussalmans. Though the Muslim historians roundly assert that the whole of Telingāna was brought under control, the conquest of the country was not completed without further resistance. Ulugh Khān appears to have met with some opposition in the south-western Āndhra country. 'Iṣāmī alludes to the conquest of Gutti and Kuntī in one of the opening sections of his work.<sup>39</sup> Gutti was at this time under the rule of a Telugu Cōḍa chief called Jagatāpi Gangayadēva who, taking advantage of the dissolution of the Sēuṇa kingdom after Rāmadēva's death in 1313 A.D., seems to have established his authority over portions of Anantapur and Bellary districts.<sup>40</sup> The *Kumāra Rāmana Kathe*, a Kanarese chronicle of the chiefs of Kampili, states that some time before the flight

tendent for Epigraphy, Madras for securing for my study a fresh estampage of the inscription). Though the other inscription dated 1326 A.D. still offers difficulty, the copper plate charter of Prōlaya Nāyaka leaves no room for doubt that Pratāparudra died in captivity as stated by Shams-i-Sirāj Afīf.

39. *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn* (Agra) p. 29, couplets 590-91.

کہ بگرفت از زور بازو تلنگ      کہ بگرفت جا جانگر تابه بنگ  
کہ بگرفت گوئی و کنتی نخست      کہ شمشیر در آب دریا بشست

"Who conquered Tiling by the force of his arm? Who conquered Jājānagar as far as Bengal? Who conquered Gutti and Kuntī at first and washed his sword in the waters of the sea?"

It is obvious that the author of these achievements was 'Ulugh Khān.

40. *Bhārati*, xv, pp. 157-60.

of Bahā-ud-Dīn Garshāsp to Kampili, Kumāra Rāmanātha, the war-like son of Kampili Rāya, repelled an attack of Jagatāpi on Kummaṭa. The cause of this invasion is said to have been the desire of Jagatāpi to avenge the insult which Rāmanātha offered to the Sultān of Dehli by destroying the imperial palanquin which was sent round with the army for collecting the tribute.<sup>41</sup> If this were the cause of Jagatāpi's invasion, it is evident that he owed allegiance to Ghaiyās-ud-Dīn Tughlaq who must have been the Sultān of Dehli at this time. Jagatāpi must have been compelled to submit to the Sultān, when 'Ulugh Khān captured his capital Guttī. Though no information is available about the operations at Kuntī (in the Kurnool Dt.)<sup>42</sup> and other parts of the country, the allusion to the washing of 'Ulugh Khān's sword in the waters of the sea appears to indicate the subjugation of the littoral along the coast of the Bay of Bengal. The presence of Sālār Ulwī, one of 'Ulugh Khān's officers, at Rājahmundry in 1324 A.D. strengthens the belief that the coastal region did not submit to the Muslim armies without a struggle.<sup>43</sup> Ulugh Khān did not entirely depend on force for establishing his control over the land; he seems to have adopted to some extent a policy of conciliation which was calculated to make his rule as little obnoxious to the Hindu chiefs as possible. He allowed some of the old Hindu officers of Pratāparudra to rule the country, provided they agreed to pay him an annual tribute, and even received a few of the former ministers of the kingdom into his favour; and treated them generously so as to make them

41. QJMS, 1929, Supp. p. 3.

42. The exact situation of this fort is not known; but, according to *Rāmarāṣyam*, Sōmadēva, one of the ancestors of Āravīṭi Bukka, and a contemporary of the famous Kampili Rāya, conquered the fort of Kuntī, Nākula-pāḍu, Mudugallu, Anegondi and Sara—consequently he acquired the biruda of 'the Conqueror of Kuntī'—*Sources*, p. 82.

43. 425 of 1926.

forgetful of their loss of freedom.<sup>44</sup> Most of the chiefs seem to have submitted to the Muslim rule without further opposition; and agreed to pay tribute to the Sultān of Dehli in the place of their old sovereign.

## SECTION 5

### *The Conquest of Ma'bar*

Notwithstanding the Muslim invasions under Khalji Sultāns, Ma'bar still remained unconquered; the country was no doubt ravaged and plundered both by Malik Kāfūr and Khusrau Khān, as noticed already, but remained unsubdued.<sup>45</sup> Although Baranī mentions Ma'bar incidentally as one of the provinces of the Dehli empire at the time when Sultān Muḥammad Tughlaq transferred his capital to Dēvagiri,<sup>46</sup> he does not give the date of its conquest. Yāhyā bin Aḥmad states that Ulugh Khān was entrusted with the command of an expedition against Ma'bar in 721 A.H. by Ghaiyāṣ-ud-Dīn Tughlaq.<sup>47</sup> As Ulugh Khān sustained a defeat at Warangal

44. A contemporary work on *Svarasāstra* by Gaṇapanārādhyā, a brother of Rāmarāja who flourished in Pratāparudra's court, alludes to the manner in which some of the old Hindu nobles were treated by the Sultān. Gaṇya, the father of the author, was a minister of Pratāparudra; and Rāmarāja, his elder brother, was held in great esteem. After the overthrow of the Kākātīya power, the Sultān showed him great favour; bestowed on him wealth; restored him his former possessions, placed under him chiefs of cavalry and treated him with the respect due to a *maṇḍalésvara*. (*Bhārati*, xii, pp. 29-31). It is not unlikely that 'Ulugh Khān treated the other chiefs and ministers in the same manner.

45. See Ma'bar 1311-23, JOR xii, pp. 192-216.

46. E.D. iii, pp. 238-9.

47. "When the business of the State was brought into order (after the Sultān's accession on 24 Shā'bān 721 A.H.), His Majesty sent out Ulugh

and was consequently compelled to retreat to Dēvagiri, he could not have proceeded to Ma'bar at that time; but it is not unlikely that after the fall of Warangal in 1323 A.D. that he might have led an expedition to Ma'bar and subdued the country. The *Pāṇḍyan Chronicle*, as a matter of fact, assigns the conquest of Madura to Ś. 1246 Rudhirōdgāri corresponding to 227th year the *Kollam-alinda* era; and this date works out correctly to 1323 A.D. During this year Āthi Sultān and one Malik Nēmi 'came from Dehli in the north, and taking Parākramadēva', the ruling king of Madura, 'captive, they sent him to Dehli and conquered the country.'<sup>48</sup> The account of the chronicle is based on facts. The Pāṇḍyan records of the period mention the name of a chief of the family called Parākrama whose sway extended over Tinnevely, Madura, Ramnad, and Tanjore districts as well as the Pudukottah State. He is said to have ascended the throne in 1315 A.D.<sup>49</sup> An epigraph dated 732 A.H. (1332 A.D.) inscribed on the wall of the temple of Bhūmīśvara at Rāngiam in the Pudukottah State refers to Ādi Sultān as the ruler of the country, and shows without doubt that Muslim rule was established in the heart of Ma'bar. The identity of Ādi Sultān is not however clearly established; he may probably be identified with Sultān Muḥammad Tughlaq himself.<sup>50</sup> 'Iṣāmy

Khān with a vast force against Tiling, and Ma'bar in the same year." *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* (G.O.S. lxiii), p. 93.

48. Taylor: *Hist. Mss.* i, 203.

49. *Pāṇḍyan Kingdom*, p. 245; *Chronological List*, 447-449.

50. Dr. S. K. Aiyangar, who proposes this identification, suggests that 'it is barely possible it refers to Jalāl-ud-Dīn who must have been the governor of Ma'bar in this year' (*South India and Her Muhammadan Invaders*, p. 165, n, 1). The evidence on this point is not quite clear. Although Ibn Batūṭa (see *Foreign Notices*, p. 217) asserts that Jalāl-ud-Dīn Ahsan was the governor of Ma'bar, 'Iṣāmy speaks of him only as *Kotwāl* of Madura and declares

refers to the capture of a king of Ma'bar by one of the Sultāns of Dehli, though it is not easy to discover the identity of the captor.<sup>51</sup> The person who actually effected the capture of the Ma'bar ruler

that he usurped the government of the province after murdering the officers who were in charge of the administration. *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, p. 449.

بہ معبر یکے سیدے کو تو مال در آن وقت بودست نامش جلال  
بزد کوس و از شاه دہلی گذشت بکشت از سران عوان هفت هشت

This is corroborated by Yāhyā bin Aḥmad:—"Sa'iyid Ḥasan Kithili .....fermented a revolt at Ma'bar, and having killed some of the imperial officers that had been appointed to the district, and gaining over others to his own party, put himself in possession of the entire country of Ma'bar." (*Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*, G.O.S., lxiii, p. 108).

It is therefore doubtful whether Sayyid Jalāl-ud-Dīn was the governor of Ma'bar at the time of his revolt. The evidence of the Indian historians seems to indicate that he occupied a subordinate role in the government of Ma'bar. Therefore, Ādi Sultān mentioned in the Rāngiam inscription cannot be definitely identified with him.

51. *Futūh-us-Salātīn*: p. 29.

نخستین که زد خیمہ در دیوگیر بدست که شد را ئی معبر اسیر  
که بگرفت از زور بازو تلنگ که بگرفت جا جانگر ڈا بہ ہنگ

"Who pitched his tent in Devgir at first? In whose hands did the king of Ma'bar become a prisoner? Who conquered Tiling by the force of his arm? Who conquered Jājānagar as far as Bengal?"

The lines preceding these couplets describe the conquests of 'Alā-ud-Dīn Khalji. It was also 'Alā-ud-Dīn that first attacked Dēvagiri. There is, however, no evidence whatever to show that a Pāṇḍyan king had ever been captured by 'Alā-ud-Dīn's officers. Even 'Iṣāmy does not refer to any such incident in describing 'Alā-ud-Dīn's campaign in Ma'bar. The second half of the first couplet cited above seems to refer to the capture of Pāṇḍya Parā-kramadēva by Ādi Sultān in 1323 A.D. 'Iṣāmy may be tentatively taken to have had in his mind Ulugh Khān while speaking of the capture of the king of Ma'bar.

was, perhaps, Ulugh Khān himself.<sup>52</sup> There is thus sufficient justification for assuming that as soon as he effected the conquest of Warangal, Ulugh Khān, marched at the head of an army to Ma'bar captured the king of Madura, and took possession of his government and laid the foundations of Muslim rule in the country.

## SECTION 6

### *Expedition against Jājnagar*

The circumstances in which Ulugh Khān led his forces against Jājnagar (Orissa) are not known. The scanty information furnished by the Muslim historians affords little or no help. The purpose for which the expedition was undertaken is nowhere clearly stated. It is not known whether it was designed to subjugate Orissa, or merely to capture the elephants, which abounded in that country, for military purposes. Whatever be the underlying motive of the expedition, it opened up a fresh field for the exercise of Muslim imperialistic ambitions.

Ulugh Khān set out from Warangal about the middle of 1324 A.D. and marched with his army along the east coast subduing the petty Nāyaks that still remained at large. He captured the city of Rājahmundry on the Gōdāvarī, where he caused a mosque to be built to commemorate his victory.<sup>53</sup> Turning in a north-easterly direction, he marched towards the Uriya frontier which he seems to have reached without opposition.

The intelligence of the arrival of Ulugh Khān's army having been conveyed to the Gajapati Vira Bhānudēva II, he promptly concerted measures to repel the invasion. According to Iṣāmy who alone furnishes the details of this campaign, Vira Bhānudēva

52. J.M.U. xi, p. 43 n 11.

53. 425 of 1926.

quickly gathered together a force of 40,000 foot armed with sword and lance, 500 horse, and a powerful contingent of war elephants which he placed under the command of a great noble of his court, and despatched to the frontier to oppose the invaders. The Uriya forces, as soon as they arrived on the frontier, came into conflict with the Muhammadans; and in an engagement that took place suffered a heavy defeat. Many were slain in the battle and the survivors sought safety in flight. Ulugh Khān plundered their camp and took much booty beside the whole contingent of war elephants which was immediately despatched to the court of the Sultān at Dehli.<sup>54</sup>

Baranī and other historians assert that Ulugh Khān returned to Warangal immediately after this victory<sup>55</sup> But they do not disclose the reason for his sudden retirement after a successful preliminary skirmish with the Uriya army. Probably Ulugh Khān had no desire to undertake the subjugation of a difficult mountainous country like Orissa. His object was perhaps to make military demonstration on the Uriya frontier to prevent the possibility of an attack from that side on the imperial territory.

What Ulugh Khān might have done, had he the opportunity of leading another expedition to Orissa, it is difficult to imagine. He

54. *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, pp. 392-3.

55. *Tārīkh-i-Firūz Shāhī*, E.D. iii, p. 234; *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*, (G.O.S. lxiii), p. 96.

'Isāmy, however, states that 'Ulugh Khān proceeded from Jānagar directly to Dehli, carrying with him the booty to pay homage to the Sultān.

گرفتند ترکان پس از ارتحال  
وزین ماجرا یک دو روزی گذشت  
همی راند تا کرد پیا بوس هـ

زبگاہ ہندو بسے رخت و مال  
الغ خان صفدر چر فیروز گشت  
از آنجا سپہ راند در تختگاه

*Futūh-us-Salātīn*, p. 393.

was, however, recalled to the court, soon after his arrival at Warangal, to direct the affairs of the State during the Sulṭān's absence in Bengal; and had to assume the reins of government as the Sulṭān met with a fatal accident, on his return from Bengal, and died.

## CHAPTER V

### THE TUGHLAQS: MUHAMMAD BIN TUGHLAQ

#### SECTION 1

##### *The Mughal War*

At the time when Muḥammad bin Tughlaq ascended the throne, large portions of Deccan and South India acknowledged the sovereignty of the Sultān of Dehli. Marhaṭṭa and Tiling were as effectively under the control of the imperial government as the districts in the immediate neighbourhood of Dehli; and a viceroyalty was set up in the far distant Ma'bar to consolidate the recent conquests, and establish the imperial authority on a firm and permanent basis. However, the peninsula as a whole was not brought under the shadow of the imperial umbrella. Several Hindu states such as Kandhyāna, Kampili and Dwārasamudra still stood outside the pale of the empire; and displayed a tendency to create trouble and subvert the authority of the Sultān. The reduction of these states was essential for securing the stability of the empire; and Sultān Muḥammad lacked neither ability nor resources to embark on the enterprise.

##### *Expedition against the Mughals (1325 A.D.)*

The Sultān's attention was, however, engaged by a serious problem which demanded an immediate solution. The Mughals who had by the time established themselves in Khurāsān and Central Asia had been making for some years in the past persistent efforts to secure a footing in India. Every year they would cross the Indus, descend upon the plains of Hindustan, and ravage the outlying provinces of the empire causing thereby much damage to the life and property of the Sultān's subjects. This could not be tolerated; and the Sultān decided to put an end to this annual irruption of

the barbarians. Instead of awaiting their arrival at the usual time, he resolved to turn the tables on them by leading a punitive expedition into their territory.<sup>1</sup>

The Sultān commanded his nobles and officers to draw one year's salary from the imperial treasury and equip their forces with new weapons of war as expeditiously as possible; and when the forces were ready, he marched at their head towards the frontier, and reached Lahore after a journey of two months. The Sultān himself halted at Lahore, and sent forward his commanders with the whole army to ravage the Mughal frontier. They proceeded from Lahore, and captured, on their way, the cities of Kalānūr and Farshūr, which, being taken by surprise, surrendered without much resistance. A large number of Mughal women and children fell into their hands. To proclaim the subjugation of these two Mughal cities, they caused the *Khutba* to be read in the name of their master; and after a brief sojourn in that neighbourhood returned to their headquarters. The Sultān remained at Lahore for about two months, chastising the rebels, and restoring peace and order in the countryside; and when he had accomplished the task to his satisfaction, he returned to Dehli.<sup>2</sup>

## SECTION 2

### *Rebellion of Bahā-ud-Dīn Garshūsp*

For two years after Sultān Muḥammad's return from Lahore he remained in the capital governing the empire with great justice.

1. 'Isāmy: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 410.

مئل کان بہر سال از آب سند      گذشتے بتاراج اقصاءے ہند  
دران سال برعکس این زیب کار      ہملک مئل قاحت ہندی سوار

2. 'Isāmy: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, pp. 410-11. The later historians, especially Yāhyā bin Aḥmad, and Badāūnī mix up the incidents of this with those

At the end of this period the peace of the empire was considerably disturbed by the outbreak of a rebellion in Deccan under the leadership of Bahā-ud-Dīn Garshāsp, the nephew of the late Sulṭān Ghaiyāṣ-ud-Dīn Tughlaq Shāh.<sup>3</sup> Bahā-ud-Dīn was a distinguished warrior, and rendered valuable services to the empire during the Mughal invasion under Shīr Mughal in 1324 A.D.;<sup>4</sup> and Sulṭān Ghaiyāṣ-ud-Dīn who was highly pleased with his nephew, conferred on him, as a mark of appreciation of his valour, the title of Garshāsp, and posted him as the governor of the frontier town of Sagar in the neighbourhood of Gulbarga in Deccan.<sup>5</sup>

The causes of Garshāsp's rebellion are not known. None of the historians, who describe the events of his rebellion, gives a satisfactory explanation. 'Iṣāmy attributes his outbreak to the

of the later expedition under Tarmā Shīrīn in 729 A. H. causing thereby much confusion.

3. According to Briggs, *Ferishta* (I. p. 418), Bahā-ud-Dīn was a nephew of Sulṭān Muḥammad; but in the Naval Kishore Press edition of *Ferishta's* history, (p. 135) he is said to have been the

عم زاده سلطان محمد شاه.

Ibn Baṭūṭa however, states that he was the nephew of Sulṭān Ghaiyāṣ-ud-Dīn himself. 'Sulṭān Tughlik had,' says he, 'a nephew, son of his sister, named Bahā-ud-Dīn Gushtasp' (E.D. iii, p. 614). 'Iṣāmy makes this point quite clear. Speaking of Garshāsp's relationship with Sulṭān Muḥammad he declares.

بہا الدین آن شہسوار و غا کہ بودے پسر عمہ مر شاه را

*Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 411.

4. 'Iṣāmy: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, pp. 394-8.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 411.

change which came over the disposition of Sultān Muḥammad.<sup>6</sup> This is however unlikely for there is no evidence to show that the Sultān began his oppressions so early in his reign.<sup>7</sup> The *Kumāra Rāmāna Kathe* attributes Bahā-ud-Dīn's (called Bahādar Khāna) rebellion to the jealous intrigues of the nobles of the court,<sup>8</sup> but no indication of these intrigues is disclosed by the Muslim historians. The real cause of the rebellion was probably Garshāsp's dissatisfaction with the Sultān for having failed to bestow upon him any higher rank or preferment after his accession. Whatever might have been the cause of his grievance, Garshāsp resolved to seek redress at the point of his sword; but being a farsighted and prudent man, he laid his plans carefully and proceeded with considerable caution. He amassed a large sum of money and won over to his side many of the nobles who held estates in his principality to his side. He also made provision for the safety of himself and his family in the event of failure by cultivating the friendship of the Hindu king of Kampili in his neighbourhood.<sup>9</sup> Having thus strengthened himself, Garshāsp set up the standard of rebellion. He put forward his claim to the throne, and having collected forces in the

6. *Ibid.*, p. 411 (couplets 7889-90).

چو در طبع خسرو بدید انقلاب      بر افگند از روع و وحشت نقاب  
سپاهے بر سم کیاں جمع کرد      ز اقصاءے کشور بر آورد گرد

7. 'Isāmy, as a matter of fact, assigns the commencement of the Sultān's tyranny to the period which immediately followed Kishli Khān's rebellion, as indicated by the heading

آغاز ظلم سلطان محمد شاه ابن تغلق شاه.

*Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 429.

given by him to one of the sections of his work.

8. *Kampili and Vijayanagara*, p. 10.

9. Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, pp. 418-19.

manner of kings began to harass the nobles who still remained loyal to the throne.<sup>10</sup>

The rebellious activities of Garshāsp soon attracted attention; Malik Zāda Aḥmad Ayās who was the governor of Gujārāt at this time began to make brisk preparations for putting down his rebellion; and the Sultān, on receiving a report of the rebellion sent an express order to Malik Zāda commanding him to muster his troops and march at their head against Garshāsp. On the receipt of the royal *farmān* Malik Zāda completed his preparations, and set out with the army accompanied by Qawām-ud-Dīn, Malik Quṭb, Tātār Khān, Asharf-ul-Mulk and other distinguished warriors. When Garshāsp learnt that an army from Gujarāt was marching against him, he quickly collected his troops, and marched towards the Gōdāvarī with a view to contest the passage of the river. He arrived on the bank of the river, crossed it with his forces, and took up his position on the other side; he placed himself in the centre and posted his lieutenants Khizr Bahrām and Bēdār on his right and left respectively.<sup>11</sup> Meanwhile, Malik Zāda reached Dēvagiri, where Majīr Abū Rijā, the governor of the province, joined him; and proceeded immediately to meet the rebel forces whose whereabouts he must have learnt at Dēvagiri without difficulty. As soon as he arrived on the bank of the river, Malik Zāda saw the rebels, and proceeded at once to array his troops for battle. He

10. *Ibid.*, p. 418. "He began to turn his thoughts," says Ferishta, "towards the throne." According to Ibn Baṭūṭa, Garshāsp even 'refused to give his oath' to Muḥammad bin Tughlāq (E.D. iii, p. 614). This is doubtful; for 'Iṣāmī suggests by implication that he acknowledged Sultān Muḥammad as his sovereign during the first two years of his reign (*Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 411).

11. According to Ferishta, Garshāsp marched up to Dēvagiri where he is said to have arrayed his troops in battle order (Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 418).

took up his position in the centre at the head of his Turkish followers; and entrusted the command of the right to Ashraf-ul-Mulk with Tātār Khān by his side to render assistance; and the left to Qawām-ud-Dīn who was supported by all his countrymen.

The battle began with an attack led by Garshāsp on the centre of the royal army. He rushed upon the Turks under Malik Zāda, broke up their line and threw the whole army into confusion. He turned to his left and dislodged both Ashraf-ul-Mulk and Tātār Khān from their positions.<sup>11a</sup> Then followed a fierce *mêlée* lasting for two hours when the fate of the contending forces seemed to hang in the balance. The tide at last turned in favour of the royal army. At the height of the battle, Khizr Bahrām, the chief lieutenant of Garshāsp, deserted his master and joined the enemy with all his followers. Garshāsp saw that his cause was ruined; at once he abandoned the fight, and having hastily crossed the river, fled precipitately to Sagar, hotly pursued by the victorious Dehli army; but as he could not remain at Sagar with any sense of security, he resolved to leave the place immediately and seek shelter in the dominions of the friendly Rāy of Kampili. Therefore, he disbanded the few followers that still loyally clung to him; and forsaking all his wealth and property, took the road to Kummaṭa with his women and children.<sup>12</sup>

### SECTION 3

#### *The Conquest of Kampili.*

The Rāy of Kampili in whose territory Bahā-ud-Dīn sought refuge was, as noticed already, the ruler of a small principality com-

11a. *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 413.

چو ترکان نموده یکے ترکهار	برد راست بر فرج پرور ایداز
بجفتش فعاذه تمامي سپاه	دریده یکایک صف قلبگاه
ابا اهراف الملک قلم کشا	بجفتید قاتار از راستا

12. *Ibid*, pp. 412-13.

prising the Raichur, Dharwar, and Bellary districts with fringes of territory projecting southwards into Anantapur and westwards into Chitaldrug and Shimoga districts. The river Duree, i.e., the Kṛṣṇā separated his country from the province of Marhaṭṭa of the Dehli empire.<sup>13</sup> Kampili was a tiny State nestling in the hills on the south-western frontier of the empire over which the imperial umbrella had not yet cast its shadow. Mummaḍi Singa, the founder of this kingdom appears to have died, as stated before, about 1313 A.D., and was succeeded by his son Kampilidēva or Kampila as he was known to the Mussalman writers. He first rose to prominence in the opening decade of the 14th century, and by the valuable services which he rendered to his master Rāmadēva of Dēvagiri in his wars against Ballāḷa III, he won the confidence of his sovereign and acquired considerable power and influence in the southern frontier of the Sēuṇa dominions.

The attitude of Kampila to Rāmadēva after his return from Dehli, and to Sangama, Rāmadēva's son and successor, is not known; but towards the Mussalmans who dispossessed the Sēuṇa's of their kingdom, he showed consistent hostility; he hurled defiance at Malik Nā'ib Kāfūr, the first Muslim governor of Deccan, and appears to have been continuously at war with his successors.<sup>14</sup>

13. The river 'Duree' according to Nuniz (F. E. p. 292) formed 'the boundary of the territories of Ballagate (Deccan) and of those of the king of Bisnaga (i.e., Anegondī)' Duree is identical with the Kanarese *toze* (river) probably the Herdore.

14. Though nothing is definitely known about Kampila's relations with Mussalmans between 1315 and 1327 A.D., a statement in the Chronicle of Nuniz indicates that he was at war with them. "He (king of Bisnaga, i.e., Kampili) was beset on all sides," says he, "by the king of the people of Dely who had already up to this time been at war with him for twelve years" (F.E. p. 294). This statement is made in connection with the siege of the fort of Crynmata (Kummaṭa) by the armies of Muhammad bin Tughlaq

He was not, however, allowed to concentrate his energies to concert measures for dislodging the Mussalmans from his neighbourhood, as he was constantly troubled by the Hindu rulers of the adjoining territories who had designs upon his kingdom. He was frequently called upon to defend his dominions against the armies of Warangal and Dwārasamudra. The contemporary lithic records bear ample testimony to the long, bitter struggle in which he was involved with Balāla III. Kampila emerged out of these wars successfully, and if tradition could be relied on, he appears to have brought under subjection, with the assistance of his valiant son Rāmanātha, several petty chiefs in his vicinity and converted his small kingdom into a powerful state.<sup>15</sup>

Kampila seems to have assumed an attitude of active hostility towards the Tughlaq Sultāns from the beginning. He is said to have demolished the imperial palanquin which was sent with the officers of the Imperial State for demanding tribute; chastised the chiefs who attempted to avenge the insult offered to the Sultān; succoured the Tilinga fugitives who came fleeing to his court for protection; maintained friendly intercourse with the rebel Bahā-ud-Dīn; and offered him asylum, when, being defeated in battle, he sought refuge in his capital.<sup>16</sup> There was, therefore, sufficient justification for the imperial army to invade the kingdom of Kampili and chastise its ruler for his impudent conduct.

The Sultān, in the meanwhile, took the field in person, and arrived at the head of an army at Dēvagiri, where he heard the news

in 1327 A.D. If Kampila had been at war with the Muhammadans for 12 years up to that time, he must have been fighting, with them since the days of Malik Kāfūr.

15. *Kampili and Vijayanagara*, p. 16.

16. E.D. iii. pp. 614-15; QJMS, xx, p. 100.

of Garshāsp's defeat and flight to Kummaṭa. He summoned Malik Zāda to his camp and deputed other officers to lead the army against Kampila. The enterprise turned out to be more hazardous than it was considered at first. The emperor had to despatch no less than three expeditions before victory smiled upon his arms.<sup>17</sup> The command of the first two expeditions was entrusted respectively to Malik Rukn-ud-Dīn and Quṭb-ul-Mulk, *amīrs* of Gujarāt, who accompanied Malik Zāda's army.<sup>18</sup> No information is available from the Muslim sources about the first two expeditions except that

17. *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 414; *Tārīkh-i-Ferishta* (Naval Kishore Press), p. 135; *Kumāra Rāmāna Kathe* (QJMS, 1929 Oct. Supp.) mentions three expeditions against Kampila.

18. According to *Ferishta*, all the three expeditions were commanded by Malik Zāda who was also known as *Khawāja-i-Jahān* (*Tārīkh-i-Ferishta* p. 135).

دران اثنا پادشاه نیز از دهلی بدولت آباد آمده، خواجه جهان را با لشکرگران بر ولایت کنپله تعیین کرد - خواجه جهان دو مرتبه ازگر هاسپ شکست یافت - اما ... سیوم مرتبه غالب آمده رائی کنپله را دستگیر ساخت .

The Hindu accounts agree with *Ferishta* in stating that the three expeditions came under the command of the same general; however, he is not called *Khawāja-i-Jahān*, but *Nēmi Khān* or *Nēmi Mulk*, a legendary warrior who figures in South Indian Hindu accounts as the commander of Muslim armies from the time of 'Alā-ud-Dīn to that of Muḥammad bin Tughlaq. But this is contradicted by 'Iṣāmī who clearly states that the first two expeditions were commanded by Malik Rukn-ud-Dīn and Malik Quṭb-ul-Mulk respectively and last by *Khawāja-i-Jahān*.

بفرمان آن شاه صاحب قران  
شکسته عنان تاب شد هر دو بار  
ملک زاده شد در پی ان حصار

ملک رکن دین قطب ملک جهان  
سوی کنپله راند لشکر دو بار  
سرم بار از حضرت شهر یار

*Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 414.

the Dehli armies were defeated and compelled to retreat. Some semi-historical Kanarese *Sāmagatya*s, specially the *Paradāra-Sōdara-Rāmana-Kathe*, which describe the wars between the Sultān of Dehli and the king of Kampili at length, allude to the arrival of three Muslim invasions and the defeat and the retreat of the Dehli armies on the first two occasions. The following account of the first two invasions is based on the *Paradāra-Sōdara-Rāmana-Kathe* which appears to contain the kernel of truth.<sup>19</sup>

### *The First Invasion.*

The first expedition was despatched, as stated already, soon after the arrival of the Sultān at Dēvagiri under the command, of Malik Rukn-ud-Dīn. He crossed the Heddore (the Kṛṣṇā) and having dismantled some of the forts along his route, proceeded with his forces to Kummaṭa, the chief stronghold in Kampila's dominions. In the meanwhile information reached Hosdurg (Ānegondi), Kampila's new capital, that the Dehli army was marching upon Kummaṭa. Kampila, at once summoned a council of war, and after some discussion, it was decided to reinforce Kummaṭa and drive away the invaders. Baicappa, the minister of Kampila, was sent with the advance guard, and he was joined a little later by Bahādūr Khāna (i.e., Bahā-ud-Dīn) and Kampila's two sons Kāṭaṇṇa and Rāmanātha.

Rukn-ud-Dīn arrived at Kummaṭa and pitched his tents around the fort where he is said to have remained for two days. On the first day Kāṭaṇṇa sallied out of the fort and fell upon the Mussalman camp suddenly. Taken by surprise the Mussalmans offered but little resistance; many suffered death; and Kāṭaṇṇa safely re-

19. Besides the *Sāmagatya*s, the *Kaifiyats* of Kampili and other places furnish valuable material; much of it, however, is encrusted with legend; and no serious attempt has yet been made to collate the information gathered from different sources and separate fact from fiction.

turned to the fort with 2000 horse which he captured from the enemy. Undeterred by this reverse, Malik Rukn-ud-Dīn gathered his forces, and made an attempt, on the next day, to storm the fort, but was repulsed with great loss. Rāmanātha, supported by his brother, Kāṭaṇṇa, led his men against the Muhammadans, and after a fierce engagement put them to flight and captured much booty. The loss sustained by the Mussalmans was so heavy that it crippled their strength; and Rukn-ud-Dīn who realised that it was no longer possible to stay in the vicinity without courting further disaster gathered together the remaining forces and retreated hastily towards the Sultān's territory.

### *Second Invasion*

The defeat suffered by Rukn-ud-Dīn lowered the prestige of the imperial army; and broke for the time at least the spell of the invincibility of the might of Islām. It revealed the strength of the enemy and the grave danger threatening the Muslim power in Deccan, if steps were not immediately taken to curb him. The Sultān resolved to take prompt action, and within a short time of the return of Rukn-ud-Dīn, he equipped another army and despatched it against Kampila under the command of Quṭb-ul-Mulk.

The news of the arrival of the second invasion reached Hosamaledurga (Hosdurg); and Kampila in consultation with his minister Baicappa and other nobles concerted measures for the defence of his kingdom. The fortifications of Hosamale and Kummata were strengthened, and large quantities of 'burning sand, boiling gruel and scorching lime-stone' were gathered at the latter where the main attack was expected. By the time these preparations were completed Quṭb-ul-Mulk reached Kummata and invested the fort. The first day passed without any incident excepting a minor skirmish; but the night saw the first serious encounter between the two armies. Though Quṭb-ul-Mulk took precautions to guard himself against a surprise night attack, a party of the besieged under the instructions of Baicappa eluded the guards, and

penetrating into the Muslim lines threw the camp into confusion. The Muslim army was, no doubt, scared by the attack, but did not lose its morale or courage. The next morning, Quṭb-ul-Mulk commanded his troops to deliver an attack upon the fort simultaneously from three sides. The attack began with an attempt of the Mussalmans to scale the walls. Though they succeeded in gaining the summit in certain places, and threatened the walls of the inner fort, they failed to maintain their hold and had to yield gradually to the defenders who were led by Kampila himself in person. Both the armies returned to their respective camps in the evening; and no serious incident disturbed the peace of either camp at night.

On the third morning, Kampila drew up his force in battle array in front of the fort; and posted contingents of horses at strategic points. Quṭb-ul-Mulk massed his Turkish archers in the centre; and stationed his cavalry and elephants on their right and left to protect their flanks. The battle commenced with a charge of Kampila's forces under his son Rāmanātha upon the Muslim centre. He hurled himself with whirlwind force on the Turkish archers and spread confusion in their ranks. Unable to bear the vigorous onslaught of Rāmanātha, they ran panic-stricken to the right and left and threw the cavalry and elephants into disorder. Rāmanātha seized the moment to strike a decisive blow; and charging the disorderly Muhammadan forces cut them to pieces. Most of their officers were either slain in the battle or taken prisoner. A few including the commander Quṭb-ul-Mulk saved themselves by flight.

### *Third Invasion*

The Sultān, who felt the humiliation of second defeat at the hands of the Hindus very deeply, took immediate steps to wipe away the disgrace and restore the prestige and glory of Islām which were brought under a cloud during the recent disasters. He sent a large army under his trusted minister and friend Malik Zāda (Khawāja-i-Jahān) against Kampila and instructed him to spare no pains in effecting his downfall.

Malik Zāda set out from Dēvagiri with the army, and within a short time reached the Kṛṣṇā which he crossed by means of boats. The progress of the army beyond the river was impeded by the scarcity of water along his route owing to a drought. "At that time", says Nuniz, "there was great drought by reason of the summer season, and the waters of the few little lakes that were in the plain would not suffice for ten days for his troops, horses and elephants, without drying up." Malik Zāda was obliged to halt on the banks of the river until the advent of the rainy season; but when the rains fell and the small tanks on his path were filled with water, he broke up his camp and marched with the troops on Kummaṭa, and invested the fort.<sup>20</sup>

The siege lasted for about two months, during which Kampila and Garshāsp came out and offered battle twice or thrice to the besiegers; but being defeated were compelled to seek shelter within the fort. When the defenders were reduced to sore straits, Malik Zāda collected his troops one day, and captured one of the gates by assault. The Muhammadan soldiers swarmed on every side and scrambled into the fort.<sup>21</sup>

When Kampila found that Kummaṭa could not be defended, he resolved to abandon it, and retire while there was yet time to

20. F.E. p. 293. Though Nuniz is in substantial agreement with 'Iṣāmy and other contemporary writers, his account differs from them regarding the sequence of the events. According to Nuniz, the Muhammadans at first laid siege to Nagundy (Ānegundi or Hosdurg), where Kampila was living; and when he fled, unable to defend the fort, to Kummaṭa, they followed him thither, took that fort also and put him to death. 'Iṣāmy, however, reverses the order. The Dehli army first attacked Kummaṭa and on Kampila's flight to Hosdurg, pursued him thither. 'Iṣāmy who came to live in Dēvagiri some two years after the death of Kampila must have derived his information from first-hand sources; and his account must be considered more authentic than that of Nuniz and other later writers.

21. *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn*, pp. 414-15.

Hosdurg. So one day, accompanied by Bahā-ud-Dīn, he slipped out of Kummata and crept through the hills and jungles with difficulty to Hosdurg. He had to face a fresh difficulty. The problem of finding provisions to feed the fifty thousand inhabitants of the town was, indeed, serious, and demanded an immediate solution, if he desired to make a stand against the invaders. Therefore, he ordered all the inhabitants, excepting five thousand picked men whom he retained for the defence of the fort, to evacuate the town and seek shelter in another part of his realm. By the time that he completed these arrangements, Malik Zāda, having taken possession of Kummata arrived at Hosdurg, and beset the fort on all sides. Kampila held out bravely for one month, but he was ultimately obliged to give in owing to the scarcity of food-stuffs within the fort.<sup>22</sup> The enemy took advantage of the situation, and forced their way into the fort. Kampila saw that all was lost, but did not give up courage and surrender to the enemy. While the besiegers were still busy with fighting, he summoned his friend Garshāsp to his presence, and commending him to the care of king Ballāla III of Dwārasamudra, sent him with his family to his court accompanied by a special guide.<sup>23</sup>

Kampila then made preparations for his final encounter with the enemy. He knew that death awaited him; and he resolved to sell his life dearly; but before proceeding to face the enemy he remembered that he owed a solemn obligation to his womenfolk whom he could not afford to neglect. He had to place them beyond the reach of the Muslim soldiery and save them from dishonour and bondage. Therefore, he commanded a huge pyre to be erected in front of the palace and invited his wives, daughters and other women of his family, to mount the pyre. "I am going to die", said he, "and such of you as prefer it, do the same". The women who

22. Nuniz: F.E. pp. 293-4.

23. 'Iṣāmī: *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*, p. 415; Ibn Baṭūta, E.D. iii, pp. 614-15.

were convinced that they were only going to the World of the Gods in advance of their men to receive them when they arrived there in their turn gave a cheerful response to this invitation. "Each one of these women washed herself, rubbed her body with sandal-wood, kissed the ground before the Rāy of Kampila, and threw herself upon the pile". The wives and daughters of the nobles, ministers, and chief men of the kingdom followed their example, so that no woman was left behind to see the fall of the fort.<sup>24</sup>

When the women and children thus perished in flames and Kampila was freed from all earthly encumbrances, he left the place, took a bath, smeared his body with the paste of sandal-wood, and accoutred himself with his arms excluding the breast-plate. He then caused the gates of the citadel to be thrown open, and accompanied by his followers, advanced with grim determination to meet the Muhammadans as they rushed into the fort. He fell upon them and worked havoc in their ranks until at last, overcome by weariness and the numerous wounds received during the struggle, he dropped down and died. All his followers fell by his side. By the command of Malik Zāda his head was severed from the trunk, and being stuffed with straw was sent to the court of the Sultān to announce his victory over the daring infidel.<sup>25</sup> The

24. Ibn Baṭūṭa, E. D. iii, p. 615. Nuniz gives a somewhat different account of this incident. According to him, Kampila gathered all his women and children in the open space in front of the citadel and slew them all with his own hands; and his example was emulated by 'alī who had wives and sons who could not fight' (F.E. p. 295); but the practice described by Ibn Baṭūṭa was more popular; its prevalence in Telingāna is referred to by Khusrau and 'Iṣāmī; and the last known instance of this was witnessed by the French commander Bussy at Bobbili, when he laid siege to that fort about the middle of the 18th century.

25. Ferishta states that 'the Rāja of Kampila was made prisoner.' (Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 419), and this is corroborated by the evidence of the *Kaṣfiyat* of Bhaṭṭar (*Kampili and Vijayanagara*, p. 19); but the contemporary

Muhammadans then entered the fort, plundered the buildings, put many Hindus who offered resistance to the sword and made others including eleven sons of Kampila, and a few officers of State like Harihara and Bukka prisoners. Malik Zāda took possession of Hosdurg where he posted a garrison to keep the surrounding country under control.<sup>26</sup>

#### SECTION 4.

##### *Submission of Ballāla III*

The invasion of the Hoysala kingdom which Malik Zāda planned immediately after the capture of Hosdurg was not actuated by motives of conquest. It was an outcome of Bahā-ud-Dīn's flight to Ballāla's dominions where he had gone, on the advice of Kampila, to seek shelter. But Ballāla was not inclined to show hospitality to his unbidden guest, as it would involve him in trouble with the Sultān and frustrate his attempts to build up his own power.

The relations of Ballāla III with the court of Dehli are not known since the departure of Malik Kāfūr from the South. He probably repudiated his subordination to the Sultān and withheld the payment of tribute. Quṭb-ud-Dīn Mubārak Shāh, perhaps, made an unsuccessful attempt to impose his authority over Ballāla; but his successors, being absorbed in the affairs nearer home, paid little or no attention to the condition of the far-distant dependencies in the south and allowed them to lapse again into a state of

writers, 'Iṣāmy and Ibn Baṭūṭa definitely assert that he was killed in the battle. Their statement is supported by epigraphic evidence. An epigraph at Laksmēśvar in the Dharwar district alludes to 'the death of Kampila and Siḍila Bomma in a military campaign from Ḍilli (Bk. 21 of 1935; EI, xxiii, p. 184 n 13).

26. 'Iṣāmy: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 416; Ibn Baṭūṭa, E.D. iii, p. 615; Nuniz, F. E. p. 295.

autonomy. Ballāḷa III took full advantage of the weakness and indifference of the imperial government to project fresh schemes of conquest. He subdued the small principality of Sētu in Tulu-nāḍ, and planned the conquest of Kampili about 1320 A.D. His main ambition, however, lay in a different direction; he wanted to regain the lost possessions of his family in the Tamil country. To effect his purpose he had been making persistent endeavours since the assassination of Māravarman Kulaśēkhara I in 1310 A.D. It may be remembered that Malik Kāfūr found him leading an expedition against the Pāṇḍyan dominions at the time of his Ma'bar invasion in 1311 A.D., though he was thwarted in accomplishing his object, he did not give up the enterprise. The death of 'Alā-ud-Dīn and the subsequent disorders in the empire favoured his designs. Notwithstanding the brief distraction at the time of Mubārak Shāh's invasion of Deccan, he managed to address himself to the task without outside interference and effect a partial recovery of his patrimony. He established himself at Tiruvaṇṇāmalai in 1316 A.D. and was engaged in a war with the members of the Pāṇḍyan royal family on behalf of Vira Pāṇḍya. Though his attempt to capture Kaṇṇanūr in 1322 A.D. proved abortive, Kongu seems to have passed into his hands about this time.<sup>27</sup> However, before he could complete his task, the Muslim peril once again assumed fearful dimensions and threatened to engulf the whole of the peninsula at one sweep. The Tughlaq Sultāns displayed greater zeal in overthrowing the Hindu kingdoms than their predecessors; Warangal and Kampili which served as buffers had both disappeared, and no obstacle lay in the path of the Muslim hordes to impede their progress. Moreover, the king of Kampili who in life waged incessant war on him seemed to have purposely embroiled him in trouble, as the last act of his malignancy, by advising Bahā-ud-Dīn Garshāsp to seek shelter in his dominions.

27. MAR 1913, para 86; 444 of 1906.

Bahā-ud-Dīn was sure to draw the imperial army in his wake. As a matter of fact, Malik Zāda despatched, as soon as he completed the subjugation of the territories of Kampili, forces into his dominions to effect the capture of Garshāsp. The situation was fraught with danger. If he allowed himself to be swayed by sentiment and offered protection to Garshāsp, he knew that he had to face the might of Dehli. That way led to disaster. If, on the other hand, he swallowed his pride and surrendered the fugitive, he would sustain no material damage, and when the storm blew over he would still remain master of his extensive kingdom. Prudence and self-interest led Ballāla to choose the latter course. He seized Garshāsp, and sent him as a prisoner to Malik Zāda, acknowledging at the same time the supremacy of the Sultān of Dehli.<sup>28</sup> The promptitude which Ballāla had displayed in seizing Garshāsp produced the desired effect. Assured of the loyalty and obedience of Ballāla, Malik Zāda withdrew his forces and retired with the prisoner towards Dēvagiri, and Ballāla was left free to prosecute his own designs of conquest.

## SECTION 5.

*Conquest of Kandhyāna*

For some time after the subjugation of Kampili, Muḥammad bin Tughlaq remained in Dēvagiri; and was engaged in making

28. Ibn Bāṭūṭa, E.D., iii, p. 615;

'Isāmī: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 417.

گریزان در آمد بعد بلال	شنیدم چو گرشاسپ کم اسپ و مال
غم و درد تمهاس دریافتند	ازو اختر و بخت سر تافتند
خرد را بروماند جاءے معیب	گرفته بالاش بمکرو فریب
بصد سستے ان ہندوی ناخوان	بسمے ملک زادہ کردش روان

Cf. Briggs. *Ferishta*, i, p. 419.

arrangements for the transfer of his capital from Dehli.<sup>29</sup> Sultān Muḥammad was now at the height of his power; his empire extended from Peshawar to the Bay of Bengal and from the Himalayas to the Cape Comorin. Though his authority was acknowledged generally over the whole continent, a few Hindus still held out obstinately among the inaccessible hills and forests of Deccan. However small and insignificant they should not be allowed to remain at large, as they might serve as the nuclei of Hindu rebellion and a source of danger to the imperial domination of Islām. The total destruction of Hindu freedom was indispensable for the stability of Muslim imperialism. The Sultān therefore resolved to crush them and make the country safe for the autocracy of the faithful.

29. Yāhyā bin Aḥmad seems to suggest that the capital was transferred to Devagiri a little before the outbreak of Bahā-ud-Dīn's rebellion. Though he places both these events in 727 A.H., he describes the transfer of the capital first thereby indicating that it was accomplished before Bahā-ud-Dīn's rising (*Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhi*. G.O.S., lxiii, p. 101). Ferishta, however, states that the capital was transferred between the conquest of Kampili and the capture of Kondhāna which he assigns to 738 A.H. and 741 A.H. respectively. Ferishta's chronology is, no doubt, wrong; but the order in which he discusses these events shows that the transfer of the capital was posterior to Bahā-ud-Dīn's rebellion (Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, pp. 419-20). The evidence of 'Iṣāmy seems to support Ferishta; he clearly states that the Sultān came to Dēvagiri while Malik Zāda was engaged in a war with Kampila after the flight of Garshāsp from Sagar (*Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 414), but he does not allude to the transfer of the capital to Dēvagiri in this connection.

شنیدم شمس از شهر لشکر کشید      سوے دولت آباد سر پر کشید  
چو بشنید بشکست گرشاسپ نهر      ملک زاده را خواند بر خود خدایو

Therefore, the transfer of the capital must have taken place in 727 A. H. immediately after the overthrow of Kampila. This is confirmed by coins struck at Daulatābād in 727 A.H. bearing the superscription قیصر الاسلام a fact which indicates that Daulatābād was the capital (*Qaraunah Turks*, i, p. 83).

Nāga Nāyaka, the chief of the Kōlis, first attracted the Sultān's attention. His impregnable stronghold Kandhyāna (Simhgaḍ) in the neighbourhood of modern Poona was too near Daulatābād, the new capital, to be allowed to remain in a state of independence. Therefore, the Sultān marched against him with the army. The fort of Kandhyāna was perched on the summit of lofty precipice with its towers and battlements hidden behind the clouds. None could pass around its walls, nor even approach the environs; the slopes on its sides still remained unexplored. The countryfolk referred to it with awe as the hill of giants.<sup>30</sup> Nāga Nāyaka was fully aware of the strength of his position; and without risking an engagement in the open where the chances of his success were at best doubtful, he shut himself within his citadel and prepared to stand a siege.

The Sultān realised the difficult nature of the task he resolved to accomplish; it was, no doubt, impossible to capture the fort by storm; but the defenders whose means of subsistence were limited to the provisions stored up inside the fort could not afford to hold out indefinitely, unless they secured fresh supplies from outside. If their communications with the surrounding countryside were cut off, they would be compelled to surrender sooner or later. The Sultān, therefore, stationed himself with the army at the foot of the rock, and having prevented all ingress and egress, organized parties to harass the garrison continuously by constant attacks. Eight months passed away without any tangible results; but at the end of this period the stock of provisions was exhausted, and the garrison began to experience the effects of famine. Nāga Nāyaka saw that it was impossible to hold out further; he immediately opened negotiations with the Sultān, and promised to surrender the fort, if he and his followers were given an assurance of safety. The Sultān agreed, and when Nāga Nāyaka came down

30. 'Isāmy: *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, p. 418.

from the fort treated him kindly and invested him with a robe of honour to indicate that he was received into favour.<sup>31</sup> The fort of Kandhyāna passed into the hands of the Sulṭān, and he became the undisputed master of the whole of Deccan.

The Sulṭān returned to Daulatābād, as soon as he took possession of Kandhyāna. He had hardly remained there a week when information reached him that Bahrām Aiba, more generally known by his title of Kishlū or Kishly Khān, rose up in rebellion, and was engaged in subduing the district of Multan. He was, therefore, obliged to hasten to Hindustan making some hasty arrangements for the government of the recently acquired territories.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 418; Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 420.

## CHAPTER VI

### ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

Deccan like the other parts of the empire was parcelled out into a number of provinces. At the time of the transfer of the capital to Dēvagiri, 727 A.H., the imperial dominions in the Deccan were divided, according to Baranī, into five provinces, viz., Dēvagiri, Tiling, Ma'bar, Dhūrsamundar and Kampili.<sup>1</sup> The *Masālik-ul-Abṣār* also furnishes a similar list of southern provinces, which, while agreeing in the main with that of Baranī, presents a few variations: it mentions the name of Tiling twice,<sup>2</sup> omits Kampili altogether, and adds Jājnagar as the name of another province. Taken together these writers enumerate six provinces, viz., Marhaṭṭa (Dēvagiri), Tiling, Kampili, Ma'bar, Dwārasamudra, and Jājnagar in the South. The inclusion of the last two among the provinces of the empire has little justification. Dwārasamudra was a dependency which, no doubt, acknowledged the Sultān's suzerainty,

1. E. D. iii, pp. 236, 239.

2. *Ibid.*, iii, p. 575. It has been assumed ('Isvari Prasad, *Qarauna Turks*, i, p. 293) that the repetition of the name Tiling was due to the ignorance of the author of the *Masālik* of the geography of South India. This is hardly likely. The author of the *Masālik*, judging from the introductory remarks in his work, appears to be a careful writer who made a conscious effort to record accurate information (E.D. iii, pp. 574-5). It may be remembered in this context that Muḥammad Tughlaq split up in 1335 A.D. Tiling into two divisions each of which he constituted into an independent province with a separate capital and administrative machinery (Baranī, E. D. iii, pp. 243-4). The author of the *Masālik* had very probably these two divisions in view when he entered the province of Tiling in his list twice.

and paid him in all probability a nominal tribute; but it was not otherwise subjugated to the imperial government. Jājnagar was an independent kingdom, and owed no allegiance to any outside power. These two countries should not be classed with the provinces of the empire, as they fall into a different category. There were in the South only four provinces, Dēvagiri. Tiling, Kampili and Ma'bar under the imperial government, and a fifth had been added to their number by the Sultān in 1335 A.D. by splitting up Tiling into two independent administrative areas.

### *The extent and the boundaries*

The data available for the study of the provincial administration does not throw much light on the extent or the boundaries of the provinces; a few allusions and cursory remarks scattered in the chronicles, however, indicate roughly the area within the jurisdiction of each province. The Sēuṇa territory extending to the north of the Kṛṣṇā which passed, on the death of Rāmadēva, into the hands of 'Alā-ud-Dīn was constituted into a province with the old Sēuṇa capital Dēvagiri as its headquarters. On the north, it appears to have been bounded by a chain of hills which separated it from Bundelkhand. The Ghats of Lāchūra and Sāgūna, through which passed the road to Dehli stood in the frontier.<sup>3</sup>

3. 'Iṣāmy states that 'Alā-ud-Dīn came into conflict with Kānhā, the governor of Lāchūra as soon as he crossed the Ghāt of that name (*Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 223).

خبر شد بہ کا نہا کہ لشکر رسید	بگم پٹی لاچورہ چون در رسید
کہ بودست بہ لاچورہ مقطع مدام	ہمان ہندوئے چہرہ کا نہا بنام
غنیمت وہی کرد بے گفت گو	در آمد چو لشکر با قطاع او

Similarly, Malik Nā'ib Kāfur is said to have commenced to devastate Phillama's territory no sooner than he entered the Ghāt of Sāgūna (*Ibid*, pp. 326-7).

On the south it extended as far as the Kṛṣṇā. Nuniz casually refers to the river Duree as the boundary between Bisnaga (i.e., Kampili) and the territories of Ballagate<sup>4</sup> (i.e., Dēvagiri). The river Duree mentioned by Nuniz has not been properly identified. Sewell believes that it was the Mālaprabha, though he takes the name Duree, curiously enough, to represent the town of Dharwar.<sup>5</sup> Duree in fact is the Portuguesised corruption of the Kanarese term 'toṛe' meaning a river, probably a river big enough to deserve the designation 'the river.' While describing the circumstances that led to the outbreak of a war between the Bahmanī Sultān Mujāhid and Bukka I of Vijayanagara, Ferishta states that the latter claimed the river Kṛṣṇā to have been for ages the northern boundary of the territory of his family.<sup>6</sup> As Bukka and his brother Harihara secured the possession of the kingdom of Kampila but recently, he could not have had any ancestral posses-

بگهنتي ساگونه چرون برنشست      بتاراج بهيلم كمر چست بست  
خبر شد به بهيلم كه آمد سپاه      چو كمديد خود را سر حر بگاه

It is obvious that these passes stood on the northern frontier of Dēvagiri.

4. The term Ballagate or Bālāghāt strictly means the country above the Ghats. Nuniz himself states explicitly that Bālāghāt was identical with the 'Adil Shāhī dominions which stood on the north of the Vijayanagara empire. (F.E., p. 292).

5. *Ibid*, n. 3.

6. Briggs *Ferishta*, ii, p. 330.

و كشن راي (بك راي ؟) در جرابش نوشت كه از قدیم الايام قلعه  
را تچر و مدكل تاكنار آب كهنه در تخت را بان بيجانگر بوده مناسب  
آنكه آب كهنه را سرحد ساخته قلاع مذكوره بها گذارند .

*Tārīkh-i-Ferishta*, (Naval Kishore Press), p. 296.

sions in that region for any appreciable length of time. He must have been alluding to the territory of Kampila of whom he and his brother were political successors. If Bukka's claims were indeed based on facts, the river Duree which is mentioned by Nuniz as the northern boundary of the kingdom of Nagundy (i.e., Kampili) must have to be identified with the Kṛṣṇā, commonly known as Perdore or Heddore (the big river) among the country-folk. It is not definitely known how far the province extended in the west. Did it embrace Konkan or the country between the Western Ghats and the sea? This is doubtful, as it was regarded a safe place of refuge for the rebels against the Sulṭān's authority.<sup>7</sup> On the east the boundary is even less determinate: an imaginary line passing north to south in the vicinity of Kalyān, Gulbarga, and Sagar may roughly be taken as the boundary between Dēvagiri and Tiling.

Kampili lay immediately to the south of Dēvagiri from which it was separated, as already stated, by the Kṛṣṇā. It was bounded in the west and the southwest by the Hoysala dominions; but no definite information is available about its extent in the other directions. Though the province of Kampili was mainly constituted out of the dominions of Kampilidēva, it was not probably conterminous with the old kingdom. There is reason to believe that Muḥammad Tughlaq, from whom the founder of Vijayanagara obtained the Viceroyalty of Kampili, tacked on to the territory of the old kingdom his conquests in the southern and the southwestern Telugu country. As early as 1336 A.D., the Swarnamukhari valley passed into the hands of the rulers of Vijayanagara.<sup>8</sup> Their sway was very probably established in the east coast of the southern Telugu country before 1340 A.D. as indicated

7. 'Iṣāmī: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, pp. 450-51; Ibn Baṭṭa, E.D. iii, p. 619.

8. NDI, i, Cp. No. 15.

by the title '*pūrva-samudr-ādhiśvara*' which they assumed about this time.<sup>9</sup> Inscriptions, slightly later in date, found in the Nellore district show clearly that this was not an empty boast.<sup>10</sup> The manner in which this region was acquired by the Vijayanagara sovereigns so early in their history is not generally known. It is, however, stated in Sāyana's *Alaṅkārasudhānidhi* that Bukka I, while ruling at Udayagiri in the Nellore district, conquered the country in the neighbourhood, with the help of Mādhava, the son of Māyana.<sup>10a</sup> Several records of the period allude to the Muslim occupation of the east coast of Tondaimaṇḍalam before 1335 A.D.<sup>11</sup>; it is not unlikely that the coastal strip of the southern Telugu country was similarly occupied.<sup>11a</sup> The Sultān very probably placed the region under Harihara I's control when he conferred upon him the Viceroyalty of Kaṁpili and the latter had to effect its reconquest from some local chief who asserted his independence. If this

9. IA. x, p. 63.

10. NDI, ii, Nr. 28; L.R. 46, pp. 236-37.

10a. *Infra*, p. 183.

11. 434 of 1903, 203 of 1912.

11a. The Muslim occupation of Nellore is, as a matter of fact, alluded to in a Telugu verse addressed to Sangama II, recounting the past rulers who bore sway over the district.

సీ. ధీరుడై ధర యేలెఁ దిరుకాళదేవుండు తిక్కనాయకుఁ డేలెఁ దేజమెనఁ  
మన్మసిద్ధన యేలె మహిమతో దీపించి డాడినాగనయేలె ధన్యరీతి  
మనుగండగోపాల మనుజాధిపతి యేలె స్వర్ణదేవుం డతివ్రతిభ నేలె  
గోపినాథుం డేలె గుణపయోరాశియై రమణతో శ్రీరంగరమణుఁ డేలె  
ముప్పిడి తగనేలె ముదముతోఁ దురకేలె తిక్కన యొకకొన్ని దినము లేలె

గీ. నేలె మితండ్రి మర్యాదలెల్లఁ గలుగఁ  
గడఁక నీవేలి తందఱ కంటె మించి

.....

శరధిగంధీర సంగమశ్చాతలేంద్ర.

V. Prabhakara Sastri, *Cāṭupadyamanimanījari*, i, p. 28.

assumption is permissible, it may be concluded that the province of Kampili embraced a large part of the Telugu country including the whole of the present Cuddapah district and the bulk of the Kurnool, Anantapur, Chittore and Nellore districts, and extended perhaps as far south as Tonḍaimaṇḍalam in the Tamil country.

The province of Tiling which was situated in the eastern half of the peninsula covered a wider area. From Sagar, Gulbarga and Kalyān on the Dēvagiri frontier, it extended to the Bay of Bengal in the east. How far it spread in the north cannot be definitely ascertained at present. The northern boundary of the province probably passed from Māhūr along the valleys of the Pengaṅgā, the Waradā, the Prāṇahitā, and the Gōdāvarī and reached the sea somewhere in the neighbourhood of Cocanada. Its extent in the south can be determined with greater precision. The frontier line which separated it from the province of Kampili must have run westwards from the mouth of Mannēru in the Nellore district to Ahōbalam in the Nallamalas; and then turning to the north reached the Śrīsailam on the Kṛṣṇā in the Kurnool district.<sup>12</sup>

Ma'bar must have comprised all the Tamil coastal districts that once acknowledged the sovereignty of the Pañca-Pāṇḍyas of Madura. Though Ma'bar extended in the days of Māravarman Kulaśēkhara I (c. 1310 A.D.) from Quilon to Nellore, and from the Bay of Bengal to the Western Ghats, it suffered loss of territory, specially in the north and the west during the days of turmoil that followed his assassination. A considerable slice of territory

12. Prōlaya Vēma, the founder of the Reddi kingdom of Koṇḍaviḍu, was originally a subordinate of Prōlaya Nāyaka and Kāpaya Nāyaka, the leaders of Tiling rebellion. He assisted them in expelling the Mussalmans from Warangal (JTA, II, pp. 93 ff., A 5 of 1919-20). It is obvious that the territory which formed the nucleus of Vēma's kingdom was included in Tiling; and the boundary which later separated the Reddi and Vijayanagara kingdoms must have been identical with the old boundary between the provinces of Kampili and Tiling of the Dehli empire.

in the Southern Telugu country which was included in it was incorporated with the province of Kampili; and the two Kongus embracing the present Salem, Coimbatore and Nilagiri districts were annexed, as stated already, by Ballāla III about 1330 A.D. The remaining territory was constituted, after the Muslim conquest by the Sultān into the province of Ma'bar; and its jurisdiction appears to have extended over the whole of the east coast from Pulicat in the north to the mouth of the Tāmraparṇi in the south.

Although the Southern Hindu kingdoms were thus rapidly overthrown or reduced to subjection, the Muslim power failed to strike root anywhere in the land except Marhaṭṭa. The reason is not hard to seek. The invaders were not sufficiently numerous to keep the conquered people permanently in bondage. In Marhaṭṭa the position was somewhat different. Dēvagiri, the capital of the old Sēuṇa kings, had been made the headquarters of the new Muslim province, and it was more profoundly subjected to the influence of Islām than the other parts of Deccan. Since the days of 'Alā-ud-Dīn Khaljī, the Sultāns of Dehli persistently endeavoured to make it the centre of Islām in the South. They built mosques in the city, persuaded Muslim divines and saints to migrate to Deccan and preach the gospel of the Prophet to enlighten the infidels, and encouraged the nobles and other influential men to settle down in the country. As a consequence of this policy, Mussalmans from all parts of Hindustan flocked to Dēvagiri, and established themselves permanently in the city and its neighbourhood. In the course of a few years, the influx of the immigrants increased the Muslim element in the population enormously and transformed Dēvagiri into a stronghold of Islām.

The process of Islamisation began even during 'Alā-ud-Dīn's reign. Malik Nā'ib Kāfūr, the first Muslim governor of the province, demolished the Hindu temples, and erected, in their place, masjids for the faithful.<sup>13</sup> Sultān Quṭb-ud-Dīn not only trans-

13. *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, p. 327.

formed the administrative machinery, but apportioned the country into *iqta's* among his followers; and his policy was continued by the Tughlaqs with such vigour that within a decade of the commencement of their rule the Muhammadan population of Deccan had become so numerous as to excite widespread alarm among the Hindu inhabitants of the peninsula.<sup>14</sup>

In the other provinces, the power of the Sultān was practically confined to a few towns where the Muslim garrisons kept the inhabitants under proper control; but in the country, where the rājās and zamīndārs, in whose hands the Sultān left the administration, exercised great influence, his authority was hardly recognised. The people showed no inclination to remain submissive; and their loyalty was conditioned by the capacity of the imperial government to exact obedience. Besides, the subjugation of the country was none too systematic. A few chiefs still obstinately clung to independence in the hilly tracts of Kampili and Tiling, and the old royal family was not completely ousted from sovereignty in Ma'bar.<sup>15</sup> These served as the seeds of future rebellion. Nevertheless, the power of the Sultān was widely recognized; and the comparative scarcity of epigraphical records belonging to any of the South Indian dynasties in the east coast between 1324 and 1335 A.D. indicates that he managed, on the whole, to keep his hold on his southern conquests during the period.

14. Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 427.

15. Nuniz, F.E., p. 297. A minister of Pratāparudra who retreated into the hills of Palnādu was ruling in the name of his old master until 1326 A.D. (308 of 1915). Several members of the Pāṇḍyan family were holding sway in Ma'bar though their dates cannot exactly be determined. Māravarman Kulasēkhara II was ruling in Perumbālūr in Trichinopoly in 1333 A.D. (29 of 1913); and a Māravarman Parākrama Pāṇḍya in Tanjore in 1339 A.D. (50 of 1918).

The government of each of these provinces was entrusted to a governor called *nā'ib* or *nā'ib-vazīr*. A complete list of the governors of the southern provinces is not available, though the names of several of these officers, specially those in charge of the province of Dēvagiri, can be gleaned from the pages of the Muhammadan historians. Malik Nā'ib Kāfūr who was the first governor of Dēvagiri ruled the province from A.D. 1313 to 1316; he does not appear to have relinquished the office even when he was summoned to Dehli by Sultān 'Alā-ud-Dīn in 1315; for, his property and his forces were allowed to remain behind, and the administration of the province was carried on in his absence by his lieutenant, 'Ain-ul-Mulk.<sup>16</sup> After the suppression of Harapāldeva's rebellion in 1318 A.D., Sultān Quṭb-ud-Dīn appointed as the governor of the province Malik Yak Lakhy and, on his revolt in the next year, placed the administration in the hands of 'Ain-ul-Mulk. The latter held the office until the death of Nāṣir-ud-Dīn (Khusrau Khān) in 1320 A.D. On his accession to the throne of Dehli, Ghaiyās-ud-Dīn Tughlaq appears to have appointed his son Mahmūd Khān as the governor of Dēvagiri;<sup>17</sup> and he was succeeded by Majūr Abu Rijā who was administering the province at the time of Bahā-ud-Dīn's rebellion. No governor seems to have been appointed during the succeeding years owing probably to the transfer of the seat of the imperial government to Dēvagiri; but when the Sultān visited the city in 1335 A.D., on his way to Ma'bar, he entrusted the government of the province to Qutlugh Khān, who remained in the office until he was recalled to the court in 1343 A.D. Qutlugh Khān was succeeded by his brother, 'Alim-ul-Mulk; and he ruled the province until he was imprisoned by the rebellious centurions in 1346 A.D.

16. *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, pp. 340, 352.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 390.

Kampili remained as a province of the empire only for a period of seven or eight years. During this short period, it passed under the rule of two governors. The name of the first governor has been handed down in a corrupt form by the Portuguese chronicler, Nuniz, who refers to him in his work as Enybiquymelly, Mileque neby, and Melinebiqy. Sewell is of opinion that the name stands for 'Malik Na'ib, king's deputy'.<sup>18</sup> Ishvari Prasad seeks in vain to find his identity in Malik Maqbūl who later became the governor Tiling.<sup>19</sup> He appears to be identical with Malik Muḥammad who figures in the wars of the early Āraṇḍi chiefs.<sup>20</sup> The other governor was Harihara, the son of Sangama, who obtained the office from the Sultān about 1330 A.D.; he appears to have discharged the duties of his office loyally until 1335 A.D., when he asserted his independence and established a new kingdom, taking advantage of the confusion prevailing in the affairs of the southern provinces.

Very little is known about the history of Tiling during the years immediately following its subjugation. 'Ulugh Khān who was responsible for the conquest was made its first governor, and he held the office until the death of his father. The arrangements which Muḥammad Tughlaq made for the government of the province, on his accession to the imperial throne, are not known. He probably allowed Sālār Ulwī, who carried on the administration on his behalf during the period of his regency when his father was

18. F. E. p. 296, n. 2.

19. *Qarauna Turks*, i, p. 189.

20. It is not possible in the present state of knowledge to establish the identity of this Malik Muḥammad. There can be no doubt, however, that he was one of the nobles of Sultān Muḥammad's court whom he appointed to govern the province of Kampili.

absent in Bengal, to retain the government of the province and promoted him to the rank of a *nā'ib-vazīr* or governor. These arrangements, whatever might have been their precise nature, remained in force until 1335 A.D. The Sultān who came to Tiling during that year on his way to Ma'bar split up the province, into two independent administrative divisions for the better realization of its revenues; and entrusted the government of the eastern division with Warangal as its capital to Malik Kabūl or Maqbūl.<sup>21</sup> The western division with Bīdar as its headquarters was placed under Shihāb Sultānī on whom the Sultān also bestowed the title of Nuṣrat Khān. These two *nā'ib-vazīrs* were subjected to the authority of Qutluḡh Khān who was appointed by the Sultān as the Viceroy of Deccan.<sup>22</sup> Maqbūl held sway over Eastern Tiling until about 1336 A.D., when he was expelled by Kāpaya Nāyaka, the leader of the Hindu rebels. Nuṣrat Khān rose up in revolt about the same time; but being defeated in battle he was captured and sent as a prisoner to Dehli.

The Muslim historians who casually allude to the conquest of Ma'bar and the establishment of the provincial government give little information about the administrative arrangements made by the Sultān. Ma'bar, like the other provinces of Deccan must have been placed under the charge of a *nā'ib-vazīr*, assisted by a staff of quasi-military officials. The *Maduraittalavaralāru* men-

21. Baranī, E.D. iii, p. 243. Ferishta calls him Malik Nā'ib Imād-ul-Mulk (Briggs, *Ferishta*, i, p. 423). Ishvari Prasad is of opinion that Imād-ul-Mulk is a title of Malik Maqbūl (*Qaramah Turks*, i, p. 63).

22. Baranī, E.D., iii, p. 244. Cf. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (*Foreign Notices*), p. 226. At Daulatābād resides the great Khān, Qutlu Khān, the preceptor of the Sultān. He is the commandant of the city, and represents the Sultān there as well as in the lands of Śāghar, Tiling and their dependencies.

tions two Muslim governors, both of the name Ulāpathi Khān who ruled at Madura between A.D. 1326 and 1334. It is not possible to accept these names and dates as genuine. Another Muslim officer called Ādi Surattān is referred to in an inscription dated 732 A.H. at Rāngiam in the Pudukkotoh State. The identity of this officer is not known. Ibn Baṭūṭa asserts in one place that Sulṭān Muḥammad appointed Sharīf Jalāl-ud-Dīn as the governor of Ma'bar; but it is doubtful whether this is true. Baranī refers to him simply as Ḥasan, the father of Ibrāhīm, the purse bearer. 'Iṣāmī states that Jalāl-ud-Dīn was at the time of his rebellion the *Kotwāl* or the police commissioner of the city of Madura. Though Ma'bar remained under the imperial government for a dozen years, it is not possible in the present state of our knowledge to say anything precisely about the administrative arrangements of the province.<sup>23</sup>

The governor of each province was assisted in the discharge of his duties by a military coadjutor who commanded the provincial forces. Though the available evidence does not disclose the presence of this officer in all the provinces, the names of several distinguished warriors who held this office at Dēvagiri are known. To mention only the most distinguished, 'Ain-ul-Mulk commanded the provincial forces during the viceroyalty of Malik Nā'ib Kāfūr; and Majīr Abu Rijā held the office under Maḥmūd Khān. The defence of the province mainly devolved on the provincial commander; he had to keep the disorderly conduct of turbulent *amīrs* under restraint; check the disloyal activities of the Hindu zamīndārs, and realise from them the revenues due to the imperial treasury when they manifested signs of insubordination. During the absence of the governor from his province, he probably took over the entire administration of the province, thereby uniting in his person the supreme civil and military functions.

23. J.M.U., xi, pp. 41-42.

Besides the governor and the military commander there appears to have been a *kotwāl* or police commissioner.<sup>24</sup> This officer is, no doubt, mentioned only in connection with the province of Ma'bar; but it is not unlikely that he should have found a place in the other provinces. The functions of a *kotwāl* are nowhere clearly defined. He is said to have been responsible for the preservation of the peace and order of the city and 'exercised the functions of a justice of peace.'<sup>25</sup> It is not known whether his jurisdiction extended beyond the pale of the city and he had any means of influencing the administration in the country.

The weakest point in the Muslim administrative system is the absence of proper means of control over the internal administration of the province. The territory within the pale of each province was divided into *iqta's* which were distributed among the *amīrs* and *zamīndārs*. The *iqta'* holders had to maintain a stipulated body of troops for the service of the Sultān and pay a sum of money fixed from time to time as tribute into the imperial treasury. The *iqta'* holders generally showed no inclination to pay the tribute promptly, and were even disposed to offer resistance when urged to discharge their duties to the government.<sup>26</sup> This tendency constantly led to the outbreak of local rebellions which, on occasions, assumed serious proportions. Another cause of unrest was the practice of selling the revenues of the *iqta's* to the highest bidder favoured by the government,—a practice which created bad blood among the *iqta'* holders and led occasionally to grave consequences as in the case of Bharan, the ruler of Gulbarga.<sup>27</sup> There was no civil

24. *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, p. 449.

25. Ishvari Prasad: *The Qarauna Turks*, i, p. 273.

26. Nuniz, F. E., p. 297; Baranī, E.D., iii, p. 247.

27. *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, pp. 464 ff.; Baranī's (E.D. iii, p. 247) account of this incident is erroneous and misleading.

authority to check their turbulence and to assist the provincial governor to maintain royal authority. The power of the Sultān thus rested on insecure foundations which would readily give way at the slightest manifestation of weakness by the central government.

## CHAPTER VII

### LIBERATION

Sultān Muḥammad returned to Dehli after a sojourn of two years in Deccan. 'After the death of the (Hindu) king,' says Nuniz, 'he (the Sultān) stayed in that fortress (Kummaṭa) two years.'<sup>1</sup> As the Sultān came to Dēvagiri in 727 A. H., he must have remained in Deccan until 729 A. H. (1328-29 A.D.), when he was constrained to depart to Hindustan owing to the outbreak of Kishlū Khān's rebellion in Sindh.<sup>2</sup> The departure of the Sultān was the signal for the outbreak of a widespread rebellion in Tiling which ultimately resulted in the ejection of the Mussalmans from the country.

The causes of the rebellion were more cultural than political. The Hindus attached greater importance to the preservation of their religion and culture than to their political freedom. As long as an invader confined himself to the establishment and maintenance of his power and the government of the realm, they showed no serious disposition to challenge his authority; but when he transgressed the limits and displayed a tendency to interfere with their religious and social institutions, they shook off their apathy, and girded up their loins to resist his encroachments and put down

1. F. E., p. 296

2. The exact date of the outbreak of this rebellion is not known. Yāhyā bin Ahmad places it between Bahā-ud-Dīn's rebellion in 727 A.H. and the Mughal invasion under Tarma Shīrīn in 729 A.H. (*Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*, G.O.S., lxiii, pp. 101-02). It must have occurred, as pointed out by Ishvari Prasad (*Qaraunah Turks*, I, p. 75), 'either towards the close of 727 A.H. or some time in 728 A.H.' Some time must have elapsed before the arrival of the news of the rebellion in the Sultān's camp and the completion of his administrative arrangements prior to his departure to Hindustan.

his tyranny. Unlike the other conquerors of India, the Mussalmans were not content with the acquisition of mere political power. They descended on the plains of Hindustan not as mere conquerors in search of new countries but as crusading warriors to spread the holy faith in the land of the infidels. Therefore, when they overthrew the Hindu kingdoms of the North and established themselves in the land, they set about systematically to force their religion upon the people and subvert the old social and religious institutions of the country. They were not, however, completely successful in accomplishing their object, as the Hindus remained in the main loyal to the faith of their fathers and declined to change it at the point of the sword. The partial success which attended their efforts at conversion sharpened the zeal of the Mussalmans; and the stubborn opposition which they met with inflamed their anger. To stamp out heathenism and gather all the people within the fold of Islām, they prohibited the public exercise of Hindu religion, and subjected its followers to inhuman tyranny. The Hindus could not dress well, live well, and appear prosperous. Vexatious taxes were imposed on them; their seats of learning were destroyed; their temples were plundered and demolished; and the images of the gods whom they adored were defaced and smashed, and used as building material for erecting the prayer houses for the Faithful. The Hindus of the North, though they clung to their ancient faith ever so tenaciously, offered little or no resistance to their oppressors. They meekly submitted to all this ill-treatment, and betrayed a strange incapacity to organize themselves to defend their spiritual freedom.

When, however, the Muhammadans extended their field of activities, and attempted to impose their yoke upon the Hindus of Deccan they found that the task was not easy of accomplishment. No doubt, they quickly overturned all the Hindu kingdoms of the South, and brought, as shown already, the entire peninsula from the Gōdāvarī to the Cape Comorin under their control; but their success was evanescent and their authority was overthrown as quickly as it was established.

The Hindus of Deccan, specially those of Tiling, who belonged to the militant Śaiva sects of the *Pāśupatas* and the *Kāpālikas*, which were at the height of their popularity during the Muslim invasions, rose against the invaders, and chased them out of the land. The Śaivas possessed certain characteristics which, while distinguishing them from the other Hindus, reveal a strange affinity to the followers of Islām. Like the disciples of the Prophet, the Śaivas were strict monotheists, believing in the existence of only one God, Śiva, the Lord of the Universe, from whom the other deities of the Hindu Pantheon derived their divinity and power. They maintained, like the Muhammadans, that they were the chosen of God; and the people who did not share their religious beliefs were regarded as sinners whom they called in contempt *bhavis* or infidels. A strict Śaiva should offer no worship to any God but Śiva, visit no temple but the Lord's; he should not associate himself with the *bhavis*, nor eat, nor drink, nor have any manner of intercourse with them. The *bhaktas*, as the members of the sect called themselves, did not pay much regard to the differences of birth and wealth; but so far as spiritual matters were concerned, they considered that all the *bhaktas* were equal, the Brahman and the Paraiyah, the rich and the lowly, all bound together by one common bond of devotion (*bhakti*) to the Lord. The tenets of Śaivism favoured, in a certain measure, the growth of communal life among the followers of the creed, and taught them to share, on occasions, their worldly goods with their brethren. The *ācāryas* and the *gurus* occupied a position of great honour in the community, and exercised profound influence on the minds of their followers who carried out their behests with enthusiasm and alacrity. Another feature which characterised the Śaiva community is their acute sensitiveness to adverse critical opinion. Though they showed no moderation in condemning the views of others, they never tolerated any disparagement of their own faith, and readily resorted to violence in its defence at the slightest provocation. Unlike the other Hindu sects, the Śaivas were extremely intolerant, and showed no hesitation to put down the opposition of

the rival creeds with force. The Jainas and the Buddhists who still flourished in the country suffered bitter persecution at their hands. The Jaina and the Buddhist monks were put to death; their temples were demolished; and the images of their gods and goddesses were overthrown.

Though the Śaivas were all passionately devoted to the worship of Śiva, specially in the form of the *Liṅga*, they fell into two classes owing mainly to the innovations of Basava, the minister of the Kālacūrya king, Bijjala of Kalyāṇi in the middle of the 12th century A.D. Basava rejected the Vēdas, renounced caste, and repudiated the Brahmanic ritual. He laid exclusive emphasis on *bhakti*, and admitted the people of all castes into his creed, thereby founding his church on a thoroughly democratic basis. He insisted that all Vira Śaivas, as his followers were called, should carry the emblem of the *liṅga* on their bodies and make it the symbol of their creed. It was from the practice of carrying the *liṅga* about their persons that the followers of Basava acquired the appellation of the *Liṅgāyats* or the *Liṅgavants* by which they have been known ever since. A large section of the Śaivas, however, did not accept Basava's reforms, especially the rejection of the Vēda and the abolition of caste. The great divine, Mallikārjuna Paṇḍitārādhya, who was a contemporary of Basava protested against these innovations and remained aloof from his church. The Śaivas, who adhered to the teachings of Mallikārjuna and the other *Paṇḍitas* that preceded him, were known as the *Ārādhyās*. Notwithstanding the differences between the *Liṅgāyats* and the *Ārādhyās* their relations were generally characterised by feelings of amity and fellowship, mainly through the efforts of the great missionary Pāṅkuriki Sōmanātha, a contemporary of Pratāparudra, who not only popularised the teachings of Basava in Tiling but also spread them in Karpūṭa where they were widely accepted. The Hindus of Tiling and Karpūṭa, who, thanks to these efforts of the Śaiva teachers, were united in the body of their church, rose to a man and proceeded to rid their country of the presence of Muslim intruders.

The causes which led to the outbreak of the Hindu rebellion are vividly set forth in the inscriptions of the 14th century. In the Vilasa grant, for instance, it is stated that after the death of Pratāparudra the earth was engulfed in the ocean of darkness of the Turuṣka rule. *Adharma* (evil), which had been kept under control, up to that time by that virtuous monarch, flourished under them unchecked as the existing conditions were favourable for its growth. The cruel wretches subjected the rich people to torture, for the sake of their wealth; many of their victims died of terror at the very sight of their vicious countenances. The Brahmans were compelled to abandon their religious practices; the images of the gods were overthrown and smashed to pieces; the learned were deprived of the *agrahāras* which had been in the possession of their families from time immemorial; and the agriculturists were despoiled of the fruits of their labour, and their families were impoverished and ruined. None dared to lay claim on anything, whether it was a piece of property or one's own wife. To those despicable wretches, wine was the ordinary drink, beef the staple food, and slaying the Brahman the favourite pastime. The land of Tilinga, left without a protector, suffered destruction from the Mussalmans like a forest subjected to a devastating wild fire.<sup>3</sup> It is obvious that the rebellion of the Hindus of Tiling was provoked by the Muslim attempt to subvert the Hindu religion and destroy the Hindu population by a policy of universal extortion. They attacked the three visible symbols of the Hindu *dharma*, the temple, the Brahman, and the cow; and obstructed the study of religious scriptures and the performance of Vedic sacrifices. To break the strength of the Hindu community, and deprive it of its power of resistance, they plundered the rich and sucked the life-blood of the agriculturist, the backbone of the nation.

The country did not remain long under the heels of the Mussalmans; the down-trodden Hindus soon found among themselves leaders capable of effecting their emancipation from political bond-

3. *Bhārati*, xix, p. 311.

age, and offering protection to the ancient *dharma* of their land. The germs of rebellion first manifested themselves in the Gōdāvari valley, on the east coast, a region where Śaivism exercised a preponderant influence. The chiefs of the Musunūri family who unfurled the standard of revolt, and succeeded ultimately in liberating the land from the Muslim yoke, were devoted followers of Śiva. They believed that they were chosen by the Lord to execute His will. Kāpaya who finally expelled the Muslims from Tiling declares that he assumed the reins of government by the command of the God Viśvēśvara of Kāśi, and carried on the administration of the country through his mercy. He believed that his success and prosperity were due to the grace of Viśvēśvara who chose him as His special instrument for the defence of the *dharma*.<sup>4</sup> The command of the Lord was probably communicated to Kāpaya through the *ācāryas* and *gurus* of Śaivism who must have assured him of the unfailing support of the Lord in his undertaking. Though Kāpaya and the other leaders were staunch followers of Śaivism, their interest was not confined to the adherents of their own creed. Notwithstanding their extreme *bhakti* or devotion to the God Śiva, they upheld the old Brahmanical sacrificial cult and the social order based upon the *varṇas* and the *āśramas*. They restored to the Brahmins the *agrahāras* which they had lost during the Muslim rule and encouraged them to study the Vēdas and perform sacrifices for the purification and the prosperity of the land.<sup>5</sup> The prudent policy adopted by the leaders of the rebellion enlisted the sympathy and the support of the Hindus of all classes; and the Vira Śaiva as well as the Brahmanical Hindu flocked to their standard, and offered to fight under them side by side with equal zeal and enthusiasm.

The names of the leaders and the part they played in the war of emancipation lay until recently under the cloud of obscurity.

4. *Ibid.*, xi, p. 1004; JTA, ii, pp. 106-7

5. Vilasa Grant, *Bhārati* xix, p. 312; xi, pp. 941 ff; A 5 of 1919-20.

The Muhammadan historians, no doubt, narrate briefly the incidents of this rebellion; but the perfunctory character of their accounts involves the omission of several essential facts which are indispensable for a clear comprehension of the subject. Baranī and the other historians, who derived their information from him, assert that a certain chief called Kanyā Nāyak<sup>6</sup> stirred up a rebellion among the Hindus, and overthrew the authority of the Sulṭān in Tiling. Ferishta, however, states that the rebel leader was Kṛṣṇa Nāyaka, a son of Pratāparudra, the last Kākatīya monarch, whom the Sulṭān had defeated and captured a few years earlier. Kṛṣṇa Nāyaka, it is said, expelled the Mussalman governor from Tiling and began to rule the country as an independent monarch having established himself at Warangal; and later when Sulṭān 'Alā-ud-Dīn Ḥasan defeated the imperial army at Gulbarga, he entered into an alliance with him, and rendered him valuable services. According to the contemporary Deccan historian, 'Iṣāmī,

6. The name of this chief is spelt variously in Muslim histories due mainly to the ignorance and carelessness of the scribes. In *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, he was called Kanyā Pāyak.

همدین وقت، کنیا پایک که در نواحی ارنگل بود، با اتفاق  
زمینداران آند یار طغیان نمود.

*Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī* (Bib. Ind. No. 223) i, p. 207.

but this is obviously due to a scribal error.

*Ma'āṣir-i-Raḥīmī* refers to him as Katbāy Nāyak.

همدین وقت کتبای نایک در نواحی ارنگل طغیان نمود.

*Ma'āṣir-i-Raḥīmī* (Bib. Ind. No. 181) p. 351.

In fn. 2, p. 351, the editor observes,—

در طبقات اکبری کنیا و در تاریخ فرهنگه کنیا مذکور است.

In one of the Mss. of Ferishta's history in the library of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, his name is written as Kanbā Nāyak.

درین وقت کنیا نایک پسر لدر دیو که در نواحی ورنگل می بود و جزیده  
نزد بلال دیو که رای اعظم الشان کرناٹک بود رفعا گفت.

*Tārīkh-i-Ferishta* (Ms. No. 135) folio No. 108 B.

the name of the ruler of Tiling who contracted the alliance with 'Alā-ud-Dīn Ḥasan was not Kṛṣṇa Nāyaka but Kāpā or Kāpā Nīd.<sup>7</sup> There is thus considerable uncertainty among the Muslim historians about the name of the Hindu leader and the family to which he belonged.

Pratāparudra, it may be pointed out, had no issue<sup>8</sup>; and nothing is known of Kanyā or Kṛṣṇa Nāyaka excepting through the Muslim sources just cited. The contemporary Hindu records, on the contrary, show that during the period under consideration, Tiling was under the sway of the Musunūri family. In the Vilasa grant which may be assigned to a date about 1330 A.D., it is stated that Prōlaya Nāyaka, a son of Pōcaya Nāyaka of the Musunūri family, expelled the Mussalmans, and with the help of his cousins Kāpaya Nāyaka and others established himself in the king-

7. *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn*, pp. 534-5.

مکتوب فرستادن سکندر خان برکا پانیڈ در خور بر سبیل اخلاص :  
 پس از نام یزدان و نام رسول      قلم جعد کرده دبیر قبول  
 بکا پا نبشته زخان پر سه      بر بطة گوارا و خط خرويه  
 چنين نامه چون بکا پا رسيد      بعنوان او نقش اخلاص ديد

8. *Pratāpacaritra*, a late legendary account of little historical importance, mentions a son of Pratāparudra (JTA vii, p. 311) called Virabhadra. This appears to be the result of confusion caused by the similarity of names of Kākatīya Pratāparudra, and the Gajapati Pratāparudra, the latter of whom had, in fact, a son of the name of Virabhadra. A certain Juttāya-lenka Gonkāreḍḍi who was ruling in 1314 A.D. at Gaṇḍikōṭa as a subordinate of Kākatīya Pratāparudra calls himself a son of that monarch (V. R. i, Cd. 18). Juttāya-lenka Gonkāreḍḍi, was, however, as his name indicates, a son of Juttāya, a *lenka* or retainer in the service of Pratāparudra. The servants of the class of *lenkas* were little better than slaves, and they used to regard themselves as the sons of their masters. Koravi Gōparāju, a writer of the early 15th century, declares that *lenkas* were sons born of the eyes of the kings (*Simhāsanaśāstrimsika*, part ii, 7:35).

dom.<sup>9</sup> On the death of Prōlaya, he was succeeded by Kāpaya who ruled as the sole sovereign of the kingdom from the city of Ēkaśīla or Warangal.<sup>10</sup> The titles *Āndhradēśādhiśvara* and *Āndhrasuratrāṇa* borne by Kāpaya indicate that his authority was acknowledged over a large part of the Āndhra or the Telugu country.<sup>11</sup> He was evidently the Kāpā or Kāpā Niḍ, the ruler of Tiling, mentioned by 'Iṣāmy, as the friend and ally of the Sultān 'Alā-ud-Dīn Ḥasan of Gulbarga. It is obvious that the Musunūri family succeeded the Tughlaq Sultāns in the government of Tiling leaving no room for the rule of Kanyā or Kṛṣṇa Nāyaka. Nevertheless, he cannot be dismissed as an entirely fictitious character; for, the achievements attributed to him are authentic, attested by trustworthy contemporary evidence. Kanyā or Kṛṣṇa Nāyaka, like the Musunūri chiefs, stirred up a rebellion in Tiling against Sultān Muḥammad, expelled the Muhammadans from the country, established himself at Warangal, and entered into an alliance with 'Alā-ud-Dīn Ḥasan of Gulbarga. As he is said to have also ruled at Warangal at the same time as Kāpaya Nāyaka, he appears to have been identical with the latter; and the difference in his name and parentage has probably to be attributed to the erroneous character of the information gathered by the Muslim historians.

Prōlaya and Kāpaya were not alone in their struggle against the Muhammadans. They received the support and the hearty co-operation of the people and the chiefs who bore sway over them. The people, according to the Vilasa grant, flocked to the standard of Prōlaya, and slew the Muhammadans that oppressed them. The Kaluvacēru grant declares that the Nāyaks who governed the country, seventy-five in number, served under Kāpaya, and helped him to expel the Muhammadans and re-establish the

9. *Bhārati* xix, p. 311-12.

10. *Ibid* xi, p. 956.

11. *SII*, iv. 950.

Hindu supremacy.<sup>12</sup> Vēma, the future founder of the Redḍi kingdom of Addanki and Koṇḍaviḍu, who was one of the famous band of seventy-five, is said to have smitten the Muhammadan army, and dispelled the darkness that enveloped the country.<sup>13</sup> The names of the other Nāyaks are not handed down to posterity; but the combined labours of these unknown warriors bore fruit. The ancient *dharma* which they salvaged from the raging fire of Islām was passed on to their descendants; and it remains until today as an imperishable monument of the service which they rendered to their country and the nation.

The date on which Prōlaya Nāyaka unfurled the standard of revolt is not precisely known; though it is generally believed, on the authority of Ferishta, that the event took place in 1344 A.D. This belief is not, however, based on facts. The chronology adopted by Ferishta is erroneous; and from a comparison with the accounts of contemporary Muslim historians it is seen to be seven years in advance of the actual chronology.<sup>14</sup> According to the testimony of the contemporary writers, the rebellion broke out some seven years earlier, i.e., about 737 A.H. (1336-7 A.D.); and it was soon followed by the re-establishment of Hindu rule in Tiling. This, however, was not the actual date of the outbreak. The Muslim historians whose main interest lay in recording the territorial losses sustained by the empire owing to the incompetency of Sultān Muḥammad, concentrate their attention on the final episode, and assign the outbreak of the rebellion to the year in which he lost Warangal and was compelled to evacuate Tiling. The rebellion appears to have broken out, as a matter of fact, some years earlier. Contemporary epigraphic evidence clearly indicates that in certain parts of Tiling Muslim authority came to an

12. J.T.A., ii, p. 107.

13. J.A.H.R.S., xi, pp. 202-3.

14. I.C. v, pp. 135-46, 268-9.

end before 1330 A.D. The inscriptions of Prōlaya Vēma, who was, it may be remembered, one of the seventy-five Nāyaks, in the service of the Musunūri chiefs, serve as an index to the rising power of the Hindu rebels. The earliest of them is a copper-plate grant dated A.D. 1330-31, registering the gift of the village of Varivēru in the Guntur district to a Brahman named Rūpākula Brahmābhaṭṭa Sōmayājin.<sup>15</sup> Only the name of the donee and the date of the gift are mentioned in the Kaiḥiyat. It is not known why the Mackenzie Surveyors, if they had actually seen the record, did not make a copy of it, as was their wont. Next comes an epigraph from Nekarikallu in the Narasaraopet taluk of the Guntur district, dated 1332.<sup>16</sup> It refers to a gift of the entire village of Narasimhāpuram made by Anna Vēma to the temple of the God Śāntanarasimha some time before that date.<sup>17</sup> The most important of Prōlaya Vēma's early inscriptions, however, is a copper-plate grant dated 1336 A.D., which registers a gift of the village of Cimakurti in the Ongole taluk of the Guntur district as an *agrahāra* to Cittiṃmūri Timmā Bhaṭṭa. It alludes to Vēma's conquest of the coastal region between the Guṇḍlakammā and the Mahānadi, and the establishment in the conquered country of a single monarch whose throne he adorned as a unique ornament.<sup>18</sup> Though the

15. L.R. 57 (*Kaiḥiyat of Varivēru*) p. 131.

16. *Śāsanapadyamañjarī*, No. 67.

17. Anna Vēma mentioned in the record is identical with Prōlaya Vēma, the founder of the Redḍi kingdom. He was alternately called Prōlaya Vēma (i.e., Vēma, the son of Prōlaya), and Anna Vēma (i.e., Vēma, the son of Annama) as the name of his father or mother was prefixed to his own. The poet Errā Preḡgada who dedicated his *Harivaṃśa* to Vēma, addresses him as Annama Vēma in the opening stanza of the sixth canto of his famous poem:

క॥ శ్రీకరకవిప్రబంధా! నేకముఖ వినిర్గతాత్మహితకీర్తి సుధా।

నేకధనశ్శాయమాశ్రమ! హాకమలభవాంజధామ యన్నమ వేమా॥

18. EI, xxi, pp. 271-2.

inscription does not disclose the name of this "sole monarch," he is doubtless identical with Prōlaya Nāyaka who, having expelled the Muhammadans from Tiling at this time, established himself as the supreme sovereign of the country. As Vēma was a dependant of Prōlaya Nāyaka, his victories in the field were won on behalf of his master. It is obvious that some time before January 1336 A.D. the Muhammadans were ousted from the east coast, and the country was brought under the control of a new Hindu sovereign who created afresh, from the broken fragments of the Kākatiya dominions, a powerful Hindu kingdom. Although it is not possible to ascertain exactly how long before this date the Muhammadans were compelled to retire from the coastal region, their departure must have been the final act of a prolonged struggle. The formation of a national league, the struggle with the Muhammadans, the establishment of a new kingdom, and the victorious expedition to the banks of the Mahānadi must have extended over a comparatively long period of time; a period of four or even five years would not have been too long for the accomplishment of these events. By the time of the Varivēru grant (1330-31 A.D.), if not perhaps a little earlier, Prōlaya Vēma and his master threw off the Muslim yoke, and asserted their independence.

Judging from the scanty material available at present, the incidents of the rebellion seem to have occurred in the following order. The coalescence of the people discontented with the Muhammadan rule, and the formation of a confederacy for re-establishing national independence, must have preceded the outbreak of open rebellion; for without an organised body to co-ordinate and direct their activities, the Hindus could not have made any headway against the Muhammadan forces. The Vilasa grant states, as noticed already, that the Hindus unable to bear the tyranny of the Muslim conquerors, flocked to the standard of Prōlaya Nāyaka for protection; Niẓām-ud-Dīn Aḥmad alludes to the formation of a confederacy of the Hindu zamīndārs under the leadership of Kanyā (i.e., Kāpaya) Nāyaka to subvert the power

of Muhammad Tughlaq in Tiling.<sup>19</sup> The Hindu zamindārs referred to by Niẓām-ud-Dīn were in all probability the seventy-five Nāyaks who, according to the Kaluvacēru grant, served under Kāpaya Nāyaka, and helped him to drive the Muhammadans out of the country.<sup>20</sup> As Kāpaya only completed the work which his cousin had half accomplished it is not unlikely that the confederation of the Hindu zamindārs mentioned by Niẓām-ud-Dīn should have actually taken shape under Prōlaya before the outbreak of the rebellion.

The formation of the Hindu confederacy must have precipitated the conflict with the Muslim government. Information about the incidents of the struggle is extremely meagre. It is, however, certain that the Muhammadans were overpowered and compelled to evacuate the coastal region after a sharp conflict. The Vilasa grant refers, as stated above, to the defeat and the expulsion of the Muhammadans. In the *Harivaṃśa* of Errā Pregarā which was written at the time when Prōlaya Vēma was still ruling from Addanki, it is said that the *aurva* fire generated by the swift strokes of Vēma's sword dried up the ocean of the Yavana (i.e., the Muslim) army.<sup>21</sup> This is also corroborated by the evidence of the Anaparti plates which attribute to Vēma the expulsion of the Muhammadans who conquered the country after the death of Pratāparudra.<sup>22</sup> Nothing more is known about the events of this struggle, though the Muhammadans, unable to maintain their hold on the east coast, withdrew ultimately into the interior of Tiling and attempted to consolidate their position in the neighbourhood of Warangal. They were not, however, beyond the reach of the

19. *Ṭabaqāt-i-Akbarī* (Eng. Trans.) i, p. 224.

20. J.T.A., ii, pp. 106-7.

21. *Harivaṃśa*, 5:260.

22. JAHRS, xi, pp. 202-3.

rebels; for, Prōlaya Nāyaka, having brought under his effective control the territory which he had conquered established himself in the heart of the Eastern Ghats at Rēkapalli on the Gōdāvarī, and threatened to sweep them out of the Telugu country altogether.

Unforeseen obstacles seem to have interrupted the immediate prosecution of the war against the Muhammadans at this stage. The safety of the Middle Āndhra country appears to have been involved in some grave peril;<sup>23</sup> Errā Peggada darkly alludes to some danger from which Prōlaya Vēma protected the Middle Āndhra country.<sup>24</sup> Whether the danger took the shape of internal strife or external invasion, there is no means of ascertaining at present. The danger which menaced the recently won freedom of the Telugu country came perhaps from the frontiers of Kaṭṭa. Though the exact nature of the trouble is not known, it appears to have been quite serious to necessitate the despatch of a punitive expedition across the frontier. Prōlaya Vēma set out with his forces probably at the instance of his master, and overran the kingdom of Kaṭṭa as far as the banks of the Mahānadi. He

23. Madhya or Middle Āndhra is the country that lies between the deltas of the Kṛṣṇā and the Gōdāvarī. The poet Śrīnātha addresses the Redḍi king, Allaya Virabhadra, as the lord of the Madhyāndhra extending as far as the sea (*Kāśīkhaṇḍam* 3:246). It is evident that Madhyāndhra was situated on the east coast. The authority of the Redḍi kings of Rājāhmundry did not extend beyond the Kṛṣṇā in the south. The name Madhyāndhra could not have been applied to the country on the east of the Gōdāvarī as it lay in the extreme corner, and not in the centre of Āndhra. As Allaya Virabhadra is also referred to as the Lord of Vengi (*Ibid.* 5:338) the Madhyāndhra mentioned by the writers of the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries must have been identical with the region between the mouths of the Kṛṣṇā and the Gōdāvarī.

24. *Harivaṃśa*, Part II, 2:1, 4:1. In both the places, Prōlaya Vēma is said to have been the owner of a sword that offered protection to Madhya Āndhra country.

threw the dominions of the ruler of Janturnāḍu into confusion, hunted the *Manne* chiefs of the hilly tracts, and having defeated the king of Kaṭinga and Orissa in a battle, laid waste his kingdom.<sup>25</sup>

This expedition must have shown the king of Kaṭinga and his feudatories that the nascent Āndhra kingdom was powerful enough not only to guard its frontiers but to chastise the enemies who might be tempted to cross it.

The activities of the rebels were not confined to the coastal districts. During the years when the Musunūri chiefs were engaged in their conquest, the Hindus of the Western Telugu country who were subjected to the authority of Malik Muḥammad, the governor of Kampili, rose against him, and reduced him to helplessness. The people of the province, according to the Portuguese chronicler Nuniz, rose in revolt as soon as they heard of Sulṭān Muḥammad's departure from their country. 'Those who escaped to the mountains', says he, 'with others who, against their will and through fear had taken oaths of fealty for their towns and villages, rose against Melique Neby (Malik Nā'ib Muḥammad)'.<sup>26</sup> They refused to pay the taxes due from them to the government, and under the leadership of the Cālukya prince Sōmadēvarāja, the ancestor of the later Āraṇḍi chiefs, who was holding the country in the neighbourhood of Kandanaṇḍu (Kurnool) concerted measures to reconquer the territory that was under the sway of the Muhammadans.<sup>27</sup> Whether Sōmadēva had any direct connection

25. A 5 of 1919-1920.

26. Sewell: F.E., p. 297.

27. The territory extending from Kandanaṇḍu to Śrīsaṭṭam on the southern bank of the Kṛṣṇā was held by the Ceruku chiefs during the reign of Pratāparudra. Ceruku Rudra was a commander in the service of Pratāparudra; his son Bollaya or Bollā Reḍḍi, was ruling from Malyala in the Nandikotkur taluk in 1290 A.D. as a subordinate of that king (Mack, *Mss.* 15.3.5 E.M.—23

with Prōlaya Nāyaka and his associates, it is hard to ascertain definitely at present. He could not have remained entirely uninfluenced by the spirit of Hindu nationalism surging in the land. Stray allusions in contemporary inscriptions and family *praśastis* suggest, as a matter of fact, that Sōmadēva was actually in touch with the rebels of the east coast. Prōlaya Vēma, the most powerful of Prōlaya Nāyak's lieutenants, is said to have destroyed the fort of Rācūr (Raichore).<sup>28</sup> Similarly the chiefs of the Pasupula family are said to have slain a certain Gōsangi Malusa, won a victory at Mudgal and ruled over the fort of Rācūr.<sup>29</sup> If these statements were based on authentic facts, it would appear that Sōmadēva, who took, as will be shown presently, a leading part in these incidents, obtained material help from Prōlaya and his colleagues. He also received indirect help from an unexpected quarter. Ballāḷa III, the Hoysala king of Dwārasamudra, took advantage of the troubles that beset the Muslim government in Deccan, threw off his allegiance, and having declared war upon the Sultān invaded the province of Kampili.

Malik Muḥammad, the governor of the province, though assailed by the rebels on both his flanks, gathered together his men and made a futile attempt to maintain the Sultān's authority; but he soon discovered that the rebels were too many for him; and that the forces under his command were quite inadequate to arrest

Malyala). Bolla's son, Rācanna or Rāja, succeeded him in the government of the principality. He was overthrown, either at the end of Pratapārudra's reign or subsequent to the Muhammadan conquest by Tāta Pinnama, the father of Koṭṭikantī Rāghava and Sōmadēvarāja. It was about this time or perhaps a little earlier that the former came into conflict with Kampilirāya, the ruler of Kummatha (*Bhārati*, vi, p. 848).

28. ARE, cp. 5 of 1919-1920.

29. Mack, Mss. 15.4.8, p. 87.

their progress. Sōmadēva collected his followers and set about the reduction of the forts belonging to the Sultān and his vassals. According to the chronicles of the Āravīḍu family, he conquered fourteen forts, taking simultaneously no less than seven of them, viz., Mosalimaḍugu, Sātānikōṭa, Kandanavōlu (Kurnool), Kalva-kolanu, Rācūr (Raichore), Ētagiri (Etgir) and Ganginēnikonḍa, in a campaign planned on a single day. He also distinguished himself in several battles fought at Nāgulaḥḍu, Mudgal, Ānegondi, Kunti, and Sara and put to death several chiefs who opposed him.<sup>30</sup> The forts which Sōmadēva had taken, and most of the places where he distinguished himself in battle are situated in a small area comprising portions of Kurnool, Bellary and Raichore districts. A large part of this area, it may be pointed out, was included in the dominions of the Rāya of Kampili until 1326-7 A.D.; and on his death it passed into the hands of the Sultān of Dehli. Therefore, the reduction of this region must have been effected after a struggle with the Sultān's forces. The chronicles of the Āravīḍu chiefs refer, in fact, to Sōmadēva's victories over some nobles and Malik Muḥammad i.e., the governor of Kampili. It is said that he overcame a confederacy of some Hindu chiefs at Ganginēnikonḍa. Naḍa Bāla Nāyaka, Gujjala Viri Niḍu, Rudrapa Nāyaka, Gaurā Redḍi and Gangi Nāyaka combined their forces, and having taken shelter under the strong walls of the fort bade defiance to him. Sōmadēva stormed the fort and put them to the sword. Similarly, the *Manne* chief, Gōsangi, who held out in the fort of Maṇigilla was taken prisoner after the capture of his fort and was offered as a victim to the God Bhairava of the town. Sōmadēva probably received the help of the Pasupula chiefs in his attack on Maṇigilla. Who these chiefs were and why they chose to oppose Sōmadēva are matters on which the chronicles do not offer any explanation. They were probably the vassals of the Sultān who remained loyal to him owing mainly to their jealousy and apprehension of Sōma-

30. *Sources*, pp. 81-2; *Bhārati*, vi, p. 849.

dēva's growing power and importance. Sōmadēva's struggle with Malik Muḥammad appears to have been far more severe. It is said that the Malik opposed him several times, but being repeatedly worsted in the battle, was compelled, on every occasion, to seek safety in flight. Probably the enemies whom Sōmadēva vanquished in the battles of Kunti, Ānegondi, Rācūr (Raichore) and Mudgal were the Mussalmans under Malik Muḥammed. These forts, it may be remembered, were taken by the Sultān at the time of the conquest of Kampili; and they should have remained in his possession ever since. Malik Muḥammad was responsible, as the governor of the province, for their safety; and he could not have remained indifferent when they were attacked by the rebels under Sōmadēva. In the final encounter, he fell with 6000 horse into the hands of Sōmadēva; but he soon gained his freedom by promising to acknowledge the supremacy of his captor, though he seems to have repudiated his promise as soon as he attained his object.

Nuniz gives a graphic account of the affairs of Kampili at this time. According to him, Mileque Neby (i.e., Malik Nā'ib Muḥammad) was compelled to take shelter in a fortress closely besieged by the rebels. It was probably at this time that he despatched a letter to the Sultān acquainting him of the state of affairs in his province. He informed the Sultān that 'the land was risen against him'; 'every one was lord of what he pleased'; and 'no one was on his side'. The people came to 'besiege him in the fortress, allowing no provisions to go in to him, nor paying him the taxes that had been forced on them.'<sup>31</sup>

When the news of the outbreak of the rebellion at Kampili together with the governor's report reached Dehli, the Sultān summoned a council of the great men of the realm, and having explained to them the state of affairs in the province asked their advice as to what measures he should adopt to meet the situation. The councillors, according to Nuniz, expressed the opinion that the most

31. Sewell: F.E. p. 297.

prudent step which the Sultān should take in the circumstances was to appoint as the ruler of the province some one connected with the late Rāya of Kampili through ties of blood or association in the government of his kingdom. Acting upon the advice of his councillors, the Sultān made enquiries as to the whereabouts of the Rāya's kinsmen; but none being found, he released from prison six men of Kampili who were held captive. He appointed one of them, Deorao, who had been the minister of the late Rāya as the new king; and made another, who was formerly treasurer under the Rāya, governor. And having taken from them 'oaths and pledges of their fealty as vassals', he sent them 'to their lands with a large following to defend them from any one who should desire to do them any injury.'<sup>32</sup>

The information furnished by Nuniz is not entirely free from faults. It is extremely doubtful whether the Sultān actually set about, in pursuance of the advice of his councillors, to search for the heirs of the Rāya; for, he could not have been so remiss in thought as to forget Nāsir, Bakhtyār, Abū Muslim and other sons of the Rāya who were in service at his court.<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, the narrative of Nuniz seems to describe the events with substantial accuracy, for his account is confirmed by the evidence of other independent sources. Baranī casually refers to the appointment of an unnamed relation of Kampila as the governor of Kampili;<sup>34</sup> and the *Vidyāranya Vṛttānta* and *Kālaṅṇāna* supplement this statement with the information that Harihara and his brother Bukka,

32. *Ibid.*

33. Ibn Baṭūṭa, E.D. iii, App. D., p. 615.

34. The governor appointed by the Sultān was, according to Baranī's history translated in Elliot and Dowson (iii, p. 245), a relative of Kanyā Nāyakā, the rebel leader of Tiling. This view has been adopted by every writer on the subject including the author of the present work. A Ms of

the two Telugu ministers in the service of Kampili Rāya who were taken prisoners by the Sultān at the time of the fall of Hosadurga, were released from prison and were sent with an army to take charge of the province. 'At that time', declares the *Vidyāranya Vṛttānta*, 'the Nava Ballāḷas, having gathered strength, rebelled against the Sultān in Karnāṭaka; the Sultān on hearing of this rebellion sent Harihara and his brother with an army to subdue the rebels.'<sup>35</sup> This is corroborated by the evidence of the *Vidyāranya Kālaḷāṇa*, according to which the Sultān released from prison Harihara and his brother and having conferred on them the government of Karnāṭaka, sent them with an army to make war upon King Ballāḷa.<sup>36</sup> It seems therefore reasonable to hold that the relation of Kampila, whom the Sultān appointed as the governor of Kampili, was Harihara, and that he and his brother were specially entrusted with the task of subduing Ballāḷa who appears to have been somehow involved in the rebellion, though his attitude towards Sōmadēva and his followers cannot be definitely ascertained.

Harihara whom the Sultān appointed to the government of Kampili was originally in the service of Pratāparudra of Warangal. He and his younger brother Bukka were, according to *Vidyāranya Vṛttānta* and *Kālaḷāṇa*, in charge of the royal treasury. This is

Baranis' great history found in the Government Oriental Mss. Library (D. No. 258), Madras has Kambila in the place of Kanyā Nāyak.

شخصي را از اقرباء كنبلاء كه سلطان محمد فرستاده بود ...

As this passage is repeated with little modification by Nizām-ud-Dīn Ahmad, Maulāna 'Abd-ul-Bāqī and Ferishta, this appears to have been the genuine text of Baranis' work.

35. *Further Sources* (in the press). The word *Nava-Ballāḷaru* is a generic term which applies to all the kings of the Hoysala or the Ballāḷa dynasty, viz., Vinayāditya; Viṣṇuvardhana; Ballāḷa I; Narasimha I; Ballāḷa II; Narasimha II; Sōmēśvara; Narasimha III; and Ballāḷa III.

36. *Ibid.*

borne out to some extent by contemporary epigraphic evidence. Bukka was ruling, in 1314-15 A.D. during Pratāparudra's reign, the region round Kanigiri in the Nellore district, evidently as a subordinate of that monarch.<sup>37</sup> After the fall of Warangal and the captivity of Pratāparudra, they fled to Kampili, took service under Rāmanātha, the heroic son of the Rāya and entered into marital alliance with the royal family.<sup>37a</sup> They fell into the hands of the Sultān when he overthrew the kingdom of Kampili and annexed it to his dominions. Pleased with their bravery and uprightness, the Sultān later released them from prison, and having converted them to Islām kept them at his court.<sup>38</sup>

37. NDI, ii, Kg. 7.

37a. *Keladiṇṇpa-Vijayam*, p. 15.

“ಉತ್ತರದೇಶದಿಂದ ಸರ್ವೋದರರಾದ ಹರಿಹರ ಬುಕ್ಕರೆಂಬ ಬಡಕ್ಷತ್ರಿಯರು ಈ ದಕ್ಷಿಣರಾಜ್ಯಕ್ಕೆ ತಂದು ಕುರುಬರಲ್ಲಿ ನಂಬತನವಂ ಮಾಡಿ ಜಂಜು ತಂದು ಮದುವೆಯಾಗಿ ಸುಖವಾಸಿಗಳಾಗಿರುತ್ತ ಮರಲಾಗಿ.”

38. *Further Sources*. This is borne out by the evidence of five Muslim historians of whom two were contemporaries of Sultān Muḥammad. Baranī states that the person, whom the Sultān appointed governor of Kampili apostatized from Islām, revolted from the Sultān and established himself in the country.

وہم در انکم سلطان محمد در شہر بود در ارنگل فتنہ ہندو خاستہ  
و کنہا نایک دراں دیار زور آورد . و ملک قبول نایب وزیر را از ارنگل  
راہ شہر گرفت و سلامت در دہلی رسید . و ارنگل را ہندواں فرو گرفتند  
و آن دیار بکلی از دست رفت . وہم دران ایام شخصی را از اقرباء کنہلہ  
کہ سلطان محمد در کنہلہ فرستادہ بود آن بد بخت از اسلام برگشت و  
مرتد شد و بنی ورزید و عرصہ کنہلہ از دست رفت و بدست ہندواں  
افتاد . و ہمان مرتد انرا فرو گرفته بجز دیوگہ و گجرات در ضبط نہاند .

*Tārīkh-i-Firūz Shāhī* (Madras Govt. Or. Mss. Library D. No. 258.)

'Isāmy also refers to the apostate:—

یکی مرتد اقلیم کنڑ گرفت زگوئی و تاحد معبر گرفت

*Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* Ind. off Ms. f. 362.

The appointment of Harihara as the ruler of Kampili, overlooking the claims of the sons of the late Rāya who were in the Sultān's service, was actuated by motives of policy. It was calculated to establish the supremacy of Islām and preclude the possibility of the revival of the old kingdom, Harihara and his brother were Mussalmans at that time, having embraced as stated already the faith of the Prophet after the conquest of Kampili.<sup>39</sup> As their claim to rule the country rested entirely on the command of the Sultān, they were expected to remain loyal to his throne, while their intimate knowledge of the local affairs and influence over the people owing to their past associations with the Hindu court were trusted to check the progress of the rebellion and restore the authority of the imperial government.

Harihara and Bukka set out from Dehli with the army which the Sultān had given them for their defence and reached in course of time the frontiers of Kampili. What happened there on their arrival is not easy to discover, as the information furnished by our sources is not quite consistent and is encrusted to some extent with legend. According to Nuniz, Deorao (Harihara) and his followers reached without incident the city of Nagundy (i.e., Ānegundi) which lay in ruins. When the people came to know of his arrival

Nizām-ud-Dīn Aḥmad and Maulānā 'Abd-ul-Bāqī corroborate Baranī's evidence; and Ferishta states that it was Sultān Muḥammad himself who converted this governor to Islām.

شخصی از خویشان راجه کند (کنبله؟) که سلطان محمد مسلمان  
کرده به کنبله فرستاده بود از اسلام برگشت و بنی ورزید . کنبله از  
تصرف گماشتگان سلطان بر آورد .

*Tārīkh-i-Ferishta* (RASB. Ms. No. 57).

39. See for a discussion of the subject, *Origin of the City and the Empire of Vijayanagara*, p. 96; JOR, xii, pp. 24-5; cf. Ishvari Prasad; *Qarauna Turks*; I. p. 200; n. 32.

and elevation to kingship they greatly rejoiced, celebrated feasts in his honour, and having accepted him as their king surrendered to him the royal lands in their possession. Malik Nā'ib, who was pleased with the change in the attitude of the people, handed over to him in obedience to the orders of the Sultān, 'the fortress and the kingdom' and returned to Dehli. Deorao (Harihara) pacified the people who were still recalcitrant, by following a policy of conciliation; and he even abandoned the idea of recovering 'the lost lands' belonging to the old kingdom, since he knew that his material resources were too meagre to permit him to embark on the enterprise.<sup>40</sup>

Harihara's arrival in Kampili was not perhaps as peaceful as represented by Nuniz. The *Vidyāraṇya-Vṛttānta* and *Kālaṅṇāna* narrate a somewhat different story. Harihara and Bukka, it is said, crossed the river Kṛṣṇā by means of boats, and proceeded, as instructed by the Sultān, against King Ballāla without loss of time. They met him in battle, but sustained a defeat at his hands. Unable to join their forces which were separated from them during the fight, they wandered abroad and took refuge in a jungle. Overcome by fatigue, Harihara soon fell asleep under a tree, resting his head on the lap of his brother. He saw in a dream the Śaiva saint Rēvaṇa who presented to him a *linga* and advised him to meet the sage Vidyāraṇya. Harihara woke up from sleep and narrated the strange dream to his brother. They set out at once in search of the hermitage of the sage which they seem to have discovered without difficulty. Vidyāraṇya received his guests warmly, and bestowed his blessings on their enterprise; and by his grace, their army which was scattered during the engagement with Ballāla soon reassembled. They set forth again at the head of their forces, and having sought out Ballāla defeated him in battle and established themselves firmly in the country.<sup>41</sup>

40. Sewell: FE. pp. 298-9.

41. JOR. xii, pp. 25-6.

Despite the touch of unreality due to the introduction of Harihara's dream and his interview with the departed Śaiva saint of a bygone age, there is nothing improbable in the facts described in the *Vidyāranya Vṛttānta* and *Kālaṅṇāna*. They seem to be more in keeping with the trend of events at Kampili during the preceding years than the pacific succession of incidents narrated by Nuniz. It is not at all likely that Sōmadēva and his followers who successfully overthrew the Sultān's authority and won back their freedom should have returned to obedience without coercion; and Ballāla III who appears to have seized the territory in the neighbourhood of his kingdom would not have easily relinquished his hold upon it. Harihara possibly met with resistance, and did not succeed in imposing his authority without hard fighting, although the details of this fight are still hidden in obscurity. A few facts which seem to indicate dimly the course of this conflict may however be noticed here with advantage. Harihara and his brother do not appear to have succeeded in getting Ānegondi or Kuṅṇarakōṇa immediately after their return from Dehli. The little information that is available about their activities before 1336 A.D. is associated with the fort of Gutti in the Anantapur district and the country in its immediate neighbourhood. In an undated epigraph found in the fort, Gutti is said to have been 'the navel to the wheel of sovereignty over the whole earth of the illustrious King Bukka.'<sup>42</sup> As Bukka was specially associated with Harihara in the administration of the kingdom, Gutti could not have been regarded appropriately as the navel to the wheel of Bukka's sovereignty at any time subsequent to 1335 A.D., when Ānegondi, the old capital of the kingdom, appears to have been conquered. Therefore, the record under consideration must be assigned to a date earlier than 1335 A.D. It is in this region that Harihara first laid the foundations of the administrative system which later became the characteristic feature of the Vijayanagara empire. In a gift deed of the time of Harihara, preserved in the *Kaifiyat Malamādikambāla-*

42. SII, i, p. 167.

*dinne*, it is stated that 'in the region bounded by Siddhavaṭam in the east of Gutti, Penugonḍa in the south, Maddikere in the west and Drōṇācalam in the north, Harihara appointed a *karaṇika* over villages consisting of four or five hamlets, and a *sthalakaraṇa* over an area containing 20 or 30 villages having such village *karaṇikas*. He also appointed for the same region, *nāḍu-gauḍas* and *nāḍu-talaiyārs*; and having made appointments in this manner, he granted them title deeds which he had caused to be written'.<sup>43</sup> As the title deeds to the *karaṇikas* and other officials were executed on Māgha ba 30 Īśvara Ś 1259 (February 27th 1339 A.D.),<sup>44</sup> the reorganization of the administration must have taken place a little earlier. During these early years which preceded the foundation of Vijayanagara, Harihara and Bukka were engaged in the subjugation of territory extending as far east as the Bay of Bengal. The Kāpalūr grant dated 1336 A.D., which registers the gift of Kāpalūr in the Candragiri *rājya* as an *agrahāra* to a Brahman, by Harihara, shows that the territory from Nāyudupēṭa in the Nellore district to Candragiri in Chittore had already passed into his hands.<sup>45</sup> The acquisition of Candragiri must have involved Harihara in a conflict with Ballāḷa III; for, Candragiri was the capital of the Yādavarāya chieftains who owed allegiance to him.<sup>46</sup> Though nothing is known of this conflict at present, it is certain that Ballāḷa was defeated and had to acquiesce in the annexation of Candragiri by Harihara, for the fort became the headquarters of a province and remained in the possession of the successors of Harihara until the very last days of the empire.

The conquest of Nellore and Udayagiri was accomplished about the same time. The earliest record of the Vijayanagara kings found

43. *Further Sources* (in the Press).

44. *Ibid.*

45. N.D.I., i, cp. 15.

46. T.D.E.R. p. 121.

in this region is, no doubt, dated in 1343 A.D.,<sup>47</sup> but it appears to have come into their possession much earlier. There is reason to believe that some time before the appointment of Kampana as the governor of Udayagiri in 1343 A.D., the fort with its surrounding country was conquered by Bukka. Sāyana states, in one of the passages of his *Alaṁkārasudhānidhi*, that his elder brother, Mādhava helped Bukkarāja to conquer the earth surrounded by the four seas; and that at Udayagiri in the conquered country he and his younger brother Bhōganātha resided as the lords of the land.<sup>48</sup>

47. L.R. 46, pp. 236-7.

48. *Sa ēva khalu Mādhavo vasumatīm catus-sāgarī-  
Samākalita-mēkhalām nayati Bukka-rājam yudhaḥ  
Tam-anvajani Sāyanaś= tam-anu Bhōganāthas= ca=tā=  
v=ubhāv=udayam-āśritāv=acalam=atra viśvēśvaram ||*

*Bukkarājasya catus-samudrālaṁkṛta-vasumatī-samānayana-sāmarth-  
yam (ān) Māyananandanē eva Mādhava-śabdō niyamyate. Atr=  
ēty=adhikaraṇārthaḥ samupātta-dēśa-viśēṣe. acala-śabda udaya-  
śabdas=ca giri-viśēṣe niyamyatē. Īvara-śabdas=ca rājani. (Mys.  
Or. Mss. Lib. No. A. 615 p. 211).*

( I am greatly obliged to Mr. V. Raghavan, M.A., Ph.D., Lecturer in Sanskrit, University of Madras for helping me to correct the corrupt text of the Ms.)

Another fact which points out in the same direction must be noticed in this context. Bukka had a son who bore the name of Uddagiri Virūpaṇṇa or Virūpaṇṇa of Uddagiri, i.e., Udayagiri. The association of the name of Udayagiri with Virūpaṇṇa may be accounted for in three ways, by assuming, (1) that he was named after the God Virūpākṣa of Udayagiri, (2) that he was associated for a long time with the administration of the district and (3) that he was born in that fort. It must be pointed out that no temple of Virūpākṣa is ever known to have existed at Udayagiri; nor is there any evidence to support the view that he was at any time connected with the administration of the district. Therefore, the only plausible way of explaining the association of the name of Udayagiri with Virūpaṇṇa seems to be to presume that he was born in that fort. If Virūpaṇṇa was actually born at Udayagiri that event must have happened before 1343 A.D., when Kampana I took charge of the administration of the fort; and by that time Virūpaṇṇa was old enough to be posted as the governor of Penugonda (Sewell: *Antiquities*, I, p. 120).

This passage from the *Alamkārasudhānidhi* alludes distinctly to the subjugation of the country in the neighbourhood of Udayagiri by Bukka with the help of Mādhava. As the conquest of this region was accomplished partly at least if not wholly before 1336 A.D., as shown by Harihara's grant of the village of Kāpalūr within forty miles in the south of Nellore,<sup>49</sup> Bukka's rule at Udayagiri must have commenced earlier. Nellore and probably also Udayagiri appear to have been in the possession of the Telugu Cōḍas. A Telugu verse addressed to Sangama II by an anonymous poet of his court enumerates the rulers of Nellore from the time of Tirukāḷa-dēva (i.e. Tikka I) to the accession of Sangama II. It is said that a certain Tikkana was the immediate predecessor of Sangama's father, Kampana I.<sup>49a</sup> Tikkana who is mentioned by the anonymous author of this verse seems to have been identical with the Telugu prince Tirukāḷarāja, whom Dāca the Velama lieutenant of the Kākatiya general Peda Rudra, installed on the throne of Nellore after expelling Śrīraṅganātha in 1321 A.D.<sup>50</sup> Bukka must have come into conflict with him and wrested from him the forts of Nellore and Udayagiri with the territories dependent on them.

Harihara seems to have made a successful attack on Ānegondi about this time, and captured it with the surrounding territory. Although the capture of the city is not directly alluded to in the inscriptions of the period, there is scarcely any room for doubt; for, the Kāpalūr and Yarraguḍi grants mention that in 1336 A.D. Kuñjarakōṇa (Ānegondi) was the capital of Harihara's kingdom.<sup>51</sup> This is confirmed by the evidence of Nuniz who refers to Nagundy (i.e., Ānegundi) as Harihara's capital before he laid the foundations

49. N.D.I., i, cp. 15

49a. See *ante*, p. 153.

50. JOR., xii, p. 203.

51. N.D.I., cp. 15; EC, x; Bg. 70.

of Vijayanagara.<sup>52</sup> The circumstances in which Ānegondi came into his possession are not known. The activities of Sōmadēva and his allies subsequent to their victories at Ānegondi, Mudkal, Rācūr and other places cannot be traced at present. It is not improbable that they came into conflict with Harihara and being worsted by him in the struggle were compelled to submit to his authority. Attention must be drawn in this connection to a fact of some importance which has remained so far unnoticed. Tāta Pinnama and Sōmadēva, the progenitors of the later Āraṇḍi kings, rose to prominence, it may be remembered, in the vicinity of Kurnool. The former overthrew the authority of the Ceṟuku chiefs who held the district under the Kākatiyas and the latter captured Kurnool besides several other forts in the neighbourhood; but the descendants of Sōmadēva left, if the testimony of their family chronicle preserved in the *Bālabhāgavatam* can be relied upon, the region round Kurnool, and retired to Āraṇḍi (i.e., Āraṇḍi-kōṭa) in the Cumbum taluk in the extreme east of the Kurnool district which was then included in the Redḍi kingdom of Addanki.<sup>53</sup> The causes which led to the retirement of Sōmadēva's descendants from the banks of the Tungabhadra to the upper valley of the Guṇḍlakammā in the Redḍi kingdom are not mentioned in the

52. Sewell, F.E., pp. 298-3

53. *Bhārati*, vi, p. 852. According to the *Rāmarājīyam*, however, Āraṇḍi was made his headquarters by Sōmadēva himself. (*Sources*, p. 82). The extent of the Redḍi territory in the west can be definitely ascertained from contemporary sources. It is seen from Yarrā Peggada's *Harivaṁśam* that Śrīśailam (Nandikotkur taluk) and Ahōbālam (Sirivel taluk) were included in the kingdom of Prōlaya Vēma. Several inscriptions of the early Redḍi kings are found at Śrīśailam and other places in the east of Kurnool district, whereas not a single record of Vijayanagara rulers prior to A.D. 1385 has been so far discovered. Therefore, the region corresponding to the Markapur, Cumbum taluks of the Kurnool district must have belonged to the Redḍis.

chronicle. Nevertheless it is not unlikely that their migration eastwards was due to some external pressure on their original home. As the territory around Kurnool passed into the hands of Harihara before 1339-40 A.D.,<sup>54</sup> it seems fairly certain that Sōma-dēva or his successor having been dislodged from his ancestral abode by Harihara moved towards the Redḍi frontier where he perhaps expected to remain without molestation.

Harihara successfully put down the rebellion in Kampili and fully justified the confidence which the Sulṭān had placed in him. Although he found, on his arrival from Dehli, that his authority was confined to a small area round about Gutti, he strove hard to extend its boundaries, and within a short period of three or four years built up with the help of his brother Bukka a kingdom extending from Hampi on the Tungabhadra to the Bay of Bengal and from the Kṛṣṇā to Candragiri.

54. L.R. 23, (*Aṭakalagundu*) pp. 52-3; *Mack Mss.* 15.5.33 (*Akumalla*), pp. 307-14.

## CHAPTER VIII

### NEW KINGDOMS

#### SECTION I

##### *Rebellion in Ma'bar*

While Harihara was still engaged in reducing Kampili to subjection, a serious rebellion broke out in Ma'bar in 1334-5 A.D.<sup>1</sup> Sayyid Jalāl-ud-Dīn whom according to Ibn Baṭūṭa, Muḥammad bin Tughlaq appointed governor of Ma'bar, stirred up a rebellion in the province. 'usurped the power, killed the lieutenants and agents of the sovereign, and struck coins of gold and silver in his own name.'<sup>2</sup> The political disorders in Southern Deccan and the failure of the imperial government to maintain their authority seem to have kindled the spark of ambition in his bosom and stimulated a desire in his mind to carve out for himself an independent Muslim kingdom in the South so as to enable him to keep aloft the banner of Islām and hold the infidels under subjection. The conditions were quite favourable for the successful prosecution of his designs. The Telugu country on his northern frontier was seething with rebellion and the authority of the Sultān had completely broken down. Discontent spread into the northern districts of his own province along the Telugu frontier where the Hindus began to manifest signs of restlessness. Ballāḷa III who repudiated his allegiance to the Sultān was actually camping at Kañcī with the officers of his army inciting the people probably to rise up in rebellion and make war

1. IC., v., p. 139.

2. Ibn Baṭūṭa, *Foreign Notices*, p. 217; Baranī, E. D. III, p. 243; 'Isāmy, *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 449.

on the Muhammadans.<sup>3</sup> If the Hindus were allowed to mature their schemes of rebellion without hindrance, the Muslim power would be completely swept away from the land before the incompetent government of the Sultān could devise measures for its protection. It was necessary to take immediate steps to uphold the supremacy of Islām. Sayyid Jalāl-ud-Dīn, the offspring of the Prophet, who proudly styles himself 'the father of fakirs and indigents, the glory of the world and of religion'<sup>4</sup> had, therefore, little hesitation in casting off the yoke of the heterodox Sultān and declaring his independence.

The news of the outbreak of the rebellion in Ma'bar reached the Sultān in his camp in the neighbourhood of Kanauj where he had gone to put down an insurrection of the people. On hearing this information, the Sultān did not immediately proceed to Ma'bar, as it is generally believed. He did not probably consider that the situation was grave enough to demand his presence. Therefore, he despatched an army to suppress the revolt and busied himself with the affairs of the Doab. Contrary to his expectations, the army sent to Ma'bar turned disloyal and joined the enemy.<sup>5</sup> As soon as the Sultān came to know of their treachery, he made up his mind to take the matter into his own hands and hastened to Dehli without loss of time. Having gathered together fresh forces, he set out at their head towards Ma'bar. When he arrived at Daulatābād, he halted there for some time and devoted himself to the reorganisation of the revenues of the province. He then resumed his journey and marched to Tiling which he intended to make the basis of his operations in the projected campaign against Ma'bar. Therefore, he broke his march on

3. 397; 401 of 1919.

4. Ibn Baṭūṭa, *Foreign Notices*, p. 218.

5. Baranī, E.D., III, p. 247.

arriving at the city of Warangal where he lay encamped for about two months gathering material necessary for the war.<sup>6</sup> The Sultān was obliged to abandon the campaign against Ma'bar and return to his capital owing to the intervention, as it were, of fate. About the time of his arrival a plague broke out in Warangal and a large number of its inhabitants were carried away. The contagion spread into the camp and decimated the troops. 'Iṣāmī gives a brief but graphic account of the pestilence.

A poisonous destructive wind blew over the city as a consequence of his inauspicious presence. Many people perished in the calamity and surrendered their souls to God; in every house several people who went to sleep lay dead (in their beds). The king was greatly perturbed by the disaster. He was himself afflicted by the disease and his mind was sorely distressed at the sight of disease and death. Nearly half of the officers of the Dehli army died; and the emperor retired from that city because he was himself in the agonies of death on account of that disease.<sup>7</sup>

6. The place where the Sultān was encamped while he was engaged in collecting war material cannot be fixed definitely owing to the divergent character of contemporary evidence. According to Baranī, the Sultān halted at Warangal. (E.D. III. p. 247); (bn Baṭūṭa asserts, on the other hand, that he 'encamped in the town of Badrakōṭ (Bīdar), capital of Tiling, three months march from Ma'bar'. (*Foreign Notices*, p. 218). Although the later Muslim historians follow the lead of the former, it is indeed difficult to decide, which of the two towns was the actual camping ground of the Sultān.

How the Sultān engaged himself during his stay in Tiling, 'Iṣāmī briefly relates in his *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 450.

رسید اندران بوم وبر ہ درنگ	وز انجا سپہ راند سوئے تلنگ
ہمی کرد تدبیر آن ہجر یار	مہرے یک دو آنجا پے کارزار
ابا فوج معبر شکست آورد	کہ اقلیم معبر بدست آورد

7. *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 450.

'Iṣāmy's testimony is confirmed by Ibn Baṭūṭa. He declares that a great part of the Sultān's army perished in the plague. 'The slaves and the mamelukes died as well as the chief *amīrs* like Malik Daulat Shāh.....and Amīr 'Abd-ul-lah-ul-Harvy."<sup>8</sup> The Sultān had, therefore, to give up the campaign against Ma'bar and order an immediate retreat; but before he left the city, he made fresh arrangements for the maintenance of his authority in Tiling, as he probably apprehended the outbreak of trouble after his departure. He appointed Malik Qabūl or Maqbūl, the deputy Vazīr, the governor of Tiling, and having left him at Warangal with a contingent of forces to govern the country, he returned to Daulatābād<sup>9</sup>, where he remained for a short time undergoing treatment.

8. *Foreign Notices*, p. 218.

9. The identity of the officer whom the Sultān left at Warangal as his deputy is involved in doubt; for, Ferishta states that the person appointed by the Sultān was 'Imād-ul-Mulk and not Maqbūl. As far as one can judge from the available sources, 'Imād-ul-Mulk appears to have been the title of Malik Sartiz who died later in a battle with Zafar Khān at Sindhatan on the Gōdāvarī. Malik Maqbūl or Maqbūl was the title conferred by Ulugh Khān on the Tilingī convert Kattū or Kannū who embraced Islām on the death of Pratāpurudra (E.D. III. p. 367).

Yāhyā bin Ahmad, the only writer who describes the titles conferred by Muḥammad bin Tughlaq on his nobles at the time of his accession to the throne gives the following account. "Malik Qabūl became Malik Kabīr, Malik Sarteer became 'Imād-ul-Mulk; and Malik Maqbūl became Kawam-ul-Mulk" (*Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* G.O.S., lxiii p. 99). Ishvari Prasad however asserts that Malik Maqbūl or Qabūl became Vazīr-i-mamālik under the distinguished title of Imād-ul-mulk. The province of Gujarāt was entrusted to Malik Maqbūl who was elevated to the rank of Khān-i-Jahān. (*Qarauna Turks*, I. p. 63). It is not known whether Malik Maqbūl 'Imād-ul-Mulk was identical with Malik Maqbūl Khān-i-Jahān. Unfortunately Ishvari Prasad does not mention the source from which he has drawn this information.

It was at this time that he detached Bidar with its surrounding country from Telingāṇa and having constituted it into a new province, placed it under Shihāh Sultān on whom he conferred the title of Nuṣrat Khān.<sup>10</sup> The Sultān was not inclined to prolong his stay in Deccan owing to disorders that broke out in different parts of the realm. He set out after a stay of one month, from Daulatābād and proceeded to Delhi by way of Mālwa.<sup>11</sup>

## SECTION 2

### *The Hindu rebellion in Deccan*

The calamity which overtook the Sultān's army at Warangal was, indeed, far-reaching in its effects. The destruction of a large part of the royal army reduced the military strength of the Sultān; the abandonment of the campaign against Ma'bar lowered his prestige; and the false rumour of his death in the plague which spread like wild fire all over the empire snapped asunder the slender bonds of loyalty which bound the people to the throne. Ibn Baṭūṭa who was in Delhi at this time briefly describes the consequences of the disaster. "The provinces revolted, anarchy reigned in the country, and little was needed for power to slip from his hands."<sup>12</sup> Dec-

10. Baranī states (E.D. III. p. 244) that Qutluḡ Khān was also entrusted at this time with the administration of Marhaṭṭa. There is, however, good reason to believe that Qutluḡ Khān was the governor of Marhaṭṭa even before the Ma'bar rebellion. According to 'Isāmy, it was Qutluḡ Khān who sent a messenger to the Sultān while he was returning from Warangal informing him that Malik Hoshang had revolted. (*Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 450).

11. *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, p. 451.

یکے مہار در دولت آباد ماند      دگر روز در سمیت دہلی براند

12. Ibn Baṭūṭa, *Travels*, Defrémery and Sanguinetti iii, pp. 333-4, (I am obliged to Miss K. M. Soumini, M.A., M.Litt, a former research student in the department for translating this passage from the French for my use). Cf. *Foreign Notices*, p. 219.

can which was the scene of the disaster was affected more profoundly than the other parts of the empire. The Muslim nobles as well as the Hindu chiefs hastily shook off the yoke of Dehli and proclaimed their independence. The first attempt to overthrow the Sultān's authority was made by Malik Hoshang who seems to have held a fief in the neighbourhood of Daulatābād.<sup>13</sup> He rose in revolt as soon as the false rumour of the Sultān's death in Tiling reached his ears; but he soon discovered his mistake; and apprehending danger he fled in alarm to Badahra, a hill-fort whose situation remains still unidentified, and besought the protection of its Hindu ruler.<sup>14</sup> On

13. Ibid pp. 335-36; *Foreign Notices*, p. 326.

It is doubtful whether Malik Hoshang rebelled against the Sultān though 'Isāmy states explicitly that he did so

بگو گاه جهانگیر فیروز جنگ شد که برگشت از شمشیر  
*Futūh-us-Salātīn*, p. 450.

Ibn Batūṭa, however, declares that on hearing the rumour of the death of the Sultān Hoshang fled from Daulatābād to Konkan. If this were true, Hoshang could not have risen in rebellion against the Sultān whom he believed to have been dead. His flight from Daulatābād must have been due to his fear of some one whom perhaps he expected to succeed the Sultān.

In some of the modern works on the history of the Tughlaq Sultāns, it is stated that Malik Hoshang was the governor of Daulatābād (See Ishvari Prasad, *Qarauna Turks*, I. p. 148; Agha Mahdi Husain, *the Rise and Fall of Muḥammad Bin Tughluq*, p. 161). This is not based on facts. Ibn Batūṭa on whose authority this statement is evidently made states simply that Hoshang was, at the time of his rebellion, in Daulatābād (*Travels*, Defremery and Sanguinatti, III. p. 335-6). As a matter of fact, it was Qutluḡ Khān who was the governor of the place at that time, (Isāmy: *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, p. 450).

14. *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, p. 450.

ز اقصاء اقلیم عطف کرد بکوه بد سرا شد آن سست مراد

The British Museum Ms. has Badasra. Ibn Batūṭa, however, does not mention the name of the fort; he places it somewhere in the hills between

obtaining the intelligence of the insurrection, the Sultān, who was proceeding by easy stages to Daulatābād in a litter, marched to Badahra and demanded that Hōshang should be handed over to him. The Hindu prince who was a man of honour refused to comply with the Sultān's demand and defied him to do his worst. It is difficult to imagine what steps the Sultān would have taken to enforce obedience to his commands, had not Hoshang lost courage and fled suddenly to Konkan. The Sultān showed no inclination to continue the hostilities against Badahra, and leaving the insolent Hindu prince who deserved severe chastisement for his misdemeanour unpunished, he resumed his journey to Daulatābād where he soon got reconciled with Hoshang, through the instrumentality of Qutlugh Khān, the governor of Marhatta.

The rebellion of Malik Hoshang, brief and ineffectual as it was, reveals the extent to which the Sultān's power was reduced. A petty Hindu chief, at best the master of a mountain stronghold, dared to defy the Sultān in person, and yet was allowed to go with impunity. The conduct of the prince of Badahra was symptomatic of the general attitude of the Hindus towards the imperial government. The hateful tyranny which had been grinding them for years began to betray signs of approaching breakdown. They should bestir themselves and concert measures to precipitate its downfall. They remained long under the spell of the nightmare and it was time that they made an attempt to shake off the morbid influence which cramped their spirits. Hindu society was in a state of ferment and the leaders of the community were busy formulating schemes

Daulatābād and Konkan and calls its Hindu ruler Burabrah. (*Travels*, Defrémery and Sanguinetti, iii. p. 335-6). 'Isāmy's account is perhaps more authentic, as he had better facilities of obtaining accurate information about the incidents that occurred in Daulatābād and its neighbourhood than Ibn Batūta. It may be remembered that 'Isāmy was at this time residing in Daulatābād.

for the expulsion of the *mlecchas* and the revival of the ancient *dharma*.

The Hindus of Tiling who partially succeeded in recovering their freedom naturally took the lead. Prōlaya Nāyaka, their leader, was probably dead by this time; and he was succeeded by his cousin Kāpaya Nāyaka, a man of keen insight and great ability. Kāpaya Nāyaka, like most of his contemporaries, knew that the Tughlaq imperialism was at an end; and that the time was propitious to make an earnest attempt to restore the Hindu supremacy; but unlike others, he clearly saw that the task was not easy of accomplishment due to the presence of large bodies of Mussalmans in the land. The *amīrs* and *grandeės* who settled down with their dependents and slaves in the country; the foreign merchants and adventurers who followed the Dehli armies to Deccan in search of fortune or employment; and the large community of Hindu converts who embraced Islām owing to fear, conviction, or considerations of political advancement were not expected to remain idle and suffer the Hindus to win back their freedom. Notwithstanding their mutual jealousies and distrust of the Sultān and his government, they might, in the face of common danger, join together and obstruct the progress of the Hindu restoration. To neutralise their strength and overcome their opposition Kāpaya conceived the idea of uniting the Hindus of the South into a pan-Hindu federation. It was not, however, possible to give material shape to the idea without the active co-operation of the other Hindu leaders, specially Ballāla III, the most powerful of the Southern Hindu kings who still managed to keep himself upon the throne. If Kāpaya could persuade Ballāla to join hands with him, the other Hindu princes might be expected to lend him support without hesitation. The military position of the Hindus would be immensely strengthened and their chances of success against the Mussalmans greatly multiplied. Therefore, Kāpaya paid secretly a visit to Dwārasamudra and explained in person to Ballāla the object of his mission. Ferishta gives an account of what took place at Dwārasamudra during this visit.

"At this time," says Ferishta, 'Kishn Nāyak (Kanbā Nāyak),<sup>15</sup> son of Laddar Dēv, who was in the neighbourhood of Warangal, went alone to Ballāl Dēv who was the great king of Karnāṭak and said "the Mussalmans having entered the countries of Tiling and Karnāṭak entertain the idea that they should extirpate us once for all; this matter demands anxious consideration.' Ballāl Dēv summoned the grandees of his kingdom, and asked their advice. After deep deliberation and careful examination they decided that Ballāl Dēv, leaving all his dominions behind, should make the frontier of his kingdom in the path of the armies of Islām his capital, and liberate Ma'bar, Kampila and Dhōrsamand from the power of the Mussalmans; and likewise Kishn Nāyak (Kanbā Nāyak) should seize Warangal at this time which was suitable for wresting it from the possession of the court of Dehli."<sup>16</sup>

Ballāla accepted the advice of his councillors, and having given a solemn undertaking to Kishn Nāyak that he would co-operate with him in his enterprise, sent him back to his country. He then proceeded to concert measures for implementing the terms of the agreement.

'Ballāl Dēv,' according to Ferishta, 'built in an inaccessible place in the hilly tract on his frontier a city in the name of his son, Sajan Rāy<sup>17</sup> which came to be known as Bijan Nagar; and in course of time, on account of frequent usage it was changed into Bijānagar. A large body of horse and foot having followed Kishn Nāyak, (Kanbā Nāyak) he captured Warangal at first. The Vazīr Malik 'Imād-ul-Mulk came fleeing to Daultābād (Dehli). Afterwards, Ballāl Dēv having given assistance to Kishn Nāyak (Kanbā Nāyak) they dragged out of the clutches of the Mussalmans from both sides

15. RASB. Ms No.D. 57.

16. *Tārīkh-i-Ferishta*, (Naval Kishore Press), p. 138.

17. Sajan Rāy appears to be a scribal error for Bijan Rāy.

the kings of Ma'bar and Dhōrasamand who from ancient times were the tributaries to the kings of Karnāṭak.<sup>18</sup>

The account of Ferishta is not quite genuine; for the accuracy of some of his facts is not beyond dispute. In the first place, the date which he assigns to the outbreak of this rebellion is much later than the actual time of its occurrence. As a matter of fact, a comparison with contemporary histories reveals that the rebellion in Tiling broke out actually in 737 A.H., some seven years earlier than the date suggested by Ferishta.<sup>19</sup> Secondly, the name of the leader of the Tilingi rebels was not Kishn (Kanbā) Nāyak, as stated by Ferishta, but Kāpaya Nāyak; nor was he, as pointed out already, a son of Laddar Dēv or Pratāparudra. Thirdly, Ballāl Dēv, i.e., Ballāla III was not the erstwhile overlord of Dhōrasamand, but the king of Dhorsamand itself, a fact which Ferishta does not seem to have been aware of. Otherwise, he would not have made Ballāla his own tributary. Lastly, Ballāla had no son of the name of Sajan or Bījan Rāy; nor had he any connection with the foundation of Vijayanagara.<sup>20</sup> However, Ferishta's narrative despite its inaccu-

18. *Tārīkh-i-Ferishta*, (Naval Kishore Press), p. 138.

19. IC. V. pp. 268-9 cf. Agha Mahdi Husain, *Rise and Fall of Muḥammad Bin Tughluq*, p. 162.

20. The evidence of Ferishta is not trustworthy; for he appears to have incorporated into his history without discrimination any story about the foundation of the city which reached his ears. At the end of his work he narrates a story which differs considerably from the one that attributes the foundation to Ballāla III. "The other most powerful Rāja of Hindustan" says he, "is the Rāja of Karnāṭak in the Deccan. One of the kings of that place Bijay Jayachand who was on the throne of the kingdom 900 years before this, in as much as he caused the city of Bījānagar to be built, made it famous by his own name. His descendants knowing it to be auspicious took considerable trouble in making it prosperous so that the inhabited area of that city reached seven miles. The first person who rebelled in Hindustan and gave

racies and false statements is not entirely fictitious; for, as pointed out in an earlier context, it embodies the kernel of truth which demands close consideration. The rebellion in Ma'bar and Kampila and the replacement of the Muslim power by the Hindu authority lend support to Ferishta's narrative. The king of Ma'bar who formerly paid tribute to the Rāyas of Karnāṭak was very probably the Śambuvārāya, for the northern districts of Ma'bar, specially Chingleput, North Arcot and South Arcot were subjected to the authority of the Śambuvārāyas about this time; and Ekāmrānātha, one of the chiefs who flourished at this time<sup>21</sup> appears to have expelled the Muhammadans from the country and assumed, in commemoration of his victory, the title of *Veṅṛuman-koṇḍān* or 'he who took the earth by conquest.'<sup>22</sup> As the 17th regnal year of *Veṅṛuman-koṇḍān* corresponds with Ś. 1260 (1338 A.D.), he seems to have ascended the throne in 1321-22 A.D.<sup>23</sup> However, no traces of his rule are found in any part of the country before his 14th regnal year (1335-36 A.D.), though from that time his records run up in a series until his 18th regnal year (1339-40 A.D.).<sup>24</sup> Evidently, *Veṅṛuman-koṇḍān* had little or no power during the first thirteen years of his

currency to sedition and mutiny against the Rāy of the kingdom of Kanauj was the ancestor of the Rāyas of Karnāṭak. So it has been described. Mahārāja who was his contemporary went on an expedition, expelled Subavarāy, the ruler of the Deccan; and his descendants held the sovereignty from generation to generation until the time when the king of the name of Rāmraj who having waged war in 970 A.H. with the rulers of the Deccan was slain by them"—*Tarikh-i-Ferishta*, (Naval Kishore Press), Part II p. 420.

21. A.R.E., 33 of 1933-4.

22. *Ibid*, 1924, Pt. ii, papra 27.

23. *Ibid*, 29 of 1933-4.

24. *Ibid*, 46 of 1900; 435 of 1903; 42, 48 of 1921; 499 of 1926; 398 of 1928-29; 89 of 1932-33; 29, 33 of 1933-34; S.I.I., I. No. 77.

reign, a fact which must be attributed to the Muslim occupation of the country. It may be remembered in this connection that Ma'bar was conquered by Ulugh Khān in 1323 A.D.; and that it formed an integral part of the Dehli Empire up to the outbreak of Sayyid Jalāl-ud-Dīn's rebellion in 1334-5 A.D. The Muhammadan invasion, and the consequent destruction of the Hindu temples and the devastation of the country-side are, in fact, alluded to as events that had taken place just before that time in the earliest of Veṅṇuman-koṇḍān's inscriptions.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, it may be reasonably assumed that Ekāmranātha Śambuvarāya, reconquered the country from the Mussalmans. The presence of Ballāla III in 1334-5 A.D. at Conjeevaram, the capital of Śambuvarāya, definitely indicates the existence of friendship between them;<sup>26</sup> and it is not at all unlikely that the latter received some help, as suggested by Ferishta, from Ballāla in his war against the Mussalmans.

Kampili, another province which, according to Ferishta, Ballāla III and Kishn (Kanbā) i.e., Kāpaya Nāyak intended to liberate from the Muslim authority obtained its freedom at the same time. Although Ferishta records the decision of the Hindu leaders to help the people of Kampili to win back their freedom, he does not state whether they actually carried it into effect. This was probably due to the attitude of the governor of Kampili which rendered outside intervention superfluous. The governor whom Sultān Muḥammad had appointed apostatized, as stated by Baranī, from Islām and declared his independence.<sup>27</sup> There is thus considerable truth in Ferishta's account; and notwithstanding the numerous inaccuracies which cast the shadow of doubt on its genuine-

25. A.R.E., 434 of 1903.

26. *Ibid.*, 401 of 1919.

27. *Tārīkh-i-Firūz Shāhi*, Madras Government Or. Mss. Library D. No. 298.

ness, it is impossible to ignore its value and reject altogether the information which it furnishes.

The events connected with the Hindu rebellion mentioned by Ferishta may now be considered in greater detail in the light of the meagre information that is available for examination at present. The first step which Ballāla is said to have taken was to shift his capital to an inaccessible place on his northern frontier in order to bar the path of the Muslim armies. This is not improbable, as an attack from Daulatābād might be reasonably expected in the circumstances. Qutluḡ Khān, the governor of Marhaṭṭa was not likely to remain idle watching the rebellious activities of the Southern Hindus without making an attempt to suppress them and restore the authority of the imperial government. Therefore, it was not at all unlikely that Ballāla should have temporarily shifted his residence to the Muslim frontier to provide against the eventuality of an attack from the north. The statement that, on this occasion, he laid the foundations of a new city, not to speak of Vijayanagara, must, however, be rejected as totally false, as it is contradicted by the available contemporary evidence.

As soon as Ballāla strengthened his northern frontiers and secured it against Muslim invasion, he seems to have sent an auxiliary force to the assistance of Kāpaya Nāyaka for liberating Telin-gāna. What happened after this is not on record. Baranī contents himself by summing up laconically the final result of the revolt and Ferishta adds but little to increase the stock of information. Malik Maqbūl who had to face immense odds suffered defeat; and finding that he could do little against the Hindus, he abandoned Warangal and fled precipitately to Daulatābād.

The fall of Warangal was immediately followed by the outbreak of revolt in Kampili. Baranī and Ferishta both refer, as noticed already, to the simultaneous outbreak of rebellions in Tiling and Kampili and the overthrow of Muslim government. Moreover, the former declares explicitly that the relation of Kampila who rose

up in revolt had seized Kampili.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, it is certain that Harihara, on hearing of the final defeat of the Mussalmans in Tiling and the re-establishment of Hindu government in Warangal under Kāpaya Nāyak, picked up courage, renounced Islām and having re-entered the Hindu fold he declared his independence. To celebrate the victory over his enemies and the restoration of the country to the Hindus, he laid the foundation of a new city on the southern bank of the Tungabhadra opposite to his capital Kuñjarakōṇa (Ānegundi) and gave it the appropriate name of Vijayanagara. He also celebrated his coronation, according to the ritual prescribed in the *śāstras* on 18th April 1336 A.D., in the presence of God Virūpākṣa at Hampi.<sup>29</sup>

Hindu leaders had accomplished successfully a great part of their task by liberation of Tiling and Karpāṭa; but Ma'bar was still under Muslim rule. Sayyid Jalāl-ud-Dīn who declared his independence at Madura, as stated earlier, in 1334-5 A.D. was expected to take necessary steps to consolidate his power now that the fear of an invasion from Dehli was completely set at rest. If they were earnestly desirous of liberating Ma'bar, they had to strike at once and recover the country before he could establish himself firmly. Therefore, Ekāṃranātha Śambavarāya rose up against the Mussalmans, and managed to mop up, with the help of Ballāla III and Kāpaya Nāyaka, the Muhammadan settlements in the northern districts of the country (i.e., Tonḍaimaṇḍalam). Ferishta's statements that Ballāla and Kishn (Kāpaya) Nāyaka drew the king of Ma'bar from both sides out of Muslim control

28. *Tārīkh-i-Firūz Shāhī*, Madras Govt. Or. Mss. Library, D. No. 298.

Cf. *Tārīkh-i-Ferishta*, (RASB. D. 57).

و عرصہ کنبلا ہم از دست رفت و بدست هندوان افتاد ،  
و همان سرکد انرا فرو گرفته .

29. NDI, I. cp. 15. Sewell: *Hist. Insc.*, p. 185.

seems to suggest that the Hindu authority was re-established over the whole of Ma'bar. This is, however, not true; for the whole of the lower Kāvērī valley, and the coastal region extending perhaps as far as the island of Rāmēśvaram remained in the possession of Sayyid Jalāl-ud-Dīn and his successors, until they were finally subdued by Kumāra Kampana thirty-five years later. The liberation of Ma'bar was, therefore, only partial; and notwithstanding the continuous efforts of Ballāla during the remaining years of his life, he did not succeed in overcoming the Muslim resistance. Though certain parts of the peninsula, like Ma'bar still remained in the hands of the Muhammadans, the power of the Tughlaq Sultāns was completely broken, and they lost all their territories in the Deccan with the exception of Marhaṭṭa. New Hindu kingdoms had come into existence and the political geography had undergone a change, and the stage was thus readjusted for the enactment of the next scene in the political drama of the country.

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